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ABSTRACT
BECOMING A GOOD NEIGHBOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CASE OF CHINA’S
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 1989 - 2006.
Dirk Richard Morton
Old Dominion University, 2007
Director: Dr. Jie Chen
Since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and the
ASEAN states following the end of the Cold War, Sino-ASEAN relations have widened
and deepened considerably. This is surprising, considering that most ASEAN states
viewed China as a revisionist power and threat to regional security during the Cold War
and Vietnam and the Philippines have a history of armed conflict with China over as-ofyet unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Given the withdrawal of
American military forces from the Philippines in 1992 and the steady growth of Chinese
economic and military power, one might expect ASEAN’s traditionally-held threat per
ceptions of China to continue or even increase. This, however, is not the case as China
is viewed increasingly in Southeast Asia as a cooperative, responsible “good neighbor”
and Sino-ASEAN relations continue to deepen. This study argues that a reorientation of
Chinese regional foreign policy is the principal force responsible for these surprising turn
of events, and that ideational factors supervened structural factors in inducing this reori
entation. Through a historical analysis within a social constructivist theoretical frame
work of arguably the most contentious issue in Sino-ASEAN relations, this study con
cludes that China’s cognitive base was changed as a result of “complex” social learning
induced by increased diplomatic interaction with ASEAN which, in turn, led to Beijing’s
successful “good neighbor” diplomacy and the subsequent emergence of China’s new
“post-Cold War” identity in Southeast Asia and beyond.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Chinese foreign policy has undergone considerable change since the end of the
Cold War, especially so in Southeast Asia. This transition in Beijing’s approach to rela
tions with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)1and member states is
responsible, to a large degree, for the rapid improvement and deepening of the relation
ship that began during the mid-to-late 1990s, and continues today. As of 2006, China’s
relations with ASEAN and member states have never been better. Trade and economic
relations between China and the Southeast Asian countries have increased greatly, and
will continue to do so in light of the agreement reached in 2001 to establish a ChinaASEAN Free Trade Area, in effect merging the economies of China and the ASEAN
states to create a huge trading block in Asia estimated to have a combined population of
two billion and collective GDP of $3 trillion by 2010.2 Some analysts of Chinese foreign
policy argue that current friendly relations between China and the ASEAN states are the
result of a change in China’s approach to Sino-ASEAN relations initiated during the mid1990s. Various labels are used to describe this innovative approach, such as China’s
“smiling diplomacy,” ’’charm offensive ”or “ good neighbor” diplomacy (GND). What

This dissertation follows the format requirements o f The Chicago Manual o f Style, 15th edition.
1ASEAN is comprised of ten member states: Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Indonesia; Laos; Malaysia;
Myanmar; the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Vietnam.
2 John McBeth, “Taking the Helm,” Far Eastern Economic Review 16 (October 2003).
3 See Andrew J. Nathan, “China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait,” China Journal 36 (July 1996): 87-93; An
drew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997); Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, A sia’s China De
bate: A Special Assessment (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003); and David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter
2004/05): 64-99, respectively.
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ever the label, Beijing’s diplomatic approach dining the last decade in the region is predi
cated on reassuring the ASEAN states that China’s rise need not be feared —that no
“China threat” exists. Beijing would rather have the ASEAN states view the rise of
China as an opportunity for mutual economic benefit as well as the development of a
stronger regional Asian position vis-a-vis the United States.
Considerable evidence exists that Beijing’s GND has already succeeded in lessen
ing perceptions in Southeast Asia of a China “threat.” Witness the PRC’s actions during
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when Beijing made repeated assurances that China would
not devalue the renminbi to maintain the competitiveness of its exports. Even as China’s
economy slowed the following year, Beijing reiterated its pledge against devaluing
China’s currency and gained important recognition for doing so from the international
community.4 Even after the crisis had passed, Beijing continued to resist revaluation of
the renminbi as late as 2003, when Chinese premier Wen Jiabao pointed out to the inter
national community that “[T]he Chinese government has always held a serious and re
sponsible attitude towards the [currency] issue,” and that China’s actions had “contrib
uted to the stability of the economy and financial well being of the region and the
world.”5 Since then, China and the ASEAN states deepened their economic interdepend
ence through the implementation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in
2005. Improvement in other areas of PRC-ASEAN relations, such as increases in aca
demic and professional exchanges, bi-directional tourism, and the growth of cultural

4 Both British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Chirac praised Beijing’s responsible behav
ior during the Asian financial crisis, describing the PRC as “a pillar o f stability and responsible behavior.”
See “Blair Looks to Profit in Beijing,” South China Morning Post, 6 October 1998.
5 “Stable RMB Exchange Rate Benefits World Economy: Premier Wen,” People's Daily Online, 7 August
2003 (accessed 15 June 2006).
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exchange programs can also be observed as further evidence that Beijing’s GND has im
proved China’s national image in Southeast Asia.
This turn of events in Southeast Asia is surprising for several reasons. First,
China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries during the Cold War were, for the most
part, antagonistic and confrontational. As elaborated in the following chapter, China has
historically been perceived in Southeast Asia as a threat. In fact, ASEAN was established
in 1967 partly to oppose the expansion of Chinese power. Second, as discussed in the
following two chapters, just a decade ago China’s territorial disputes in the South China
Sea with several Southeast Asian states (Figure 1) were moving the region closer to con
flict.6 Aggressive actions and provocative statements by Beijing during the late 1980s
and early 1990s in support of China’s claim of “inviolable” territorial sovereignty over
the Paracel and Spratly Islands and most of the South China Sea, for that matter
(Figure 2), reinforced and increased perceptions in Southeast Asia of a “China threat.”
Third, China’s military modernization initiated during the 1980s (especially in areas re
lated to power projection capabilities) increased concerns in the region and beyond that a
rising China would have a destabilizing influence in Asia. China’s military moderniza
tion campaign continued unabatedly through the 1990s, and presently shows no sign of
slowing its pace. The “China threat” thesis, especially as expounded by the second Bush

6 China has territorial disputes with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes, with the Philip
pines over the Spratlys and adjacent areas, with Malaysia and Brunei in the Spratlys, and with Indonesia
near the Pratas Islands. While these disputes have engendered much tension between China and the
ASEAN states, armed conflict has been limited to China’s disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. As
such, Hanoi and Manila historically viewed themselves as “frontline” states facing Chinese expansion into
the region.
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Conflicting Territorial Claims in the South China Sea.
Source: The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas o f South East Asia
(St. Martin’s Press, 2006).
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Administration, appeared therefore to be confirmed by Beijing’s aggressive attitude and
brash actions regarding the South China Sea disputes. From the vantage point of South
east Asia then, the American military withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992 combined
with the PRC’s military modernization and truculent attitude vis-a-vis the territorial dis
putes in the South China Sea reinforced historic perceptions of a China threat.
Given these conditions and perceptions, mainstream realist theory suggests that
the smaller and weaker ASEAN states —especially those contesting Beijing’s territorial
claims in the South China Sea such as Vietnam and the Philippines —should view China
as a rising threat. Realism predicts that states either join with or balance against rising
powers or threats. As such, the ASEAN states should be expected to either balance
against rising Chinese power through defensive alliances with other states (the United
States being the most likely balancer) or bandwagon with the rising regional power. Yet
the ASEAN states have chosen neither strategy, suggesting that their approach in dealing
with the rise of China is not founded solely upon power or threat considerations. In spite
of the China threat thesis and its regional manifestation in the form of the South China
Sea disputes, Sino-ASEAN relations since the mid-to-late 1990s have improved to the
point that both sides now discuss the establishment of a “security community” to com
plement the economic integration already underway.
While the above evidence supports the assertion that Beijing’s GND has im
proved Sino-ASEAN relations by promoting an image of China as a “friend” and a “good
neighbor,” some may question whether this test of the GND thesis is indeed rigorous
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enough. This study therefore seeks answers to several important questions concerning
China’s GND in Southeast Asia. First, what are the underlying motivations behind
China’s GND in the region, and to what extent has social learning resulting from diplo
matic interaction with the ASEAN states impacted Beijing’s evolving application of
China’s good neighbor diplomacy? Second, how successful has Beijing’s approach to
relations with the ASEAN states been in mitigating regional fears of a “China threat” and
in improving Sino-ASEAN relations? And lastly, can Beijing’s GND find relevance and
utility in China’s relations with other regional powers such as Japan, India, and Australia
—as well as with Beijing’s strained but vitally important relationship with the United
States? To answer these questions, a historical approach within a social constructivist
theoretical framework is undertaken to (1) identify and explain the causes of change in
China’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War by examining the
case of China’s policy toward the South China Sea disputes with the Philippines, Viet
nam, and with ASEAN as a group; and (2) study the effects of such change on SinoASEAN relations by examining the change in Southeast Asian perceptions of China as a
regional and global power.
As discussed in greater detail below and in subsequent chapters, realist theory
falls short in explaining this turn of events in Sino-ASEAN relations because of its my
opic focus on material power distribution and associated threat perceptions, while at the
same time liberal institutionalist theory also misses the mark because its focus on the
constraining effects of institutions on actor behavior is undertaken within the same nar
row conception of anarchy utilized by realism. In addition, both schools of thought fall
7 1 define Beijing’s GND as a foreign policy strategy premised upon portraying China as a cooperative,
responsible, and friendly “good neighbor” in Southeast Asia aimed at dismissing the “China threat” thesis
and improving Sino-ASEAN relations.
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short in their analyses of recent Sino-ASEAN relations because they do not allow actor
identity and interests to be endogenously given. Therefore, in order to fully understand
and appreciate the recent and remarkable about-face in Sino-ASEAN relations, a different
theoretical model is needed. Because the “China threat” debate associated with the rise
of Chinese economic and military power is intimately related to this study’s analytical
approach, a brief review of the relevant literature follows.
CURRENT DEBATE ON CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY
Considerable theoretical debate has taken place concerning the implications of
China’s rapidly increasing economic and military power on the international system, and
the debate continues. As discussed below, realism believes that China’s rise to great
power status in Asia represents a growing threat to the US-led international order, while
liberal institutionalism believes that the rise of China can occur less dramatically as
China becomes “socialized” through its participation in international institutions and re
gimes and is transformed into a status quo power. A third approach which focuses on the
social construction of identity and interest and its effect on state behavior challenges
some basic assumptions made by mainstream IR theory. The constructivist approach,
unlike realism and liberal institutionalism, does not assume that actor identity and inter
ests are exogenously given. Instead, actor identity and interest formation is viewed as an
ongoing endogenous process in which identity and interests can change through social
interaction at the international level. Constructivism makes another point of departure
from mainstream IR theory in that it rejects the narrow, self-help definition of anarchy
shared by the realist and liberal schools.
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China as a Rising Threat
Proponents of the “China threat” thesis believe that China is rapidly becoming a
threat to the stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region, if not the world. They sup
port their predictions by citing the spectacular rise in the PRC’s economic strength which
allows Beijing substantial leverage in the global economy, and by pointing to Chinese
efforts at modernizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and seeking power projection
capabilities in Asia. One of the most widely known works in Realist literature represent
ing the “China threat” school is Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Monroe’s book, The
Coming Conflict with China. The authors contend that the leadership in China has been
working towards a goal of domination over Asia by a four-pronged strategy based on ac
quiring sovereignty over Taiwan, expanding Chinese power projection capabilities and
military presence in the South China Sea, seeking a reduction in American military pres
ence in East Asia (excepting Japan), and tolerating a high American military presence to
o

prevent Tokyo from rearming and becoming more assertive in Asian affairs. While
Bernstein and Monroe’s rather pessimistic analysis of the strategic implications of
China’s rise is quite foreboding, other analyses are even more dubious of Chinese inten
tions and conclude that Chinese foreign policy represents some sort of sinister plot for
world domination.9 These and other analyses that posit a growing China threat are theo

8 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Monroe, The Coming Conflict with China (Vintage: Reprint edition,
1998).
Q
Examples of these rather Manichean points o f view are Constantine C. Menges, China: The Gathering
Threat (Nelson Current, 2005), and Arthur Waldron, “Why China Could be Dangerous,” American Enter
prise 9, no. 4 (July-August 1998): 40-45. Menges argues that the U.S. and China could be headed toward a
nuclear face-off within four years. The thesis o f Menges’ study is that China is pursuing a systematic strat
egy to gain geopolitical and economic supremacy in Asia first, and then possibly globally, within the next
two decades. Menges cites as evidence China's secret alliance with Russia, the PRC’s growing military
power and nuclear threat, and the damage to the US economy caused by the PRC’s trade tactics. Further,
Menges asserts that China and Russia have been responsible for weaponizing terrorists hostile to American
interests. Waldron’s argument is similar, but founded upon a more balanced (yet still quite skeptical)
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retically based upon “balance of power” theory and represent various variations of the
realist approach premised on power considerations (material power, mostly defined in
military or economic terms) and a zero-sum, “self-help” conception of anarchy at the sys
temic level.10 Other realist approaches are modeled on Stephan Walt’s “balance of threat”
theory premised upon perceptions of threat (rather than distributions of power) as evalu
ated through the lens of human cognition, which represents an attempt in the realist pro
ject to incorporate ideational factors into realist structural theories.11 There are, however,
some realist studies which do not conclude that China’s rise necessarily constitutes a
analysis o f Chinese intentions. Waldron argues that “China seeks to combine targeted military capabilities
with diplomatic and economic measures in order to weaken American presence and resolve in Asia.” Also
see Waldron’s testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Arthur Waldron,
“U.S. China Relations: Status o f Reforms in China, ” Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Af
fairs, 22 April 2004.
10 John J. Mearsheimer’s work serves to exemplify these sorts o f analyses. In The Tragedy o f Great Power
Politics, Mearsheimer argues “[t]he great powers seek to maximize their share o f world power" because
"having dominant power is the best means to ensure one's own survival," and warning “against putting too
much faith in the goodwill o f other countries." Mearsheimer believes that by trying to make China wealthy
and democratic via engagement will only make it a stronger rival. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f
Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002). Robert Gilpin argues in War and Change in
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Reprint edition, 1983) that differential growth of
power in the international system and the result o f this unevenness causes a shift in the balance o f power
(defined in economic or military terms) weakens the basis o f the existing system as those actors gaining
power see increasing benefits and the decreasing costs o f changing the system. Actors, therefore, seek to
alter the system through territorial, political, or economic expansion until the marginal costs o f continuing
change are greater than the marginal benefits. When states develop the power to change the system accord
ing to their interests, Gilpin maintains they will strive to do so. Another example o f such analyses is Mi
chael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (The
RAND Corporation; 2000), in which they argue that Chinese history, the behavior o f earlier rising powers,
and the basic structure and logic o f international power relations suggest that a strong China will likely
become more assertive globally, beginning in 2015-2020 at the earliest. The United States, they argue,
should adopt a policy o f realistic engagement with China that combines efforts of cooperation whenever
possible; and, if necessary, preventing Chinese acquisition of capabilities that would threaten US national
security interests and remaining prepared to cope with the consequences o f a more assertive Chinese for
eign policy. Other analyses o f this type are routinely generated by the RAND Corporation and other think
tanks funded by the U.S. Department o f Defense, such as, Mark Buries, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and
the Central Asian Republics, (MR-1045-AF, 1999); Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky, Daniel L.
Byman, Roger Cliff, David T. Orletsky, David Shlapak, and Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and a Ris
ing China: Strategic and Military Implications (MR-1082-AF, 1999); Mark Buries and Abram N. Shulsky,
in Patterns in China's Use o f Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (MR-1160-AF, 2000).
These publications are part of a project conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program o f Project AIR
FORCE sponsored by the Deputy Chief o f Staff or Air and Space Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
(AF/XO),and the Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force
(AF/XOI).
11 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance o f Power,” International Security 9
(1985): 3-43. and The Origin o f Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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threat to regional order. 12 Nonetheless, the realist approach over determines threat while
at the same time under determines change.
A “Socialized” China
Authorities on the other side of the “China threat” debate interpret China’s rise to
great power status in less ominous terms. In general, these neo-liberal scholars and ana
lysts believe that China can be “socialized” either through participation in international
institutions and regimes which reduce transaction costs and constrain actors behavior
through mutually accepted normative frameworks, or as a result of China’s increasing
economic interdependence in the global economy. Many scholars of the liberal school
argue that the Chinese economy is of vital and primary importance to the Chinese and
that Beijing pursues “economic security” through increased economic interdependence
with surrounding states.

i -j

Most maintain that the Chinese realize that it is not in China’s

12 Perhaps one of the best examples representing this genre o f analysis is Chinese foreign policy is Avery
Goldstein’s Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stan
ford University Press, 2005). Goldstein does a good job analyzing and explaining the constraints on Chi
nese foreign policymaking from a Realpolitik perspective. Goldstein argues that the PRC’s new grand strat
egy seeks to promote continued economic growth and development, and domestic stability, while at the
same time address and correct irrational and fearful perceptions held by other nations concerning the rise of
China. Goldstein makes an interesting historical comparison between the current rise o f China and the ear
lier rise o f Germany during the late 1800s, arguing that China’s new grand strategy is quite similar to that
followed by Bismarck - namely, reassure neighboring countries that the rising new power is not a threat to
be balanced against, and thus mitigate the security dilemma between the rising and established powers.
While the comparison is insightful and interesting, there exist some important differences between Ger
many and China. One obvious difference is that Germany was industrially and technologically one o f (if
not the most) advanced society in Europe at the time, while the same thing can hardly be said about China
currently. Nonetheless, the comparison is interesting in that both states believed that their rise to great
power status could best be realized through a strategy o f downplaying others’ fears and perceptions of
threat posed by the rising power. Goldstein’s thesis gives a good Realist account and explanation why Bei
jing had to rethink its approach to foreign policy, but does not offer any ideas concerning how Beijing
might actually implement the new approach.
13 Thomas G. Moore approaches Beijing’s GND from an economic perspective centered on the effects of
globalization on Chinese foreign policy, arguing that “economic globalization provides the means by which
China can pursue an alternative strategy for coping with U.S. hegemony in lieu o f the classical balancing
strategy many observers had expected Beijing to adopt during the post-Cold War era.” According to
Moore, China’s alternative strategy is based upon establishing more cooperative relations among countries,
or better “economic security.” Thomas G. Moore, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age o f Globalization,” in
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best interests to follow a confrontational path to great power status. Further, some ana
lysts believe that Beijing came to an understanding that continuing a strategy of balanc
ing against American hegemony by working towards a multi-polar power structure was,
in the near to middle future, a flawed stratagem. The PRC could not pursue a costly and
dangerous policy of actively balancing against the US and continue to experience sub
stantial economic growth simultaneously. American hegemony, the Chinese came to be
lieve, would not quickly yield to a new multi-polar world during the early 21st century, as
was initially believed in the early 1990s.14 Other researchers focus on China’s diplomacy
and increased participation in international institutions and multilateral organizations.15
The approach utilized by this group offers a better explanation of the shift in Chinese for
eign policy than does the realist approach given the dramatic increase of Chinese partici
pation in multilateralism, but falls short because its approach is limited to studying the
constraining effects of institutions on state behavior under anarchy. As with the neo-

China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New
York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).
14 Thomas G. Moore and Yong Deng make some o f the strongest arguments that Chinese foreign policy has
undergone a dramatic shift as a result of new perceptions o f what constitutes Chinese self-interest in the
21st century. They posit that Beijing is following new geopolitical strategy o f co-opting US power by en
meshing it in a deepening web of interdependence instead o f pursuing a traditional balancing strategy
against American hegemony. See “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization,” chap. 6; and Yong
Deng and Thomas G. Moore, “China Views Globalization: Towards a New Great Power Politics?” Wash
ington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 117-36.
15 Jianwei Wang argues that China’s recent multilateral diplomacy is mainly motivated by instrumental
considerations, being perceived as a more effective and less threatening way o f advancing the PRC’s inter
ests and projecting China’s influence in both Asia and globally. Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Di
plomacy in the New Millennium,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed.
Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 159-200. One o f the
more recent works on Chinese multilateralism in Southeast Asia is Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Multilateralism in
China’s ASEAN policy: its evolution, characteristics, and aspirations,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27,
no. 1 (April 2005): 102-121. Kuik studies the origins and patterns o f China's involvement in regional multi
lateral institutions and its characteristics and implications for China’s ASEAN policy in the post-Cold War
era. Kuik argues that China's perceptions and policies toward multilateral institutions have undergone sig
nificant changes, from caution and suspicion to optimism and enthusiasm. Further, he maintains that in
stead of perceiving multilateral institutions as malign arrangements that might be used by other states to
challenge China's national sovereignty and to limit its strategic choices, Beijing now views multilateral
institutions as useful diplomatic platforms that can be utilized to advance its own foreign policy objectives.
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realist approach, the liberal school does not allow for possible change in actor identity
and interest endogenously to the interaction process, and —as with realism —only defines
anarchy in self-help, zero-sum terms. As such, while scholars in this second group do not
commit the same error of over determining threat as do neo-realist studies, the neo-liberal
approach is guilty of under determining the change in recent Chinese foreign policy in
Southeast Asia.
Metamorphosis of China’s Identity
Taking a different perspective than that of the mainstream Realist and Liberal tra
ditions, constructivist analyses of Chinese foreign policy emphasize ideational over mate
rial factors. As such, actor identity and interest formation is viewed as being mostly in
fluenced by perceptions of self and of other actors (role-identities) rather than by the dis
tribution of power (material) and self-help anarchy. Constructivist studies argue that Bei
jing came to a realization that Chinese national interests could be better achieved in
Southeast Asia through cooperative rather than confrontational relations with ASEAN
and member states.16 This realization occurred, some argue, through a change in identity
and interest formation resulting from social interaction and shared knowledge. There are
differences and points of debate within this group concerning China’s rise and its influ
ence on Chinese foreign policy, to be sure. These differences are reflected in the differ
ing approaches and perspectives utilized by individual scholars. Some scholars focus on
domestic Chinese politics, elite power structures, and Chinese political culture,17 while

16 See, for example, Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China’s Regional Strategy,” in Power Shift: China
and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2005), 48-68.
17 Addressing the roles of perception and sentiment in the growth of popular nationalism and its influence
on Chinese foreign policy and Sino-American relations, Peter Hays Gries traces the emergence o f this new
nationalism and argues that it is challenging the Communist Party's monopoly on political discourse and
thereby threatening the regime's stability. Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and
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other scholars focus their study of Chinese foreign policy on China’s national image and
identity.

18

For all the above accounts (and including many Institutionalist arguments),

China is viewed as the primary catalyst of change in the region because of the rise of the
PRC as the engine of regional economic growth, a major military power, a growing force
in regional diplomacy, and as a proactive member in multilateral institutions. As such,
these scholars challenge the “China threat” theory by arguing that Beijing has come to an
understanding that a strategy of balancing against US power ultimately is counterproduc
tive to Chinese interests given current restraints imposed upon China by both domestic as
well as international environments. By the early 1990s, Beijing learned that a balancing
strategy had little chance of success, was too costly, and would have a detrimental impact
on China’s domestic development. They argue that instead of balancing against the U.S.,
Beijing now pursues a strategy based on maintaining a peaceful international environ
ment and China’s continued economic development within the present international sys
tem. Beijing’s GND, therefore, is based upon assuring the ASEAN states that China’s
rise poses no threat but rather an opportunity for the Southeast Asia states to integrate

Diplomacy (University o f California Press, 2005). Concerning China’s political culture, several prominent
studies have been undertaken. Examples include Lucian W. Pye and Nathan Leites, Nuances in Chinese
Political Culture (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1970); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit o f Chinese
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); and William S. Pott, A. Chinese Political Philoso
phy (New York: Knopf, 1981). Some more recent works on Chinese political culture are Shiping Hua, ed.,
Chinese Political Culture, 1989-2000 (East Gate Book, 2001), and Shiping Hua, Utopianism in Chinese
Political Culture (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
18 Hongying Wang draws on constructivist theory in her interesting study o f Chinese foreign policy and
national image building, concluding that Beijing is actively promoting a new image o f China as a coopera
tive and responsible member of the international community. See Hongying Wang, “National Image Build
ing and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds.
Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 73-102; and David
Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Win
ter 2004/05): 64-99. Shambaugh argues that China’s “good neighbor” diplomacy has succeeded in dispel
ling the China threat thesis in region, and that "most nations in the region now see China as a good
neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a non-threatening regional power."
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their own economic development with that of China.19 As this integration process moves
forward and interaction between China and the ASEAN states intensifies, a new regional
(Asian) identity emerges.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study is informed fundamentally by the work of Alexander Wendt and other
scholars within the constructivist school who follow the positivist tradition of scientific
inquiry.20 More specifically, this investigation supports Wendt’s argument that “anarchy
is what states make of it” and utilizes Wendt’s analytical framework of three “cultures of
anarchy” and the notion of “distribution of interests” (where interests are defined mostly
in ideational terms, but also, to a lesser extent, defined in materialistic terms) in its analy'y t

sis of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Through the case study of Beijing’s

19 See David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 2004),David Shambaugh, ed., Greater China: The Next Superpower? (Ox
ford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” 64-99.
20 Amitav Acharya investigates the issue o f national identity in Southeast Asia and its influence on state
relations in the region, while Alastair Iain Johnston gives a constructivist appraisal o f the “ASEAN Way”
and IR theory. Johnston makes an interesting argument concerning the social construction of security di
lemmas (he focuses on Sino-American relations) which this study will utilize in the context o f the security
dilemma between China and the ASEAN states vis-a-vis their territorial disputes, as further explained be
low. Peter J. Katzenstein and others argue that explanations derived from only one paradigm have short
comings beyond their inability to recognize important empirical anomalies. These authors maintain that IR
research is better served by combining explanatory approaches from different research traditions or, as they
call it, “analytical eclecticism”. See respectively Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International
Relations o f South-East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Sociali
zation in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory,” in International
Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, eds. John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Co
lumbia University Press, 2003), “International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China and the
World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Westview Press, 1998),
55-87, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, vol. 4 (Spring 2003): 5-56, and “Bei
jing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied Power?” in Rethinking Security in East
Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, ed. J. J. Suh, et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 34-96;
and Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, “Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” in
Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, ed. J. J. Suh, et al. (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2004), 1-33.
21 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make o f It: The Social Construction o f Power Politics,” In
ternational Organizations 46, no 2 (1992): 391-425, “The State as person in international theory,” Review
o f International Studies 3 0, no. 2 (2004): 298-316, and Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge
University Press, 1999).
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diplomatic approach to China’s South China Sea disputes, I argue that the processes of
interaction between China and ASEAN at the international level facilitated a rapid expan
sion of shared knowledge and social learning which in turn impacted and changed the
cognitive base (and thus identity) of each actor. Before continuing, however, I must
make two caveats. First, I do not dismiss realist theory as an important analytical tool for
the study of international relations. Realism offers many useful insights and ideas such as
the notions of anarchy and balance of power which are extremely helpful in understand
ing the interaction of states in the international community. In fact, this analysis utilizes
realist theory to explain structural change in the international system following the end of
the Cold War. However, as with any theory, realism has its weaknesses as well. One of
realism’s most conspicuous weaknesses is that it tends to over determine threat while at
the same time underdetermine change. For this reason, I believe that realism proves itself
unable to fully explain the incredible rapprochement in Sino-ASEAN relations since the
end of the Cold War and why a social constructivist approach offers a more accurate
analysis and understanding of our topic. Second, because there exists a great diversity of
analytical approaches within the social constructivist school, I must explain why this
study is based on the theoretical work of Alexander Wendt as opposed to that of other
“constructivists”. One reason that my research follows Wendt’s version of constructiv
ism is that his approach is commensurate with the scientific approach followed by main
stream International Relations (IR) scholars - positivism. As such, Wendt’s form of con
structivism represents a “moderate” stream of constructivist IR theory which rejects the
more radical “postmodernist” stream represented by the works of Bob Walker, Richard
Ashley, and Ann Tickner.22 Another reason for following Wendt’s approach is that it re
22 Richard Ashley, “The poverty o f neorealism” International Organization 38, 225-286, and “The geopoli-
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jects the realist notion of a “logic of anarchy” (conflictual, self-help world) and thus al
lows for a more nuanced understanding of anarchy (“anarchy is what states make of it”).
Anarchy does not always have to be premised on conflict and self-help - it can sometimes
be premised on cooperation and mutual benefit. As such, Wendt’s approach to construc
tivism allows for a rationalist, positivist approach to IR theory.
Until now, I have not offered a precise definition of “social learning.” This must
now be rectified, as social learning resulting from multilateral diplomatic interaction be
tween China and the ASEAN states became the principal source of change in China’s
GND in Southeast Asia after 1996. It is important to note that “social learning” is de
fined differently by the various theoretical approaches in IR. Rationalist theoretical ap
proaches, such as realism, generally emphasize the behavioral (causal) effects of social
learning by focusing on how new information about the environment enables actors to
pursue and achieve their interests more effectively and treat the identities and interests of
the actors as being constant and exogenously given. In other words, for rationalist theo
ries, learning and perspective-taking (the ability to see Self from the perspective of the
Other) do not change who actors are or what they desire, just actors’ ability to realize
their desires in a given social context (“simple” learning).
A constructivist-interactionist approach, on the other hand, defines “social learning” as a mechanism of cultural selection which allows for the possibility that social

tics of geopolitical space: Toward a critical social theory o f international politics” Alternatives 12, 403-434;
R.B.J. Walker, “Realism, change, and international political theory” International Studies Quarterly 31, 6586, and Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993); and Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993).
23 “Cultural selection” is defined by Alexander Wendt as an “evolutionary mechanism involving the trans
mission o f the determinants o f behavior from individual to individual, and thus from generation to genera
tion, by social learning, imitation or some other similar process.” Wendt, Social Theory o f International
Politics, 324-326. Wendt quotes Richard Boyd and Peter Richerson, “Sociobiology, culture and economic
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learning may also have “construction effects” or constitutive effects on identities and in
terests (“complex” learning).24 Thus, identity and interest formation must be defined as
an ongoing social process endogenously given to interaction. In other words, actors are at
every occurrence of interaction mutually defining who each of them is. This is not to say
that the rationalist and constructivist-interactionist models of social learning are mutually
exclusive —just that they have different ideas about what actually occurs in structural
change and why it happens. In both models actors are rational, but in the rationalist
model the basic unit on which utility and rational action is calculated is the actor (egoistic
state), and in the constructionist model the basic unit is the group of actors (holistic
community).

From the constructivist-interactionist perspective then, through interac

tion-generated “complex” social learning, Self and Other develop a collective identity (a
fully internalized culture) that actors have created and with which they identify. The
mechanism through which identities are learned is known as “reflected appraisals” or
“mirroring,” a process in which “identities and their corresponding interests are learned
and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others.”

Thus,

the generalized Other becomes part of their conception of Self. As such, collective iden
tity is associated with the structure of any internalized culture, and therefore a change in
that structure necessitates a change in collective identity, “involving the breakdown of an
theory,” Journal o f Economic Behavior and Organization 1 (1980): 97-121. Wendt equates cultural selec
tion to Kenneth Waltz’s “socialization.”
24 For our study then, “simple” social learning may induce a reorientation of an actor’s method or strategy
of realizing foreign policy goals, but without changing an actor’s identity or interests. “Simple” learning,
therefore can lead to instrumental change in actor behavior. “Complex” social learning, on the other hand,
may induce a reorientation o f an actor’s foreign policy as a result o f changed actor identity and interests.
“Complex” learning can therefore lead to constitutive change in actor behavior. See Social Theory o f Inter
national Politics, 326-335. For a more detailed discussion o f the differences between simple and complex
learning, see Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1990). Haas
uses different terms (“adaptation” and “learning”) but illustrates the same difference.
25 Social Theory o f International Politics, 337.
26 “Mirroring” hypothesizes that actors see themselves as a reflection of how they think others see them.
Social Theory o f International Politics, 327.
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old identity and the emergence of a new. Identity change and structural change are not
equivalent, since identity formation happens ultimately at the micro-level [unit, or state]
and structural change happens ultimately at the macro, but the later supervenes on the
former.”27 As discussed below, an interactionist model of social learning is employed to
explain and illustrate the evolution of Beijing’s approach (GND) in the territorial disputes
and its impact on ASEAN perceptions of China —and thus on Sino-ASEAN relations.
Using Wendt’s interactionist model in our analysis of the change in Beijing’s
GND and its effect on Sino-ASEAN relations, this chapter identifies and explains the
emergence and evolution of a regional collective identity bom of “complex” learning as a
major source of change in both Beijing’s approach to the territorial disputes and in SinoASEAN relations. As argued below, multilateral interaction with ASEAN on economic
and security issues influenced change in China’s identity from that of a “sovereign, asser
tive power” (egoistic identity) to “member of regional grouping” or “ASEAN Partner”
(holistic identity).

?o

This process began with Beijing’s acceptance of multilateral discus

sion of the South China Sea issue (1995-1996), but the intensity of this process increased
exponentially from 1997 forward in most areas of China-ASEAN interaction —especially
in the economic area. I argue that by 2002-2003, as a result of interaction between China
and ASEAN and a corresponding development of a regional collective identity as “Asian
states,” the culture of anarchy underwriting the relationship moved away from that of a

27 Social Theory o f International Politics, 338.
28 For this study, China’s “identity” is defined within the framework of the case study (China’s identity as
an actor in the issue o f the territorial disputes in the South China Sea) and should not be confused with
China’s overall national identity (which encompasses far more than the specific issue of China’s territorial
disputes in the South China Sea). Therefore, in this case study China’s “identity” is synonymous with
China’s “role-identity”.
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“Lockean culture” (egoistic identity, others viewed as “rivals”) toward a new “Kantian
culture” (collective identity, others viewed as “partners” or “friends”).29
An excellent example of such shift in identity was the 1997 Asian Financial Cri
sis, which revealed a burgeoning sense of “we-ness” in Sino-ASEAN relations on the part
of China. Beijing’s decision against devaluing the Renminbi demonstrated altruistic
thinking based on group interest as opposed to egoistic self-interest. In fact, the 1997 Fi
nancial Crisis represented the moment in time when a “collective” identity between
China and the ASEAN states began to emerge. While Beijing’s acceptance of multilat
eral talks on the territorial disputes in 1995 was the result (in all likelihood) of “simple”
social learning —an instrumental application of the shared knowledge that ASEAN
highly valued multilateralism — China’s selfless actions during the Financial Crisis, and
demonstrated acceptance of the “ASEAN Way,” signaled that something deeper than
egoistic interaction was starting to occur. However, one must remember that identity
formation is an ongoing process, and depending on the circumstances in which it occurs,
old identities can be either reinforced or changed.
China’s Schizophrenic Identity
Actually, China’s identity during 1997 - 2005 was schizophrenic. Schizophrenic
in the sense that while China’s multilateral relations with the ASEAN states concerning
the territorial disputes revealed a new “post-Cold War” identity, China’s traditional “Cold
War” identity remained dominant in bilateral dialogue until the 2005 Tripartite Agree
ment between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines for joint development of offshore hy
drocarbon reserves in the disputed Spratly Islands.
29 For a more thorough discussion o f the three “cultures o f anarchy,” see Social Theory o f International
Politics, Chapter 6.
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In China’s multilateral relationship with ASEAN, Beijing initially pursued a strat
egy of subsuming the South China Sea disputes within the wider context of Sino-ASEAN
relations by indirectly linking progress in Sino-ASEAN relations in general to the South
China Sea disputes specifically. If ASEAN pushed China too hard on the disputes issue,
Beijing could stall on other issues (trade, cooperation, etc.). Conversely, Beijing might
reward ASEAN for downplaying sovereignty issues by conceding to broadened multilat
eral discussion of the disputes. To this point, it was purely egoistic Realpolitik behavior
on the part of China. However, by 1996 Beijing began to understand, appreciate, and be
come comfortable with the special brand of multilateralism practiced by ASEAN —the
“ASEAN Way” of informal, consensus-based multilateral discussion of mutual interests,
and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. “Complex” learning be
gan to challenge traditional perceptions of Self and Other (“role-identities”) in the rela
tionship. Becoming good neighbors was less daunting than first believed, as both sides
“learned” that Self and Other were not that different after all. By 2002 - 2003, China’s
“post-Cold War” identity superseded her traditional one evidenced by Beijing’s accep
tance of the Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea (2002) and ASEAN’s Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003. From the ASEAN perspective (addressed di
rectly in the next chapter), Beijing’s new GND in Southeast Asia was interpreted as evi
dence that ASEAN’s policy of “engagement” and “socialization” of China was working.
In addition, not wishing to scare-off the Chinese from this integrative process, the
ASEAN states seemed happy not to push China too hard on the Spratlys disputes. Both
China and the ASEAN states desired (and took action) to prevent the South China Sea
disputes from impeding strengthening China-ASEAN relations. As such, Beijing’s GND

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22

approach to the territorial disputes cannot be fully understood and appreciated outside
and apart from the wider multilateral context of Sino-ASEAN relations and the role
played by “complex” learning and the formation of a “collective identity.” Over time, an
emerging collective identity, or perception of “We-ness,” in Sino-ASEAN relations in
creasingly imparted an influence on Beijing’s bilateral implementation of the GND to the
territorial disputes.
Throughout most of this second period of our case study, Chinese bilateral diplo
macy represents “simple” learning and instrumental changes in Beijing’s application of
the GND to the territorial disputes —in effect, a continuation of China’s “Cold War”
identity. Beijing’s bilateral GND strategy was formulated upon linking the disputes to
the larger context of improving relations and trade with both Vietnam and the Philip
pines. Beijing agreed to discuss the disputes with both Hanoi and Manila (as long as the
issue of sovereignty was not put on the table) while sweetening the pot in the bilateral
relationships with a substantial Chinese commitment to strengthened trade and economic
development, as well as increased Chinese technical and scientific aid. As long as Hanoi
and Manila agreed to put the issue of sovereignty in the South China Sea disputes on the
back burner, relations and trade with China could continue to strengthen. However, as
discussed further below, over time “complex” learning at the multilateral level eventually
had a “spill-over” effect on China’s bilateral diplomacy ultimately leading to a resolution
of China’s “schizophrenic identity” in 2005. The historic 2005 Tripartite Agreement be
tween China, Vietnam, and the Philippines for joint development of offshore oil in the
disputed Spratlys evidences that China’s “Cold War” identity in bilateral diplomacy had
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finally yielded to the new “post-Cold War” identity evidenced earlier in Beijing’s multi
lateral diplomacy.
Therefore, I am not arguing that China’s identity shift occurred at any immediate,
definite moment in time, or that the metamorphosis happened in all issue areas simulta
neously. Rather, social construction of actor identity and interests occurs over time and is
a never-ending, continual process. As such, I do not make the argument that China and
ASEAN have become absolute “friends,” rather that they no longer perceive one another
in zero-sum egoistic terms associated with a Hobbesian strategic culture (as “enemy”) or,
for that matter, completely in terms attributable to a Lockean culture (as “rival” or “com
petitor”). Increasingly, China and the ASEAN states are seeing and coming to under
stand one another in terms associated with a Kantian strategic culture (as “partners” or
“friends”).30 This does not mean, however, that Sino-ASEAN relations will continue to
improve in a linear fashion. Currently this appears to be the case, but “complex” social
learning can also lead to negative changes in role-identities, which adversely affect stateto-state relations.
During the first period of our study (1989-1996) discussed in the following chap
ter, interaction between China and the ASEAN states led mostly to “simple” social learn
ing which caused Beijing to modify its GND through a superficial embrace of multilater
alism to demonstrate a cooperative and non-threatening Chinese attitude. The initial re
orientation of Beijing’s GND toward multilateralism, however, was principally motivated
by instrumental calculations. China’s traditional Cold War identity as a self-interested
actor appeared to continue unchanged into the post-Cold War period (Figure 3). This is
not to say, however, that “complex” learning was not occurring as well. Learning is a
30 Social Theory o f International Politics, 297-312.
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process which occurs over time. As such, the impact of social learning on actor behavior
may not be immediately perceptible, as new ideas challenge standing beliefs or percep
tions (culture) which are not easily changed.31 I argue that “complex” learning began to
take place during the first period of our study, but its impact on Beijing’s GND only be
came readily discemable during the second period of this study (1997-2006). I argue
that diplomatic interaction between China and the ASEAN states generated shared
knowledge as a result of both “simple” and “complex” learning which caused a change in
the cognitive base of Chinese policymakers as well as that of their ASEAN counterparts.
Changes in actor cognitive bases caused by “complex” learning, in turn, caused (and con
tinues to cause) a corresponding transformation in shared role-identities which ultimately
is responsible for the positive developments witnessed in Sino-ASEAN relations during
the last decade. In other words, due to “complex” social learning gained through diplo
matic interaction, China’s traditional identity is changing toward a new, more holistic or
collective post-Cold War identity. As such, the role-identity of China among the ASEAN
states is emerging from the historic “enemy” or “rival” to a new role-identity of “good
neighbor,” “partner,” or even “friend.”

Cognitive BaseA
Cognitive BaseA

Figure 3.

Simple Learning

|Cognitive BaseA

Complex Learning -> [Cognitive Bases

“Cold War” Identity
“Post-Cold War” Identity

Hypothesized Effects of “Simple” and “Complex” Learning on Chinese
Cognitive Base and National Identity.

31Wendt argues that due to the dialectical relationship between agency and structure, “culture is a selffulfilling prophecy” and must reproduce itself “if it is to be culture at all.” Social Theory o f International
Politics, 186-187.
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Cognitive BaseA reflects China’s traditional knowledge base of Self and Other predicated
on self-interest, self-help, and the distribution of material power in the international sys
tem, externalized as China’s “Cold War” identity (China as an egoistic, revisionist power
with an essentially bilateral approach to foreign policy). Cognitive Bases reflects
China’s new (current) knowledge base of Self and Other predicated on mutual interest,
cooperation, and the distribution of both material power and ideas, externalized as
China’s “Post-Cold War” identity (China as a holistic, status-quo power with an increas
ingly multilateral approach to foreign policy emphasizing mutual interests-benefits ).
This theoretical approach allows a more nuanced and insightful understanding of
recent Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia than do mainstream realist and liberal
theories. The strategy behind Beijing’s foreign policy has significantly changed due to
the social construction of knowledge at the international level of politics (shared knowl
edge) and its influence on the social construction of identity and interests at the state
(unit) level. As argued below, the source of this change has not been adequately identi
fied nor explained thus far by mainstream neo-realist analyses based upon notions of
“balance of power” or “balance of threat,” relative national (material) strength, and dis
tribution of capabilities within the international system, nor by neo-liberal analyses which
neglect the social processes of identity and interest formation and tend to focus on ex
plaining results rather than process. The reason for this is that these approaches discount
or ignore the important role played by non-material forces and factors (ideas, social proc
esses, and shared knowledge) on the construction and composition of state identity, inter
est, and perception of Self and Other (culture) and rely too heavily on materialistic and
individualistic (as opposed to holistic or systemic) explanations. As a result, these ap
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proaches fail to offer a complete explanation of the sources of change in the deepening
China-ASEAN relationship. I argue that a more complete explanation and analysis can
be accomplished by supplementing mainstream realist and liberal analyses by defining
state interest and identity formation in idealistic as well as materialistic terms, and by al
lowing for the existence of more than one “logic of anarchy” as postulated by realist and
liberal theories.
Assumptions and Major Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical framework explained above, this study assumes a causal
relationship between Chinese “good neighbor” diplomacy in Southeast Asia and a change
in perceptions of China by the ASEAN states. I argue therefore that threat perceptions of
China held by Vietnam, the Philippines, and ASEAN only began to lessen as China’s tra
ditional Cold War identity began to give-way to a new post-Cold War identity bom of
shared knowledge, complex learning, and a changed cognitive base. Specific to the case
study, this study tests the following hypotheses: (1) Over time, social learning (independ
ent variable) has affected a change in China’s GND (dependent variable) toward a more
holistic and less narcissistic attitude; and (2), the change in China’s GND (now the inde
pendent variable) has affected a change in ASEAN perceptions of China as well as the
style and orientation of their China policies (dependent variable). In other words, there
are two assumed causal relationships (as Figure 4 indicates): one relationship is between
social learning gained through interaction and a reorientation in Beijing’s GND where the
former is the independent variable and the latter the dependent variable; the other rela
tionship is between the reorientation of Beijing’s GND and a change in ASEAN states’
perceptions of China and their China policies, where the former becomes the independent
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variable and the latter the dependent variable. These hypothesized casual relationships are
explained and tested by the case study as discussed in the following three chapters.

SOCIAL LEARNING
-> BEIJING’S GOOD
-> ASEAN PERCEPTIONS
(IDEATIONAL FACTORS)
NEIGHBOR DIPLOMACY OF AND POLICIES
TOWARD CHINA
Figure 4.

The Major Relationships Among the Variables.

VARIABLES AND THEIR MEASUREMENT
Hongying Wang’s recent study of national image building as part of Chinese for
eign policy traces various images that the PRC government projected of China since the
Maoist period.32 Wang’s study provides us with an assessment and measurement of Bei
jing’s external promotion of China as a “cooperative” and “peace-loving” country which
clearly demonstrates China’s active campaign to promote a “good neighbor” image in the
international community. Wang’s analysis of the average frequencies of projected im
ages (1954-1999) indicates that Beijing’s projection of China as an international “coop
erator” has increased appreciably since 1989 and become the most frequently projected
image of China since 1993.

The image of China as a “peace-loving” country is the sec

ond most frequently projected image by Beijing since 1992.34 This investigation com
plements Wang’s study by measuring ASEAN perceptions of China through an analysis
of public opinion polls and surveys, and media. Indicators of favorable regional percep

32 Wang’s data was derived from quantitative content analysis of articles appearing in Beijing Review and
government work reports (zhengfu gongzuo baogao) relating to Chinese foreign policy. Hongying Wang,
“National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese
Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005),
73-102.
33 “National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,” figures 4.1 and 4.2, 77-78.
34 Ibid.
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tions of China relating to the disputes are views (images) of China as a “peaceful” or
“cooperative” or “responsible” member of the international community (good neighbor).
Indicators of Chinese accommodation are increased bilateral cooperation in various is
sues concerning the South China Sea, and increased acceptance and willingness to dis
cuss the disputes multilaterally {accede to ASEAN normative behavior —the “ASEAN
Way”). Indicators of Chinese aggressiveness are provocative military actions and de
ployments, and refusal or hesitancy to discuss the disputes within a multilateral setting
{rejecting ASEAN normative behavior).
WORKING HYPOTHESES FOR THE CASE STUDY OF CHINA’S TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Working from our two major hypotheses, it is possible to derive several working
hypotheses for the investigation of the PRC’s “good neighbor” diplomacy using the case
of the regional territorial disputes between China and Vietnam, and China and the Philip
pines. (1) If social learning causes Beijing to adjust its GND to accommodate the con
cerns of ASEAN states regarding disputed territories in the maritime environment, then
regional perceptions of China will become less suspicious and more benign. (2) If social
learning causes Beijing to adjust its GND to accommodate Chinese self-interest by be
coming more aggressive in enforcing or defending Chinese territorial claims, then re
gional perceptions of China will become less benign and more suspicious. (3) As percep
tions of China in Southeast Asia move along the spectrum between threat and coopera
tion, ASEAN and ASEAN states’ China policy will change in terms of orientation and
style.
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ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter Two discusses and critically analyses Beijing’s traditional bilateral di
plomacy concerning China’s South China Sea disputes with both the Philippines and
Vietnam from the end of the Cold War until 1996, and also explains why Beijing began
in 1995-1996 to explore a new approach to the disputes at the multilateral level. In es
sence, the origins of Beijing’s “good-neighbor” diplomacy (GND) in Southeast Asia can,
to a large extent, be traced to the lessens and insights gained by Chinese leaders from the
mounting problems associated with the territorial disputes and their increasingly detri
mental effects on Sino-ASEAN relations. Beijing’s traditional bilateral approach to the
disputes, premised on China’s “indisputable” sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly
islands, a strong aversion and avoidance of multilateral dialogue, and an aggressive mili
tary posture in the South China Sea, caused an increased perception in Southeast Asia of
China as a growing “threat.” This regional trend served to support the wider “China
threat” thesis, as articulated by the United States to support Washington’s escalating con
tainment strategy, and therefore threatened to undermine Chinese foreign policy in
Southeast Asia. The solution to Beijing’s foreign policy dilemma, as it turned out, was to
deconstruct China’s image as a “threat” in the region by actively promoting a new
friendly, cooperative “good neighbor” image of China in Southeast Asia (instrumental
change of GND as a result of mostly “simple” social learning). The South Sea disputes
became, then, a good opportunity for Beijing to demonstrate China’s good intentions and
ameliorate China’s traditional image in the region. And, considering that the South Sea
disputes represented one of the most difficult and challenging issues in Sino-ASEAN re
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lations, they became a rigorous litmus test that China had to pass before China’s relation
ship with ASEAN could deepen.
Chapter Three discusses the evolution and implementation of Beijing’s GND to
China’s territorial disputes during the last decade (1997 - 2006) with Vietnam and the
Philippines at the bilateral level, as well as with ASEAN at the multilateral level. A new
source of change in Beijing’s GND is identified and its impact on both the territorial dis
putes and Sino-ASEAN relations is analyzed. The argument is made that during this pe
riod “complex” social learning increasingly caused both instrumental and constitutive
change in Beijing’s GND. Specifically, “simple” learning led to instrumental change,
while “complex” learning led to constitutive change in Beijing’s GND due to a change in
China’s cognitive base (identity). Further, I argue that bilateral diplomacy, due to the
directly confrontational setting of this type of dialogue, led mostly to “simple” social
learning which affected instrumental modification of Beijing’s GND without affecting a
change in China’s cognitive base or national identity. On the other hand, multilateral di
plomacy (especially Track II settings) led to both types of social learning, “simple” and
“complex,” due to the plurality of views and positions facilitated by this type of setting.
As such, Beijing’s bilateral handling of the territorial disputes represents “simple” social
learning during the first period of this study (1989 - 1996) and during most of the second
period (until 2004 or so) as well; while China’s growing multilateral approach to the dis
putes represents the impact of “complex” social learning (beginning in 1995 - 1996)
which led to a change of China’s cognitive base and national identity.
Chapter Four offers an evaluation of the impact of Beijing’s reoriented GND on
ASEAN perceptions of China through a qualitative analysis of the change in China’s na
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tional image in Southeast Asia (strength of “China threat” perception in the region) and
its resultant influence on the security behavior of the ASEAN states regarding China.
This empirical analysis is based on data obtained from opinion polls and surveys, and
from content analysis of articles appearing in the region’s national English-language
newspapers concerning the territorial disputes. The general effects of Beijing’s GND on
ASEAN perceptions (as a group) of China are discussed first, followed by a countryspecific analysis of the change in national perception of China resulting from Beijing’s
GND and its impact on security behavior of each of the following countries: Vietnam, the
Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Chapter Five concludes the study by reviewing and discussing the forces and fac
tors responsible for the evolution of Beijing’s GND since the end of the Cold War, and
by evaluating the impact of Beijing’s GND on the territorial disputes, as well as the im
plications and ramifications of China’s GND within a wider, more inclusive context of
Sino-ASEAN relations in general.
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
This study will make several contributions to the discourse on Chinese foreign
policy since the end of the Cold War. First of all, the case study of China’s territorial
disputes in maritime Southeast Asia will produce more empirical data concerning Bei
jing’s “good neighbor” diplomacy in the region and its influences and effects on SinoASEAN relations. Moreover, it contributes to the analysis of security tension between
China and ASEAN by advancing Alastair Iain Johnston’s investigation of the social con
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struction of security dilemmas35 by investigating how security dilemmas might be so
cially deconstructed as well. This paper argues that as social constructions, security di
lemmas can be altered through actions taken by one (or more) actor(s) that change threat
perceptions of the “other” either toward spiraling arms races and increasing possibilities
of conflict (as realist interpretations of security dilemmas maintain), or toward a lessen
ing of threat perceptions and the growth of more harmonious relations. Security dilem
mas need not necessarily spiral toward conflict —actors can sometimes “learn” that the
“other” is not as threatening as initially believed, and therefore change their opinions and
perceptions of one another. Shared knowledge, therefore, can impart positive, as well as
negative influences on the social processes of state identity and interest construction,
which can (sometimes) change the “logic of anarchy.”
This study makes several arguments concerning Beijing’s “good neighbor” di
plomacy in Southeast Asia. First, China’s GND in Southeast Asia represents a profound
transformation, beginning in the mid-1990s, in Beijing’s foreign policy in the region.
Second, this change in Chinese diplomacy, to a large extent, reflects Beijing’s response to
increasing perceptions in Southeast Asia of China’s rise as constituting a growing “China
threat.” Third, Beijing’s GND aims to dispel the “China threat” thesis in Southeast Asia
by promoting a friendly, non-threatening image in the region that that will reassure the
ASEAN states and lessen the Sino-ASEAN security dilemma. Fourth, this study argues
that, to a certain extent, Beijing’s “good neighbor” diplomacy in Southeast Asia is the
result of socialization between China and the ASEAN states, and that Beijing’s new re
gional diplomacy is based partially upon the “ASEAN Way” (consensus-based, non35 See Alastair Iain Johnston, “International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China and the
World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Westview Press, 1998),
55-87.
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confrontational relations). Fifth, the evolution and maturation of Beijing’s GND in
Southeast Asia appears as a text book example of Wendt’s interactionist model of social
learning. The realization that China’s image as a threat in Southeast Asia was being per
petuated by Beijing’s South China Sea policy led ultimately to a policy based on the
Kantian model of collective identity and cooperation. Sixth, this study will shed light on
possible strategies an ascending power might follow to manage its rise in the interna
tional system. And finally, this investigation posits that China’s GND approach to its re
lations in Southeast Asia might offer greater insight into Chinese foreign policy in gen
eral, especially since the turn of the 21st century.
Unlike the often unilateral foreign policy approach of the United States during the
George W. Bush administration, the PRC has pursued both bilateral and multilateral di
plomacy at Track I and Track II venues to cooperate with China’s neighbors. Without
giving any ground on China’s claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, Beijing’s
GND has transformed an issue fraught with potential for armed conflict into one of joint
exploration and cooperation —truly a remarkable success by any measure.
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CHAPTER II
CHINESE DIPLOMACY AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES, 1989 - 1996:
IN SEARCH OF A NEW APPROACH

This chapter seeks to explain the change and reformulation of China’s regional
foreign policy in Southeast Asia from 1989 to 1996 through a case study of Beijing’s
evolving diplomatic approach to the South China Sea disputes and its effect on SinoASEAN relations. Argued below, two major factors contributed to the transformation of
China’s regional foreign policy —one structural, the other ideational. The initial factor
affecting a transformation of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia was structural.
The end of the Cold War, the subsequent death of the Soviet Union, and the resolution of
the Third Indochina War had, by the end of 1991, removed historic constraints on Chi
nese foreign policy in Southeast Asia allowing Beijing greater opportunity and freedom
to pursue closer relations with the ASEAN states. During the first half of the 1990s,
however, Sino-ASEAN relations remained strained as China continued to be perceived as
a threat to regional peace and stability. Beijing’s bold and aggressive action concerning
the South China Sea disputes was the principal reason for the continuance of China’s
traditional Cold War image in Southeast Asia. However, increased interaction between
China and the ASEAN states concerning the territorial disputes led to the second and
most important factor affecting change in Beijing’s GND and substantial improvement in
Sino-ASEAN relations —social learning (ideational factor).
Through interaction over time, China and the ASEAN states developed shared
knowledge of Self and Other which led to both “simple” and “complex” learning. As ar
gued below, Beijing’s social learning during the first period was mostly “simple” leam-
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ing which affected instrumental change in Beijing’s GND but led to little or no change in
China’s identity. Beijing “learned” that the ASEAN states continued to perceive China
as a threat in spite of China’s promotion of a “good neighbor” image in the region, and
that the South China Sea disputes were the principal reason for this. As explained below,
this knowledge induced an instrumental transformation of Beijing’s GND toward accept
ing multilateral dialogue with ASEAN concerning the territorial disputes in the South
China Sea without affecting a change of China’s traditional cognitive base and identity
(Figure 5). However, towards the end of the first period (by mid-1995 ), “complex”
learning began to challenge some core beliefs or assumptions underwriting China’s tradi
tional cognitive base. However, the effects of the initial “complex” social learning did
not directly manifest themselves in Beijing’s GND until the second period (1997 - 2006).
Let us now briefly discuss China’s traditional Cold War identity (or Cognitive BaseA)
and assess the causal effects that structural change in the international system imparted
on China’s regional foreign policy.

jCognitive BaseA

Figure 5.

Simple Learning

Cognitive BaseA

“Cold War” Identity

Effect of “Simple” Learning on China’s Cognitive Base and Identity.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS
China’s relations with most of its Southeast Asian neighbors during the Cold War
were adversarial, reflecting the bipolar setting that forced Beijing to conceive Chinese
security in global, rather than regional terms. Because Beijing supported insurgency
groups in many Southeast Asian countries at the time, China had an image of being an
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aggressive troublemaker. Chinese support of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge in the then
unfolding Cambodian disaster reinforced the image shared by most ASEAN states of
China as a “threat.” Beijing’s violent 1988 clash with Vietnamese naval units at Fiery
Cross Reef in the Spratlys, in which three Vietnamese vessels were destroyed and over
70 sailors killed, heightened fears in Southeast Asia that the PRC would increasingly use
force in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea.36 Events leading to the
June 1989 government crackdown on the student-led pro-democracy movement in
Tiananmen Square further strengthened the image of China as a growing problem and
potential threat worldwide, as most western nations condemned Beijing’s actions and
demonstrated their disapproval by imposing sanctions against the People’s Republic.
With the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold
War, many wondered whether Beijing’s foreign policy would become even more aggres
sive as the constraints on Chinese foreign policy imposed by the bipolar international
structure at the time gave way and the US was expected to significantly reduce its mili
tary presence in Asia as a consequence. Thus, by the end of the Cold War, the regime in
China was perceived by much of the world as brutal and authoritarian in its domestic
policies, aggressive in asserting China’s territorial claims, and revisionist in its foreign
policy. In short, China was perceived as constituting a “threat” both domestically as well
as externally in the international community.
This negative, threatening image of China began to change, however, during the
1980s when Beijing began formulating an integrated regional policy known as zhoubian

36 See Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (New
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 134-35 and U.S. Department o f Energy, Energy Information Admini
stration, Country Analysis Brief: South China Sea Region (Washington, D.C., 2003).
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_China_Sea/Background.html (accessed 12 June 2006).
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zhengce (“periphery policy”) or mulin zhengce (“good neighbor policy”) to adapt China’s
foreign policy to new trends in Asia. One of these trends was the promise of a “Pacific
century” marked by fast economic growth in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing understood that
integrating China’s economy with the rest of the region could offer a new path to eco
nomic development and prosperity. Another trend was the rise of the “new Asianism”
doctrine that attributed the success of Asian modernization to uniquely Asian values. As
this doctrine challenged the concept of Western economic and ideological dominance,
Beijing wished to support this trend through establishing closer relations with China’s
Asian neighbors.37 This new policy was undertaken by Beijing during the 1980s partially
in response to a diminishing Soviet threat and partially in light of a corresponding diminishment in the utility of Sino-American rapprochement.

-3 0

As such, Beijing’s new “pe

riphery policy” was a nuanced adjustment of China’s Cold War regional foreign policy
bringing it in line with what were perceived at the time to be slowly developing geo
strategic trends. Beijing’s peripheral policy, however, was inadequate and underdevel
oped to respond to unforeseen events in 1989.
Tiananmen
In 1989 two events significantly changed China’s external political and strategic
environment which, in turn, stimulated greater impetus toward further adjustments and
reformulation of Beijing’s new “good neighbor policy” or GND; the Tiananmen Massa
cre in June, and the ending of the Cold War in November. As we shall see, both events
can be seen as causal factors in stimulating an initial change (1989 to 1995, or so) in Bei
37 See You Ji and Jia Qingguo, “China’s Re-emergence and Its Foreign Policy Strategy,” in China Review,
ed. Joseph Y. S. Cheng (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1998), 128.
38 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2005), 21-22.
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jing’s foreign policy approach in Southeast Asia. Because of the events of June 1989 and
the resultant international condemnation of the Chinese government, China found itself
sanctioned and diplomatically isolated by the West. The reaction in Southeast Asia,
however, was more subdued and far less critical than that of the West. Actually, Bei
jing’s brutal repression of the pro-democracy activists imparted little negative impact on
China’s relations in the region. This is not difficult to understand, considering that most
of the ASEAN states had human rights records no better than that of China. As such, the
Southeast Asia states were sympathetic to China’s notion of state sovereignty and the
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries (both China and
the ASEAN states resented the American human rights campaign). It seemed logical,
therefore, that Beijing focus China’s diplomatic energies on cultivating better relations
with the ASEAN states to counter the diplomatic isolation imposed on China by the
West. Establishing good relations with the ASEAN states, therefore, became extremely
important to Beijing in its campaign of ending China’s status as an international pariah. 39
•

End of the Cold War
The other big event of 1989 which impacted and induced change in Chinese re
gional foreign policy —the end of the Cold War —facilitated Beijing’s plans of wooing
the Southeast Asian states by removing constraints on Chinese foreign policy associated
with the bipolar international system. The ending of the Cold War and the subsequent
demise of the Soviet Union transformed the then extant bipolar international system into
the current American unipolar configuration, which in effect changed the external condi

39 Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors,” Security Dialogue 30, no. 3 (1999):
338.
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tions on which China’s grand strategy of “peace and development” was based.40 The
post-Cold War international environment for China then, was significantly less threaten
ing than the immediate past, which allowed Beijing increased flexibility in pursuing
China’s relations with other states. In Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union’s demise ended
Vietnam’s ability to continue its aggressive and expansionistic polices in Cambodia and
forced Hanoi to seek accommodation with China and the ASEAN states that allowed a
resolution of the Cambodian issue in 1991. With this accomplishment, the last vestiges
of the Cold War security situation (security dilemma) in Southeast Asia finally ended,
removing the associated constraints on Chinese regional foreign policy. In short, during
the early 1990s it became possible for Beijing to implement its “good neighbor diplo
macy” in a meaningful way.41 To that end, Beijing initiated a bilateral campaign to im
prove relations with China’s neighboring countries. In Southeast Asia, China normalized
relations with Indonesia (8 August 1990), Singapore (3 October 1990), Brunei (30 Sep
tember 1991), and Vietnam (November 1991),42 and began to pursue relations with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1991 43 This brings us to another

40 See John W. Garver, “China’s U.S. Policies,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese For
eign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 201-204; Bates
Gill, “China’s Evolving Regional Security Strategy,” in Power Shift: China and A sia’s New Dynamics, ed.
David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2005), 247-252.
41 From this point in time forward, I define GND as being the diplomatic component o f Beijing’s new for
eign policy approach in Southeast Asia aimed at deepening China’s relations and influence with ASEAN
and member states while at the same time resisting American and Japanese influence in the region. A basic
premise o f the GND is mitigating fears associated with the rise o f Chinese economic and military power
through actively promoting a friendly, cooperative, and responsible image of China in Southeast Asia.
42 Zhao, 338.
43
For good accounts o f initial China-ASEAN encounters, see David Shambaugh, “Return to the Middle
Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century,” in Power Shift: China and A sia’s New Dy
namics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2005), 23-47; David Shambaugh,
"China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05):
64-99; Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” in China Rising: Power
and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2005), 166-177; and Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors,” Secu
rity Dialogue 30, no 3 (1999): 335-346.
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(and perhaps most interesting) source of change in Beijing’s regional foreign policy —the
increase in interaction between China and the ASEAN states in the post-Cold War era.
IDEATIONAL FACTORS
During China’s period of diplomatic isolation imposed by the West following the
Tiananmen Crisis and the end of the Cold War, ASEAN decided to pursue a policy of
engaging China with a view of “socializing” Chinese behavior to mitigate possible re
gional instability and conflict associated with China’s rise and a possible American mili
tary drawdown in Asia. As such, Beijing’s desire to establish good relations with
ASEAN dovetailed on ASEAN’s desire to engage China. These mutual desires led to the
informal establishment of Sino-ASEAN relations in 1991 and to formal relations between
the two sides in 1996.44 The end of the bipolar international system removed many con
straints on Chinese foreign policy and allowed Beijing to pursue a new, more focused
regional policy aimed at improving Sino-ASEAN relations. However, as the early 1990s
neared an end, the impact of this source of change on Chinese foreign policy weakened.
At about the same time, the impact of increased interaction and “simple” social learning
between China and ASEAN on Beijing’s regional foreign policy amplified. Much of the
increase in interaction is attributable to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea,
which during the early 1990s was the principal issue standing in the way of improved
Sino-ASEAN relations. Actions undertaken by Beijing in 1992 and 1995 to assert Chi
nese sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago and much of the South China Sea (dis
cussed below) served to heighten perceptions of a rising China threat among the ASEAN
44Lai To Lee gives a good account o f initial China-ASEAN contacts. Lai To Lee , China and the South
China Sea Dialogues (London: Praeger, 1999), 15-27. By 1991, China had established official relations
with all ASEAN states, and in 1996 China became an official dialogue partner o f the ASEAN Post Ministe
rial Conference (PMC).
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states and thereby undermine Beijing’s strategy of pursuing improved Sino-ASEAN rela
tions vis-a-vis China’s “good neighbor” diplomacy. As such, the territorial disputes be
came the crucial issue in determining the future of Sino-ASEAN relations. I argue below
that through the process of China-ASEAN interaction, “simple” social learning occurred
resulting in the creation of “shared knowledge” of Self and Other that induced an instru
mental transformation of Beijing’s GND —but not yet a transformation of China’s cogni
tive base and identity. However, as discussed in the following chapter, “simple” social
learning, over time, ultimately led to “complex” social learning that did affect a meta
morphosis of China’s identity (Cognitive Bases) and a constitutive change in Beijing’s
GND.
PROBLEMS WITH THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
Beijing’s traditional diplomatic approach to the territorial disputes in the South
China Sea from 1989 to 1996 was based on three guiding premises —the inviolability of
Chinese sovereign territory, a strong preference for bilateral negotiations with other dis
putants, and an intense determination to prevent the internationalization of the South
China Sea issue. These premises, however, began to have detrimental effects on China’s
larger foreign policy goal in the region —to strengthen China-ASEAN relations and
thereby limit American and Japanese influence in Southeast Asia.45 Ever since the end of
the Cold War and especially after the stunning 1991 American military tour de force in
the first Gulf War, Beijing pursued a foreign policy of promoting a multipolar global sys
tem to balance the preponderant military and economic power of the United States. This
stance caused growing problems between Washington and Beijing that led to a more con
45 Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China’s Regional Strategy,” in Power Shift, ed. David Shambaugh
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2005), 50-51.
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frontational relationship between the two states and ultimately to the birth of the China
threat thesis. The Clinton Administration’s linkage of human rights in China and the re
newal of China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status heightened ill will in both
capitals as well as supported a growing opinion among the American public that the rise
of Chinese power and influence spelled trouble for the U.S. The Bush Administration’s
aggressive and confrontational position in Sino-American relations, along with primarily
American calls for the containment of China, led to perceptions in Beijing that China had
to prevent the strategic encirclement of itself by an American-led, anti-China alliance.
Hence, Beijing pursued a policy in Southeast Asia of seeking and promoting closer
China-ASEAN relations to dispel the China threat thesis and thus lessen any desire
among ASEAN countries to ally with the U.S. against China in the region. Beijing’s re
calcitrant and reluctant attitude to address the South China Sea disputes within ASEAN’s
multilateral framework and aggressive Chinese moves to assert the PRC’s claim of terri
torial sovereignty over the Spratlys were causing friction in the burgeoning ChinaASEAN relationship and were, therefore undermining Beijing’s larger strategy of resist
ing American influence in Southeast Asia. Beijing’s aggressive and assertive actions
concerning the South China Sea disputes also supported the China threat thesis by
strengthening the traditional image of China in Southeast Asia as a potential aggressor.
In short, China’s approach to the South China Sea disputes was antithetical to Beijing’s
larger foreign policy goals of strengthening relations with ASEAN and resisting Japanese
and American influence in Southeast Asia.
By 1995, as we shall see, China’s leadership realized that a new approach to the
South China Sea disputes was vital if the China-ASEAN relationship was to widen and
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deepen. It became imperative for Beijing to prevent the maritime disputes from straining
and limiting, or perhaps even preventing, the normalization of China-ASEAN relations.
The problem for Beijing was that it had to accomplish this task without compromising
China’s claim of territorial sovereignty over much of the South China Sea, which Beijing
saw as inviolable.46 We will first examine Beijing’s bilateral approach to the South Sea
disputes with both the Philippines and Vietnam, as bilateral diplomacy represents China’s
traditional approach in relations with Southeast Asia (Cognitive BaseA). Beijing’s multi
lateral diplomacy is examined next, as it serves as a key indicator of change in China’s
GND. Having said that, I must point out that in some instances Beijing’s bilateral diplo
macy also serves as an indicator of change, but this is so mostly during the second period
of this study (1997-2006).

BILATERAL DIPLOMACY
The Philippines
The dispute over the Spratlys between China and the Philippines remained quiet
since Filipino President Aquino’s 1988 trip to China, where both sides reached an agree
ment to put the territorial dispute on hold so that it would not negatively affect improving
relations between the two countries.47 However, by the time of Washington’s 1992 an
nouncement of an American military withdrawal from the Philippines and an increase in
tensions between China and the Philippines in the Spratlys due in part to Manila’s plans
for turning two islets in the Spratlys into diving resorts, Manila’s view of the PRC had

46 The issue of territorial sovereignty has always been one o f the most important issues for the PRC; an
issue that, until recently, caused Beijing considerable friction and conflict with states along China’s land
border (Soviet Union, India, Vietnam) as well as with states that share a maritime border with the PRC
(Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan).
47 The Straits Times, 26 April 1988.
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become more dubious and suspicious. Thus, at the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
(AMM) hosted by the Philippines in July 1992, President Fidel Ramos and Foreign Sec
retary Raul Manglapus demonstrated their displeasure to Beijing by attempting to inter
nationalize the South China Sea disputes just as ASEAN promulgated the Declaration on
the South China Sea (both discussed below).48 The following year, Ramos traveled to
Beijing in April for talks concerning the dispute.
During the talks, Ramos was reassured that Beijing was committed to resolving
the dispute peacefully. Further, the Chinese suggested that both sides shelve the sover
eignty issue and develop the natural resources of the Spratlys jointly.49 Ramos returned
home with a smile on his face, a result apparently of both the substantial economic
agreements and benefits gained by the Philippines, as well comforting reassurance from
Beijing that China was not a military threat to the Philippines.50 Indeed, Ramos subse
quently suggested that the Chinese economy was a model for Asia and that he was confi
dent that the PRC would not start a new confrontation with the Philippines over the
Spratlys. He cited Beijing’s agreement to take part in a future multilateral workshop
hosted by Manila on marine research in the Spratlys as evidence of China’s good inten
tions.51 The road toward increased cooperation and better relations between Beijing and
Manila, however, still had bumps and potholes ahead that had to be circumvented.
The relationship between China and the Philippines began to sour in 1994. Bei
jing was not pleased by Ramos receiving Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui at Subic Bay

48 President Ramos favored a conference under United Nations auspices to resolve the problem, while Raul
Manglapus made proposals to the AMM and ASEAN PMC that an international conference be convened
on the disputed Spratlys. See Lee, 102.
49 Lianhe Zaobao, 27 April 1993 as cited in Lee, 102.
50 The Straits Times, 28 April 1993.
51 Ibid.
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during Lee’s controversial “holiday diplomacy” nor did China approve of Manila’s li
censing of a Philippine-American offshore oil exploration project in the Reed Bank area
close to the Spratlys. According to Lai To Lee, these circumstances expedited Beijing’s
desires for, and efforts toward, an agreement with Manila for joint offshore oil and gas
exploration and development in the Spratlys.

However, just as it seemed that Beijing

and Manila were moving towards an understanding over the Spratlys, the discovery by
the Philippines of Chinese-built structures on Mischief Reef in the Philippine-claimed
Kalayaan area of the disputed archipelago began a diplomatic row between the two dis
putants. Manila lodged official protests against Chinese actions, and subsequently de
stroyed Chinese territorial markers on nearby reefs, arrested 62 Chinese anglers for
poaching, and organized a media trip to the area to publicize Chinese territorial en
croachment.53 In addition, Manila suggested taking the issue to the UN Security Council
and the International Court of Justice if no bilateral solution could be reached and also
passed a $2 billion (US) bill in the Philippines Congress for modernizing its military (na
val and air forces), building lighthouses and increasing armed patrols in the disputed
area.54 Further, President Ramos’s use of the row with China to whip up public support
of his coalition party in upcoming elections did not help relations with Beijing.55
Beijing reacted by denouncing Manila’s actions as “provocative” and, as could be
expected, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan voiced China’s objections to the

52 Lee, 105. During a meeting in June 1994, Chinese vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made
it clear to Philippines House o f Representatives Speaker Jose De Venecia that Beijing welcomed joint de
velopment of the Spratlys and shelving sovereignty issues, but at the same time indicated that China would
not welcome any internationalization o f the Spratlys dispute. See The Straits Times, 20 June 1994.
53 Lee, 105.
54 The Straits Times, 21 February 1995.
55 Lee, 106.
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internationalization of the issue.56 Nonetheless, China agreed to hold bilateral talks with
Manila to discuss the disputes. Talks commenced shortly there after covering a wide
range of issues such as cultural and economic cooperation, but failed to reach any sub
stantive agreement concerning the Spratlys specifically, save consensus to solve the dis
pute in a peaceful manner and to continue talks at an unspecified date in the future.57
Because the Mischief Reef affair marked the first instance of a territorial dispute
with an ASEAN state, China faced for the first time a multilateral reaction. The ASEAN
ministers issued a joint statement on the South China Sea on 18 March 1995 urging all
concerned parties to respect and follow the provisions of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration
on the South China Sea advising concerned parties to seek negotiated solutions through
participation in various forums.

CO

Further, during the first China-ASEAN security dia

logue held in Hangzhou during April, the Spratlys were also brought up in the discus
sions (discussed below). Increasingly, ASEAN applied multilateral pressure on Beijing,
and Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN as a full member in July only intensified that pres
sure. Therefore, the Chinese realized that some diplomatic way to diffuse the conflictual
situation in the South China Sea was necessary so that it would not undo the gains made
by Beijing in its strategy of strengthening relations with ASEAN.
During the months of April and May 1995, considerable diplomatic activity con
ducted between China and the Philippines ultimately yielded an understanding (but not a
resolution) over the Spratlys. Jiang Zemin assured Ramos by letter that the Spratly prob
lem would be resolved peacefully and that friendly relations between the two countries

56 The Straits Times, 23 March 1995.
57 Ibid.
58 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Declaration on the South China
Sea (22 July 1992). http://www.aseansec.org/3634.htm (accessed 5 August 2005).
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would continue.59 In response to increased tensions between Beijing and Manila because
of Manila’s press tour of the Spratlys, President Ramos decided on a Track II approach
and sent Filipino businessman Alfonso Yuchengco to Beijing as a special envoy to carry
Ramos’ response to one of Jiang Zemin’s letters. During his visit to China, Yuchengco
was presented with a plan for joint ventures between China and the Philippines for scien
tific surveying and developing the oil resources of Reed Bank. In addition, the Chinese
indicated that Beijing would even consider international cooperation and capital invest
ment in the project, but warned against any moves by Manila to internationalize the dis
pute over sovereignty of the archipelago.60 Concerning the structures erected on Mis
chief Reef by the Chinese, Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Yinfan stated that those
structures were available for use by Philippine fishermen, and that he hoped for the early
release of the 62 Chinese anglers arrested by Philippine authorities after the Mischief
Reef incident. Wang also announced that China would like an agreement with Manila
promoting cooperation on fishing in the area as well as preventing the arrest of Chinese
anglers in the future.61 This Track II approach seemed to yield some benefit for the Phil
ippines in subsequent Track I dialogues with China.
During the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) and the second ASEAN Re
gional Forum (ARF) meeting held during July 1995 in Brunei, Chinese and Philippine
delegates discussed their bilateral relationship (including the Spratlys issue) on the side
lines, successfully laying the groundwork for formal meetings the following month. At

59 The Straits Times, 16 May 1995.
60 Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Yinfan made it perfectly clear to Yuchengco that it would be unwise
for Manila to involve ASEAN or the United States in the dispute, adding that the Chinese military had been
restrained by Beijing from taking any action in the Spratlys, but this restraint would not be permanent if
Manila continued to take provocative actions. See Lee, 108-109; and The Straits Times, 23 June 1995.
61 The Straits Times, 23 June 1995.
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these meetings, an agreement was reached to set up panels of experts to discuss the legal
basis of their conflicting claims of territorial sovereignty in the Spratlys. More signifi
cantly, both parties agreed to formulate and implement a “code of conduct” governing
their mutual actions in the Spratlys.

The Code stipulated that the disputes in the Sprat

lys should not be allowed to adversely affect the normal development of relations be
tween the two countries, and that the disputes should be resolved in peaceful ways. Im
portantly, the Code would adhere to international law and the United Nations Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). Even more importantly, the Code represented the first instance of Bei
jing agreeing to multilateral cooperation “at the appropriate time”63 and the first official
acknowledgement by Manila of the Chinese proposal for joint exploration and develop
ment of offshore oil and gas reserves in the Spratlys.64 Following the August meetings
and agreement on a “code of conduct,” relations between the two countries improved.
Ramos released the 62 detained Chinese anglers in two batches the next month and, in
November, released another group of 14 Chinese anglers on compassionate grounds.65
During a November meeting between Jiang and Ramos in Osaka before the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, the Chinese President reiterated that the PRC
posed no threat to the peace and stability in the Asia Pacific, and that China and the Phil
ippines could resolve their differences through friendly talks,while Ramos madelittle
fuss over naval encounters off Subic Bay with ships of possible Chineseorigins.66 At a
later meeting between Ramos and Li Peng at the first Asia-Europe Meeting held in Bang

62 The Straits Times, 12 August 1995.
63 The Straits Times, 11 August 1995.
64 Lee, 110. Also, see The Straits Times, 11 August 1995.
65 The Straits Times, 10 November 1995.
66 According to Lee, Beijing denied any knowledge of the suspect ships and their activities. Lee, 110. Also,
see The Straits Times, 30 January and 12 February 1996.
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kok in March 1996, both sides agreed to keep their ships away from the disputed areas in
the Spratlys to avoid possible conflict.

f\1

Cooperation in the Spratlys between Beijing and

Manila was subsequently furthered during bilateral meetings at the vice-ministerial level
later that month, where several important confidence-building measures (CBMs) were
established to facilitate cooperation in the areas of piracy, smuggling, fishing, environ
mental protection, the establishment of communication systems for military garrisons in
the Spratlys as well initializing military exchanges between the two sides.68 Concerning
the Chinese presence on Mischief Reef, it was agreed that the issue would be set aside for
the time being.69 The agreement to put the territorial issue on hold and pursue joint de
velopment of the area was reiterated by the Chinese at subsequent interactions between
Beijing and Manila

70

The marked improvement in Chinese-Filipino relations witnessed during the later
half of 1995 and 1996 did not last. Nonetheless, Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy with Ma
nila during this period did reveal hints of a change in the PRC’s overall position vis-a-vis
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. While negotiations with Manila conformed,
for the most part, to China’s traditional strategy of seeking bilateral resolution of its terri
torial disputes in the Southeast Asian maritime environment, the Chinese acknowledg
ment that multilateral venues and CBM mechanisms concerning the Spratlys dispute
were a possibility in the future was highly significant. It suggested that shared knowl
edge (ASEAN set a high value on China’s willingness to discuss the territorial disputes
67 The Straits Times, 3 March 1996.
68 The Straits Times, 15 March 1996.
69 Ibid. Interestingly, the Chinese used the bilateral meeting to assure that Beijing’s missile tests being con
ducted at the time in the Taiwan Strait was not a threat to the Philippines nor to the 100,000 or so Filipinos
living in Taiwan, and that China’s military maneuvers would not lead to war with the ROC.
70 During Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon’s June visit to China, an during President Jiang
Zemin’s official visit to the Philippines following that year’s APEC summit held at Subic Bay in Novem
ber.
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multilaterally in its threat evaluation of China) gained earlier by the Chinese through in
teraction with ASEAN states at the yearly Track II Indonesian-sponsored workshops
(discussed below) played a part in Beijing’s subsequent reevaluation of its diplomatic ap
proach (both bilateral and multilateral) toward the most difficult problem in PRCASEAN relations.
Vietnam
The territorial dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea is ar
guably the most serious of all the PRC’s disputes in the Southeast Asian maritime region.
One reason is that both Beijing and Hanoi claim the whole South China Sea as their sov
ereign territory. Another reason is that both countries have the most substantial military
and defense presence of all the South China Sea states and, therefore, China and Vietnam
constitute the major players in the conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War and the resul
tant collapse of the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam are two of only a handful of social
ist states remaining in the world. The normalization of relations between the PRC and
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in November 1991 was, in all likelihood, a con
sequence of these major events and the resulting strategic situation facing both states.71
According to Lee Lai To, a mutual fear of “peaceful evolution” and “attempts allegedly
initiated by the West to undermine socialist regimes by stirring up issues such as human
rights” was the chief reason for bilateral discussions leading to the normalization of Chi
nese-Vietnamese relations.72 In any event, one of —if not the —major challenges facing
both sides in establishing friendly relations remains the territorial disputes along the land
border, as well as in the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea.
71 Lee, 92-93.
72 Ibid.
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At the Sino-Vietnamese Summit of November 1991, agreements were reached
concerning trade and border affairs, and during Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’s
visit to Vietnam the following year agreements on economic cooperation and visa exemption were concluded.

n'X

•

•

•

These diplomatic milestones were furthered during subsequent

high-level meetings throughout the 1990s where the two states deepened relations (espe
cially in economic cooperation): Premier Li Peng’s December 1992 visit to Vietnam;
Vietnamese President Le Due Anh’s November 1993 trip to Beijing and President Jiang
Zemin’s reciprocal visit to Vietnam late in 1994; the second visit of Communist Party
General Secretary Do Muoi to China in 1995; and Premier Vo Van Kiet’s trip to Beijing
early in 1996. The territorial issues were apparently placed on the sidelines during the
early 1990s, and both sides agreed to settle these outstanding disputes through peaceful
negotiations.74 However, as talks between Hanoi and Beijing were progressing, Vietnam
further complicated matters concerning the territorial dispute with China by awarding
contracts to quite a number of foreign firms for offshore oil and gas exploration in the
Dai Hung oil field located off the southeast coast of Vietnam —an area of the South
China Sea claimed by China.75 In reaction to Hanoi’s actions, the PRC published its
1992 Proclamation of China’s Law on Territorial Sea and made known its May 1992 deal
with the American oil exploration company Crestone Energy Corporation to drill in an
offshore area claimed by Vietnam.

73 The Straits Times, 9 March 1992.
74 Ibid. During Qian Qichen’s 1992 visit, both sides agreed to establish a group of experts to discuss the
disputes.
75 Hanoi had awarded contracts to firms from Great Britain, Australia, Canada, France, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and the Netherlands to explore and develop the Dai Hung (or Big Bear) oil
field off Vietnam’s southeast coast. See Lee, 94 and The Straits Times, 27 Junel992.
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China’s Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, ratified by the Na
tional People’s Congress in February 1992, underlined a more assertive stance in Bei
jing’s territorial claims in the region. In addition to reiterating China’s territorial claims
to the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the Law on the Territorial Sea also asserted and docu
mented China’s claim over most of the remaining territory in the entire South China Sea!
Beijing’s assertiveness in establishing its legal claim of ownership over the maritime re
gion was reinforced by an aggressive declaration of the legal right of hot pursuit against
•

•

foreign ships if they violated Chinese laws and regulations.

1(\

The PRC’s Law on the Ter

ritorial Sea cast considerable doubt among the ASEAN states concerning China’s oftstated peaceful and benign intentions in the South China Sea. As a result, China’s image
in Southeast Asia moved again toward one of “threat” and perhaps even toward an image
of “enemy-in-the-future” for certain ASEAN states. Additionally, as mentioned above,
China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) had signed a contract in May of
that year with Crestone Energy Corporation to explore for oil and natural gas in a large
area of the Wanan Bei-21 (or Vanguard Bank-21) block. These provocative moves taken
by Beijing in early 1992 were further highlighted by statements made by senior Chinese
military officers indicating the need for a more assertive and aggressive defense of
China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. General Zhang Xusan, the deputy
commander-in-chief of the Chinese navy, argued in early 1992 that China should adjust
its naval strategy and capabilities to better protect and develop offshore oil and gas re-

76 See Beijing Review, 30 March - 5 April 1992,6-7. The Chinese delegation distributed copies of the
“Law of the People’s Republic o f China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone” to the other par
ticipants attending the third workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea held in
Yogyakarta, 28 June-2 July.
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serves in the South China Sea.

77

•

•

•

In addition, statements made by the president of

Crestone, Randall Thompson, claiming that the PRC had promised to protect Crestone’s
oil exploration operations in the Wanan Bei-21 area with its naval forces, further exacer•

•

bated feelings of ill will between the two disputants.

78

The reaction from Hanoi was quick. Vietnamese officials reminded Beijing that
both sides had reached an agreement that neither side should take any provocative actions
that might complicate the situation in the South China Sea and demanded that China annul the contract with Crestone.

70

#

Hanoi, as the old saying goes, wanted to “have its cake

and eat it too.” However, in spite of the row over offshore drilling in contested waters
and the fallout from China’s 1992 Law of the Sea, Beijing and Hanoi nonetheless contin
ued to seek a diplomatic solution to their territorial disputes along the mainland border, in
the Tonkin Gulf, and in the South China Sea. These efforts focused primarily on resolv
ing the contested mainland border and the territorial dispute in the Tonkin Gulf. The
Paracels and Spratlys were apparently too controversial a topic for either side to broach in
a serious manner. An agreement was ultimately reached in October 1993 stipulating that
both sides would follow a set of general principles on handling these disputes.

80

In addi

tion, the agreement established two working groups at the expert level to conduct followup talks, one for the land border and the other for the Tonkin Gulf.

81

After many succes-

77 The Straits Times, 7 April 1992.
78 See Beijing Review (20-26 July 1992): 5; and The Straits Times, 23 June 1992. Thompson confirmed
Beijing’s promise of military protection in Crestone’s area o f operations during a telephone conversation.
Randall Thompson, interview by author, telephone conversation, July 1992.
79 The Straits Times, 19 May 1992.
80 Both sides agreed to speed up negotiations on the border, avoid actions that could complicate the situa
tion, and eschew the use o f force over border disputes. The Straits Times, 20 October 1993.
81 Lee, 95.
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sive rounds of talks, neither working group reach any tangible settlements.

89

Talks on the

South China Sea disputes were even less successful. In an attempt to jumpstart the
stalled negotiations on the Paracel and Spratly islands, a special group of experts was es
tablished to address these disputes specifically.
During Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s November 1994 trip to Hanoi, both sides
agreed to establish a group of experts (GEM) to work on this most difficult problem. The
GEM decided in July of 1995 that the Spratlys dispute could be negotiated, but not the
dispute over ownership of the Paracels. It seems that Beijing’s refusal to discuss the
Paracels was due to China’s complete military control of the archipelago. Beijing’s
agreement to put the Spratlys on the negotiating table, however, is important in that it
represented a significant and notable change in China’s historic position on the issue con
sidering that as recently as Premier Li Peng’s visit to Hanoi in late 1992 the Chinese had
been unwilling to discuss any of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

These

moves made it apparent that during the first half of the 1990s Beijing had began to soften
its stance toward Vietnam vis-a-vis territorial issues by agreeing to limited talks and co
operative projects such as the joint working groups previously discussed. In doing so,
Beijing prevented these issues from adversely affecting China’s warming relations with
Vietnam.84
At a higher level of analysis, China’s image in Vietnam had, since the end of the
Cold War, undergone change from one of “threat” and “enemy” toward an image of a

82 By January 1998, the working group on the land border had participated in eleven rounds o f talks without
any real progress, and by March, the group working on the border in the Tonkin Gulf had convened ten
rounds o f talks with results no more substantial than agreeing to base talks upon the spirit o f international
law and practice. See BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED3118, 01/07/98.
83 The Straits Times, 3 December 1992.
84 Lee, 97.
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more “friendly” and “cooperative” (while at the same time also a “competitive”) neighbor
to the north. Admittedly, the positive transition of China’s national image in Vietnam
during this period was affected mostly by increased cooperation between the two countries in economic and social-cultural issues.

Of

Both sides realized that the territorial dis

putes remained a very real and ever-present point of conflict between China and Vietnam
and, as such, constituted the greatest obstacle to improving Sino-Vietnamese relations.
Both sides, however, also believed that the benefits of warmer, closer PRC-DRVN rela
tions were of greater importance than seeking a solution of the South China Sea disputes
favorable to themselves. Both sides were, therefore, ultimately unwilling to allow the
disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys to undermine progress toward good relations be
tween the two socialist countries. The difficulty was that neither side completely trusted
the other. Because of this lack of complete trust, each side continued to make aggressive
moves and take assertive action to strengthen their territorial claims.
What is important for this case study is that Beijing’s diplomacy (however taci
turn it appeared at the time) prevented the territorial disputes from jeopardizing China’s
goal of forging closer relations with Vietnam. There is little doubt that as Vietnam
moved closer toward full ASEAN membership, Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy with Hanoi
concerning the territorial disputes became more urgent and focused, as the Chinese be
lieved that it would be far better to reach some tentative understanding with Vietnam be
fore it gained the advantage of direct ASEAN support. The Vietnamese, on the other
hand, were stalling on the South China Sea issue while at the same time moving forward
in bilateral talks and agreements with China in other areas such as trade, economic aid,
85 For example, during the visit o f Premier Vo Van Kiet to China in February 1996, an agreement was
reached for the resumption of railway connections between China and Vietnam. The Straits Times, 13 Feb
ruary 1996.
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and cultural exchanges. Hanoi would wait until Vietnam was a full ASEAN member be
fore seriously addressing the territorial disputes with China. After all, when confronting
large powerful states, it is to the advantage of small weak states to form a unified posi
tion, take collective action, and implement multilateral strategies to lessen the asymmet
rical balance of power favoring the large powerful state. This explains, in part, the lack
of any substantial progress in resolving the territorial disputes in the South China Sea be
fore Vietnamese accession to full ASEAN membership. Progress made by Beijing and
Hanoi through bilateral talks on the land border and maritime boundary in the Gulf of
Tonkin was significant and impressive, but these achievements represent “easier” conces
sions made by both sides that served to keep Sino-Vietnamese relations headed in the
right direction and mitigate tensions over the disputed Paracel and Spratly islands. Bei
jing could demonstrate its good neighborliness to Hanoi (and the ASEAN states), thereby
lessen the image of China as a “threat,” and promote its “good neighbor” image in the
region. Hanoi, on the other hand, chose both bilateral and multilateral venues to address
the territorial dispute with China, but expected greater success through the multilateral
ASEAN process. Hanoi, it seems, used the prospect of future multilateral discussion of
the South China Sea issue (where Vietnam would have the advantage of being part of a
collective in discussions with China) as advantage in its bilateral dealings with Beijing to
maximize its gains.
Through its bilateral diplomacy with both Vietnam and the Philippines, Beijing
came to realize in the mid-1990s that China would ultimately have to address the South
China Sea disputes within ASEAN’s multilateral framework as both Hanoi and Manila
sought the advantage of confronting China as a group and therefore were unwilling to
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address seriously the disputes on a bilateral level. This realization was also founded upon
Beijing’s growing understanding and appreciation of the high level of importance
ASEAN placed on Beijing’s willingness to accept a multilateralization of the territorial
disputes in its evaluation of Chinese intentions. Clearly, if Beijing wished to change
ASEAN threat perceptions of China for the better, Beijing had to accept multilateral talks
thereby demonstrating a cooperative, good neighborly attitude. Moreover, only by doing
so could Beijing prevent the South China Sea issue from jeopardizing the future of SinoASEAN relations.
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY
Track I
A major turning point in Sino-ASEAN relations occurred in July 1991 when
China received an invitation to attend that year’s ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as a guest
of the hosting country, Malaysia. It was the beginning of ASEAN’s policy of engaging
China so that this rising economic and military power might be “socialized” into accept
ing the shared norms of behavior and interaction of the ASEAN states and thereby de
crease or manage the “China threat.”86 The Chinese were eager as well to engage the
ASEAN states and promote an image of China in Southeast Asia as a friendly, coopera
tive “good neighbor.” To Beijing, this was part of a larger foreign policy strategy initi
ated in the 1980s aimed at promoting a peaceful international environment conducive to
China’s continuing economic growth and development, as well as breaking China’s post-

86 For an excellent discussion o f the complementary economic and normative perspectives o f China and
ASEAN, see Gungwu Wang, “China and Southeast Asia: The Context o f a New Beginning,” in Power
Shift: China and A sia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University o f California Press,
2005), 187-204.
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Tiananmen isolation and balancing against American regional hegemony.87 Chinese For
eign Minister Qian Qichen’s attendance at the July 1991 AMM held in Kuala Lumpur
provided Beijing an excellent opportunity to implement its GND in the region. Qian
made it clear that China desired closer relations with ASEAN and that increased coopera
tion in the economic, political, scientific-technological, and security fields would yield
mutual benefits. Chinese assistance in various high-tech sectors such as microelectron
ics, telecommunications, and aviation would greatly benefit the ASEAN economies, as
would Beijing’s backing of ASEAN’s effort at a settlement of the Cambodian issue, since
without Chinese assistance (China was the main backer of the Khmer Rouge) a solution
of the Cambodian situation was all but impossible.88 The South China Sea issue was not
addressed at the meeting, as Qian quite obviously did not wish to sour the talks by dis
cussing China’s claim of “indisputable” sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands.
The ASEAN delegates, not wanting the first China-ASEAN interaction to go badly, also
avoided this controversial issue. At any rate, the major security concern for ASEAN in
1991 was Cambodia and Chinese assistance was deemed essential for a peaceful resolu
tion of the conflict.
China’s next encounter with ASEAN at the July 1992 AMM hosted by the Philip
pines was not as copasetic as the 1991 meeting had been, as ASEAN took the opportunity
of raising the issue of the South China Sea. ASEAN states, especially the Philippines,
brought up the South China Sea disputes with China, trying to determine what Beijing’s
future moves might be. Beijing had passed its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Con-

87 See Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the new Millennium,” in China Rising: Power
and Motivation in Chinese foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2005), 159-200.

88 T
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tiguous Zone in February 1992, and signed a contract in May with Crestone Energy Cor
poration to prospect for gas and oil in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In addi
tion, Washington had announced plans to withdraw American military forces from Subic
Bay by the end of 1992, increasing the security concerns vis-a-vis China of ASEAN,
Vietnam, and the Philippines in particular.
Qian Qichen anticipated a debate on the South China Sea and preempted the issue
during his earlier bilateral talks with Philippine Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus in
Brunei. Qian stated that China would not fill any power “vacuum” in Southeast Asia,
and also that the “informal” workshop held in Bandung was a “positive” undertaking and
that China would give positive consideration to some of the understandings reached at the
workshop. Specifically, Qian maintained that Beijing fully supported the proposals of the
Chinese experts at the workshop to increase cooperation among the maritime states of the
South China Sea in the areas of navigation, meteorology, and scientific research. Qian did
not believe that the South China Sea would become a new focus of conflict, insisting that
China’s policy emphasized peaceful solution of the dispute through bilateral or multilat
eral negotiations and that the disputes over the Spratlys could be put on hold until the
time was ripe for discussion. Qian also indicated that Beijing was agreeable to joint exploration of the resources in the disputed areas.

OQ

The 1992 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila opened with a speech by Philip
pine President Ramos who set the tone of the talks by stating that the Spratly dispute
could no longer be put on hold. To the chagrin of the Chinese, Ramos called for an inter
national meeting to settle the issue. As the meeting progressed, other ASEAN states be
sides the Philippines asked specific questions concerning China’s intentions in the area,
89 FBiS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-92-141, Ql122192; my emphasis.
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especially about Beijing’s exploration deal with Crestone Energy Corporation. Foreign
Minister Qian gave somewhat ambiguous answers, stating that Chinese actions in the
area did not contradict the principles articulated earlier by Beijing.90 Not satisfied with
the answers given by the Chinese delegates, and facing growing pressure from the Philip
pines and Vietnam (attending as an “observer”), the ministers issued the ASEAN Decla
ration on the South China Sea.91 The Declaration stated general principles based on the
joint statement of the 1991 informal workshop held in Bandung and the 1976 Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation, urging disputant states to renounce the use of force and exercise
self-restraint, and set aside issues of sovereignty while exploring joint cooperation in the
area.92 The declaration, however, was for both the Philippines and Vietnam a much
weaker and watered-down version than what they had hoped.

QT

While Manila and Hanoi

were unhappy with the declaration’s timidity, Beijing only accepted a few of the basic
principles articulated in the Declaration, and rejected the remainder as China considered
areas in the South China Sea such as the Paracels and Pratas to fall outside the purview of
ASEAN. Further, the Chinese were obviously concerned that the Declaration might lead
to multilateral discussions on issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction in disputed areas of
the South China Sea, which could weaken China’s claim in the Spratlys. According to
Qian, China would only enter into such talks when the conditions to do so were “ripe.”94
Qian suggested that quiet diplomacy was the most prudent approach, as public discus

90 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-92-142, 07/23/92.
91 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Declaration on the South China
Sea (22 July 1992). http://www.aseansec.org/3634.htm (accessed 5 August 2005).
92 Lee, 25.
93 Apparently, most ASEAN officials were afraid that a more strongly worded statement might offend Bei
jing and pressure China into using the “Cambodian card” (perhaps resupply the Khmer Rouge with arms)
in retaliation. See BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Far East, FE/1438, A2/2, 7/21/92.
94 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Far East, FE/1441, A l/2, 7/24/92.
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sions might engender “a longer time for tensions to subside, or might in fact heighten cur
rent tensions in the region.”95
China’s first major interaction with ASEAN on the South China Sea disputes at
the Track I level revealed that Beijing was hesitant, to say the least, in discussing the is
sue, except to state that the PRC intended to promote cooperation and joint development
among the claimants by shelving the sovereignty issue (ideas, as we shall see below, that
the Chinese learned through earlier interaction with ASEAN states at the Track II Indo
nesian workshops). Clearly, the Chinese recognized by then that they would have to ad
dress the territorial disputes within ASEAN’s multilateral process if Beijing’s desire of
improved China-ASEAN relations was to be realized.96 Chinese participation at the 26th
AMM as a guest of hosting Singapore the following year was significant in that it re
vealed Beijing’s desire for stronger relations with ASEAN not only in economic, scientific, and technological areas, but also in security matters.

07

In a move to assuage

ASEAN fears of a growing “China threat” Qian emphasized that China did not, and
would not in the future seek hegemony in Southeast Asia. Further, Qian stated that
through dialogue at all levels and venues all parties could reach mutual understanding
and agreement regarding the principles and mechanisms underwriting regional security.
When the ASEAN ministers asked for a full Chinese endorsement and support of the
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Qian responded that following the 1992
AMM he had written to Philippine Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo (who had then

95 The Straits Times, 22 July 1992.
96 Lee, 26-27.
97 Even before the 1993 AMM, Qian Qichen made it known to Singapore’s Foreign Minister Wong Kan
Seng that the PRC would be pleased to participate with ASEAN in regional security dialogues. See FBIS,
Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-93-140, 07/23/93.
98 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-93-141, 07/26/93.
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been chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee) stating that the Declaration’s princi
ples were mostly identical with those of China." However, while Qian indicated Chinese
support for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone (NWFZ) in Southeast Asia, he also made it clear that Beijing would not neces
sarily sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as China was not geo
graphically situated in Southeast Asia.100 Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng
extended an invitation to China to join the new ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a con
sultative partner during an “informal” dinner on 24 July 1993.101
The ARF was established at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Minis
terial Conference held in Singapore in July 1993. During the ARF’s July 1994 inaugural
meeting in Bangkok, the institution identified two primary objectives: (1) “to foster con
structive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest
and concern” and (2) “to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidencebuilding and preventative diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”102 Considering that the
South China Sea disputes between China and several ASEAN states directly affected se
curity interests of many of the region’s states (who were ARF members as well), it
seemed logical that the territorial disputes should be included in the ARF’s agenda.
Vietnam and the Philippines certainly hoped that this would be the case. As could have
been expected, China objected to the disputes issue being included in the agenda.
Concerning the Spratlys problem, Qian Qichen indicated in April 1994 to senior
Thai Foreign Ministry officials that China opposed including the issue in the ARF

99The Straits Times, 24 July 1993.
100 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-93-141, 07/26/93.
101 Ibid.
102 ASEAN Regional Forum, http://www.aseanregionalforum.org (accessed 12 February 2006).
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agenda. Instead, Qian argued that the ARF should focus on confidence-building meas
ures (CBMs).103 The inaugural ARF Bangkok meeting was premised upon the theme
“Security in the Asia Pacific: Challenges, Opportunities and Confidence Building Meas
ures in the Context of Preventive Diplomacy,” but the Spratlys issue did not become a
point of contention. ASEAN officials had proposed that speakers not raise any conten
tious issues, and Beijing was eager to avoid the issue altogether.104 During his address,
Qian Qichen proposed some ideas concerning security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
and enunciated China’s policy on regional security. While side stepping the Spratlys im
broglio, Qian stated that some territorial and border issues leftover from the past had to
be resolved. And while Beijing supported the establishment of the ARF and saw it as an
excellent forum for joint exploration for “effective ways to eliminate any destabilizing
factors and strengthen and enhance peace and stability in the region,” Qian also empha
sized the importance of bilateral diplomacy in mitigating specific issues between coun
tries, citing China’s successful use of bilateral talks in building trust and confidence
(CBMs) between itself and some of its Southeast Asian neighbors.105 Exemplifying Bei
jing’s belief in bilateral negotiation, Qian utilized the occasion to pursue bilateral talks
with other foreign ministers on the sidelines of the multilateral forum. Among others,
Qian met with the foreign ministers of both the Philippines and Vietnam, but apparently
these talks only touched upon South China Sea issues in a general way.106 In an effort to
dispel fears expressed in Bangkok by some of the ASEAN states of the rise of Chinese
military and economic power, Qian proclaimed at a press conference that China advo

103 Lianhe Zaobao, 5 April 1994 as cited in Lee, 31.
104 The Straits Times, 13 July 1994.
105 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-94-143, 07/26/94.
106 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-94-142, 07/25/94.
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cated leaving sovereignty issues aside while exploring joint development of the natural
resources in the South China Sea (again, a position that China learned would be wel
comed by ASEAN at earlier informal workshops sponsored by Indonesia). Qian would
not, however discuss issues of sovereignty. Clearly, neither China nor ASEAN were
comfortable at the first meeting of the ARF with discussing the territorial disputes di
rectly. Both sides at the time placed more importance on promoting cooperation between
China and ASEAN at the higher level and using the ARF venue for discussing CBMs for
the Asia-Pacific in general, than directly addressing the difficult South China Sea is
sues.107 This reluctance of ASEAN to confront China over the maritime territorial dis
putes, however, was not long-lived.
As mentioned above, the 1995 Mischief Reef affair between China and the Phil
ippines increased anxiety among the ASEAN states, adding new fuel to the China threat
thesis, especially in Manila and Hanoi. Furthermore, following the outbreak of the Mis
chief Reef crisis, the United States (a member of the ARF) took concerted action at the
Bangkok meeting to have the Spratlys issue discussed at the second ARF meeting while,
at the same time, applying direct diplomatic pressure on Beijing concerning the Sprat
lys.108 In addition to American concerns, other countries and users of the vital sea-lanes
through the South China Sea, such as Japan, Singapore, the European Union, and even
Moscow, expressed their concern and displeasure regarding the Spratlys imbroglio.109
The failed attempt by the Philippines to gain consensus at the 1994 ARF meeting for a
107 Lee, 33-34.
108 During an April 1995 meeting in New York between Qian Qichen and Warren Christopher, Qian was
told that Washington could not support a Chinese use, or threatened use o f force to resolve the Spratlys
dispute. Additionally, the U.S. Department o f State issued a statement on the South China Sea in May de
claring that the U.S. would “view with serious concern any maritime claim, or restriction on maritime ac
tivity, in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law, including the 1992 United Na
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea.” The Straits Times, 21 April 1995.
109 Lee, 35.
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collective ASEAN position on the Spratlys revealed a strong reluctance, on the part of
ASEAN, to confront Beijing on the Spratlys issue for fear of jeopardizing improving rela
tions with the PRC. Instead, the ASEAN ministers agreed to air their views on the Sprat
lys individually at the upcoming ARF Senior Officials Meeting (ARF-SOM) in July
1995.110
Then, in March 1995, ASEAN took a stronger position with China vis-a-vis the
Spratlys dispute by issuing the Joint Statement on the South China Sea urging all con
cerned parties to adhere to the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea of 1992.111
ASEAN’s statement indicated that the Spratlys issue was increasingly becoming a major
point of contention in China-A SEAN relations. ASEAN was determined to broach the
issue with Beijing due in part to strong lobbying efforts by Vietnam and the Philippines,
and a downturn in China’s image among the ASEAN states from “cooperative” and
“friendly” toward China as a “threat.” Obviously, the territorial disputes were becoming
a problem for Beijing and had the potential to destroy recent progress toward deepening
relations with ASEAN. If China-ASEAN relations were to improve further, Beijing
clearly had to find a solution to the problem. The Chinese had to prevent the South China
Sea issues from jeopardizing relations with ASEAN while at the same time defending
and maintaining the PRC’s claims of territorial sovereignty. An opportunity to do so pre
sented itself in April 1995.
At the first ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN-China SOM) on
political and security issues hosted by China in April 1995, the Spratlys dispute was

110 The Straits Times, 23 May 1995.
111 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Twenty-eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meet
ing, Post Ministerial Conferences and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum (Jakarta: 1995): 66,
86 .
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raised, in light of the Mischief Reef Incident, even though it was not an agenda item.
China had little choice but to respond. Tang Jiaxuan, China’s head delegate, made an
unexpected move by discussing the Spratlys informally with key ASEAN officials after
dinner in a separate room. While reiterating China’s position on the disputes and voicing
Beijing’s rejection of a proposal to set up a working group to examine territorial and sov
ereignty issues of the Spratlys, Tang suggested that the Spratlys problem could be discussed at the next ASEAN-China SOM to be held the next year in Indonesia.

119

To the

Chinese, it was apparent that the Spratlys issue was becoming an international affair - the
very thing Beijing did not want - and had the potential of derailing China-ASEAN rela
tions. Clearly, the Spratlys dispute had to either be resolved or somehow made a non
issue in China’s relations with ASEAN so that Beijing’s overall plan of forging closer
relations with ASEAN and resisting American and Japanese influence in the region could
move forward. Tang’s commitment at the first ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou to fix
ture multilateral discussions about the Spratlys revealed, for the first time, that Beijing
was investigating new approaches to mitigate the negative impact of China’s territorial
disputes in the South China Sea on China-ASEAN relations. It appears that through
China’s initial interactions with ASEAN beginning in 1991, some Chinese came to be
lieve that the “ASEAN Way” of informal talks and the consensus-based approach could
be used to China’s own advantage. By agreeing to discuss the Spratlys issue in the multi
lateral ASEAN-China SOM, Beijing reasoned that China could more effectively control
the pace of the discussions (maintain the slowest possible pace) while, at the same time,
improve China’s image in Southeast Asia. A more “cooperative” and “friendly” image

112 Lee, 35. Also see Lianhe Zaobao, 24 March 1998 as cited by Lee where an article about Tang Jiaxuan
mentions the arrangements made at the 1995 Hangzhou meeting.
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could help assuage ASEAN fears of a growing China threat and thereby move PRCASEAN relations ahead.
However, China’s commitment to multilateral discussion on the Spratlys at this
time was limited only to the ASEAN-China SOM venue, as Beijing continued to resist
the issue’s inclusion in the ARF agenda where the U.S. was a member.113 Nonetheless,
this commitment to a multilateral approach is a key indicator of Beijing’s GND as it
demonstrated Chinese commitment to cooperation and promoted China’s “good
neighbor” image in the region. Apparently, the Chinese foreign policy establishment had
not yet reached a consensus on the PRC’s approach to handling the South China Sea dis
putes. While domestic Chinese politics is outside this study’s purview, it appears that the
Foreign Ministry began to favor a more cooperative, multilateral approach to the disputes
at the time, while hard-liners within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believed that
China should continue the traditional bilateral approach based on the “inviolability” of
Chinese sovereign territory. At any rate, it is important to note here that an alternative
approach to the South China Sea disputes was taking shape within the Chinese leader
ship. To some, a new approach existed that would allow China to both mitigate the illeffects of the territorial disputes on improving China-ASEAN relations and at the same
time defend PRC claims of territorial sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys.
At the second ARF meeting held in August 1995 in Brunei, China proved unable
to prevent discussion of the South China Sea issues, but Vice Premier and Foreign Minis
ter Qian Qichen could, and did, manage to lessen the severity of the ARF Chairman’s of

113 Beijing vehemently resisted the “internationalization” o f the Spratlys dispute, which explains China’s
hesitancy to discuss the issue at the ARF.
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ficial report of 1 August 1995.114 Qian’s address of the ARF delegates on Asia-Pacific
security issues did not mention the Spratlys directly, but it did give an indication of the
Chinese position on the issue. Qian stated that China
advocates the development of regional cooperation in security matters in stages in
the spirit of dealing with issues in ascending order of difficulty, and of seeking
common ground while reserving differences. For some time to come, the coun
tries concerned may hold preliminary informal discussions and consultations on
the principles, content, scope and method of cooperation in security matters.
Meanwhile, they should carry out specific activities of cooperation on which the
parties concerned have reached a consensus or which are not highly contentious,
and institute some practical and feasible confidence-building measures in a grad
ual manner. It is not enough to limit confidence-building measures to the military
sphere only; they should encompass various fields - political, economic and so
cial.115
Addressing the Spratlys specifically, Qian reiterated Beijing’s long-held position
that a solution of the Spratlys issue should be pursued through bilateral talks, contradict
ing his earlier 1992 statements as well as the promise of multilateral talks made by Tang
in 1995 at the first ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou. Chinese diplomacy must have
seemed schizophrenic to some ASEAN delegates attending the second ARF meeting in
Brunei - is China willing or not to discuss the Spratlys at a multilateral venue? In defer
ence to growing concerns over China’s increasing military power on the part of ASEAN
states, Qian emphasized that China’s military was defensive in its strategic posture and
posed no threat to the region. Further, in an attempt at mitigating ASEAN fears, Qian
announced that the PRC would promote greater military transparency in the region by

114 The chair’s report mentioned, for the first time, the South China Sea disputes specifically, stating that
the foreign ministers of the ARF “expressed concern on overlapping sovereignty claims in the region. They
encouraged all claimants to reaffirm their commitment to the principles contained in relevant international
laws and convention, and the ASEAN’s 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea.” Association of South
east Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Twenty-eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Post Ministerial Con
ferences and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum (Jakarta: 1995): 84.
115 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-95-148, 08/02/95.
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publishing white papers on China’s military modernization and national defense policies
at an appropriate time.116
Clearly, by 1995 Beijing’s approach to ASEAN and the South China Sea disputes
had moved away from a complete reluctance to addressing the problematic issue multilaterally, allowing for the possibility of such an approach in the future. This partial accep
tance of multilateral talks indicates that Beijing understood the premium placed on multi
lateralism by ASEAN as an indicator of China’s cooperative and friendly intentions.
While some more hawkish elements in Beijing continued to favor the traditional, bilateral
approach, others were coming to the realization that Beijing would have to address
China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea within a limited multilateral frame
work if China-ASEAN relations were to widen and deepen in the future. The members
of the latter group understood that it was necessary for Beijing to convince the ASEAN
states that the PRC was not a threat, but rather a cooperative partner. Agreeing to discuss
the South China Sea disputes at multilateral forums would afford Beijing an opportunity
of improving China’s image among the ASEAN countries. After all, Vice Foreign Min
ister Tang Jiaxuan committed China to multilateral discussion on the Spratlys at the inau
gural ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou.
The question remained, however, if consensus yet existed in Beijing for imple
menting the new approach. Three such multilateral forums scheduled for 1996 would
allow Beijing excellent opportunities to promote a friendly, cooperative, “good neighbor”
image of China in Southeast Asia: the ARF SOM (May); the second ASEAN-China
SOM (June); and the third ARF meeting to be held in Jakarta in July. By putting forward
116 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Twenty-eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meet
ing, Post Ministerial Conferences and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum, 66. Beijing pub
lished its first defense White Paper in November 1995.
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a friendly, more cooperative image, Beijing might deemphasize the South China Sea is
sues since they were detrimental influences on China-ASEAN relations, dispel the
“China threat” thesis, and thereby lessen American influence in the region. If Beijing
succeeded in reaffirming its GND there would be no need for ASEAN to strengthen rela
tions with Washington. In order to implement the new approach, however, Chinese lead
ers opposing the plan needed to be convinced that China could “catch more flies with
honey than with vinegar.”
At the May 1996 ARF SOM, the South China Sea disputes were discussed in
preparation for the July ARF Jakarta meeting. Accepting the fact that the territorial dis
putes would be an issue at the upcoming ARF meeting that could no longer be side
stepped, Beijing proactively ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS)117 shortly after the ARF SOM in preparation for the upcoming ARF
meeting. The UNCLOS treaty established an international legal framework for the
world’s international waters to “contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, co
operation and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of
justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and social advancement of all
peoples of the world, in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set forth in the Charter.”

I -I o

The treaty also established a legal framework for de

termining a country’s territorial borders and resolving territorial disputes, as well as de
termining and demarking international waterways and international rights of safe pas
sage. By ratifying the UNCLOS and thereby signaling to the world that the People’s Re
public of China agreed to be bound by international law (as represented by UNCLOS),
117 UNCLOS was established on 10 December 1982 at Montego Bay.
118 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Seas (UNCLOS), http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm (accessed 9 July 2005).
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Chinese delegates would arrive in Jakarta with demonstrable evidence that China was
indeed a “cooperative” player who accepted and followed international law and the law
of the sea. In addition, by following through on its earlier promise to accede to the provi
sions of UNCLOS119, Beijing reinforced an image in Southeast Asia (and beyond) of a
“trustworthy” China.
The second ASEAN-China SOM held in Bukit Tinggi in June 1996 gave the Chi
nese yet another excellent opportunity to make good on Tang Jiaxuan’s 1995 promise and
thereby demonstrate that the People’s Republic of China honored its commitments and
valued a cooperative relationship with ASEAN. Although discussion on the Spratlys is
sue was not on the agenda, the Chinese did address the disputes directly and proposed the
establishment of a working group of experts from both sides to exchange views on mari
time law. In addition, China indicated that it was willing to contribute to an ASEAN
fund to promote China-ASEAN relations.120 Beijing’s more cooperative attitude con
cerning the South China Sea issues at the Bukit Tinggi meeting must have assuaged, to an
appreciable amount, recent fears and concerns held by ASEAN associated with the rise of
China and the recent Mischief Reef affair, as well as Beijing’s 1995-96 aggressive military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait.

101

Consequentially, the ASEAN senior officials

agreed to recommend that China be accepted as one of ASEAN’s dialogue partners.
Clearly, China was no longer seen by ASEAN as an implacable “enemy,” but instead
China was coming to be viewed by the Southeast Asian states as a “competitor” who,
119 The Straits Times, 17 May 1996.
120 The Straits Times, 12 June 1996.
121 While Chinese military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait were undertaken as a warning to Taiwan against
any moves that would nullify the “One China” policy, Beijing’s actions caused alarm in Southeast Asia as
conflict between the PRC and ROC (and the USA?) would destabilize the region and detrimentally effect
trade and the economies o f the ASEAN states. Beijing was aware of this, and took steps to reassure the
Southeast Asian states that their nationals in Taiwan would not be harmed.
122 The Straits Times, 12 June 1996.
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over time, was gaining an understanding and acceptance of the rules of the multilateral
game.
At the third ARF meeting in July 1996, the South China Sea conflicts were di
rectly mentioned for the first time as an issue of discussion on the agenda. Indonesian
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, chair of the ARF meeting, welcomed the “efforts by coun
tries concerned to seek solutions by peaceful means in accordance with international law
in general and with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas of 1982 in
particular.” Alatas also noted the contributions made by the unofficial Tract II multilat
eral Workshop Series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.123 Repre
senting a more skeptical point of view concerning Qian’s May 1996 declaration, Malay
sian foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi indicated to Qian that China’s definition of its
territorial baselines had raised questions among some ASEAN members, and requested
that Qian clarify the declaration.124 The ASEAN delegates clearly desired a definitive
statement from Qian on China’s position and intentions in the South China Sea. They
wanted to know whether China constituted a continuing threat to peace and security in
the region. Was Beijing still willing to use force in defending its territorial claims over
the Paracels and Spratlys?
Lingering fears of an increasingly aggressive China among some ASEAN states
precipitated calls for a regional code of conduct for the entire South China Sea during the
1996 AMM preceding that year’s ARF meeting. Ali Alatas responded to the proposal in
a way intended to mollify the Chinese by pointing out that the proposed code of conduct

123 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Twenty-ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,
Post Ministerial Conferences and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum (Jakarta: 1996): 96.
124 Twenty-ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Post Ministerial Conferences and Dialogue Partners and
ASEAN Regional Forum, 154.
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was only an idea at that stage that needed further study.

17^

Alatas apparently did not want

to create undue friction between ASEAN and China at that time. However, Alatas had a
change of mind by the time of the third ARP meeting and pursued the idea of a code of
conduct in his opening address, stating that he was confident that the ARF could facilitate
and agree upon a mutually fashioned regional security order based upon a code of con
duct.126
In response, Qian Qichen made an important and unequivocal announcement that
China was now open to negotiations and discussions concerning the South China Sea
situation with ASEAN as a group}21 Qian explained that since China had declared its
territorial baseline along the Chinese coast and the Paracels, Beijing was now prepared to
discuss the Spratlys dispute. Referring to the Spratlys by their Chinese name, Nansha
dao, Qian commented that the situation in the Spratlys was stable. Qian’s use of the Chi
nese name for the Spratlys, however, indirectly reiterated China’s claim to the archipel
ago. However, in the name of cooperation and good neighborliness, Qian suggested that
the issue of sovereignty be shelved for the time being. China and the other disputants
should pursue joint development of the region. Qian cited China’s recent talks with the
Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam on joint development of disputed territories to support
China’s position. Qian did not address ASEAN’s call for a code of conduct, as it was a
relatively new idea that the Chinese probably desired to study further before responding.
However, Chinese Foreign Ministry representative Shen Guofang did not discount the
idea of a code of conduct for the South China Sea in answering a reporter’s question con
cerning the possibility, stating that China was willing to discuss the issue with ASEAN
125 The Straits Times, 22 July 1996.
126 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED 2673, 07/25/96.
127 The Straits Times, 31 July 1995.
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countries.128 While agreeing in principle to multilateral talks on the Spratlys, Qian also
made it clear that Beijing would not discuss other disputed territories in the South China
Sea, such as the Paracels (Xisha dao)}29 Qian, however, did stress the importance Bei
jing placed on bilateral discussions between China and other involved countries in ad
dressing the maritime disputes. To demonstrate China’s faith in bilateral talks, as well as
Beijing’s growing support of the ARF process in promoting security cooperation, Qian
indicated that China and the Philippines would cosponsor a meeting on CBMs in Beijing
the next year.
Qian’s actions and statements at the 1996 ARF meeting, directed at promoting a
friendly, cooperative image of China in Southeast Asia that was now willing to address
the territorial disputes multilaterally, were underscored by the fact that the upcoming Bei
jing meeting would constitute the first official, multilateral international forum on security issues hosted by the PRC.

1TO

The change in Beijing’s approach to the disputes began

with Tang’s 1995 promise during the first China-ASEAN SOM in Hangzhou that China
would discuss the Spratlys within a multilateral framework at the next year’s meeting.
By making good on that promise the following year at the second China-ASEAN SOM,
as well as adopting a more cooperative stance at the 1996 ARF meeting, Beijing began a
concerted effort to promote a friendly and cooperative image of China that was willing to
play by the rules. By doing so, Beijing also mollified the China threat thesis. Beijing’s
acknowledgement and acceptance of key ASEAN norms (consensus-based, informal
multilateral relations) indicates that, to a certain extent, ASEAN’s strategy to engage and
socialize China had met with success. However, ASEAN’s success was also due, in part,
128 The Straits Times, 22 July 1996.
129 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-96-144, 07/23/96.
130 Ibid.
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to a growing willingness on the behalf of Beijing to be socialized. Clearly, both sides
were learning from their interaction with one another, and consequently moving closer
toward recognition of shared interests. Interestingly, while Beijing accepted this reality
at the official Tract I level, Chinese delegates at the Indonesian-sponsored Track II work
shops, as we shall see below, were far less willing to discuss —much less reach any sub
stantive agreement —on the Spratlys disputes or other South China Sea conflicts.
Track II
China first participated in the Indonesian-sponsored informal workshop on Man
aging Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea at its second meeting held in Bandung in
1991. Wang Yinfan, then Director of Asia Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
led the Chinese delegation. From the beginning, Wang made it perfectly clear that Bei
jing would not compromise China’s claim of “indisputable” sovereignty over the Paracel
and Spratly islands, but at the same time also mentioned that since the mid-1980s Beijing
had been more than willing to shelve the sovereignty issue and pursue joint development
of the natural resources in the Spratlys.131 Further, Wang argued that it would be more
productive to begin joint development by first cooperating on less conflictual projects
such as marine pollution and the protection of maritime living resources, search and rescue operations, anti-piracy, scientific research, and safety of navigations.

i o}

In addition,

the Chinese put forth the notion of basing cooperation upon both the spirit of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as observing the require

131 See Yinfan Wang’s statement in Singgih M. Hadipranowo, ed., The Second Workshop on Managing
Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (Jakarta: Research and Development Agency, 1991): 191; here
after, The Second Report.
132 The Second Report, 127-136, and 229-232.
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ments of the International Maritime Organization and provisions of international law.133
Wang explained, however, that China did not feel that it was necessary to seek the help of
the UN nor any third party in pursuing a resolution of the South Sea disputes, nor would
Beijing discuss issues relating to sovereignty.134
Having successfully deflected any substantive discussion of territorial sovereignty
over the Paracels and Spratlys, and stressing that Beijing would not agree to the interna
tionalization of the discussions, the Chinese delegation agreed that any territorial dispute
in the South China Sea should be resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiation,
and that disputants should exercise self-restraint in order that the situation not be further
complicated.

iic

The Chinese supported their call for joint development by agreeing to

have their own experts submit proposals for scientific cooperation in investigating the
natural phenomena, meteorological conditions, and the promotion of safe navigation in
the South China Sea.

In short, Beijing was seeking a solution of the territorial disputes

without addressing de jure the question of sovereignty.
Chinese representatives at the third Indonesian-sponsored workshop, held in

1992, faced growing concerns among the ASEAN states regarding recent Chinese actions
in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Along with Beijing’s promulgation of China’s
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone that year (which asserted Chinese
sovereignty over most of the South China Sea), other actions and statements by the Chi
nese reinforced perceptions in the region of a rising China threat. For example, state

133 Lee, 62.
134 The joint statement signed by China at the second workshop states that the participants agreed to rec
ommend that their respective governments consider cooperation in the South China Sea “without prejudice
and jurisdictional claims.” The Second Report, 75.
135 The Second Report, 75.
136 The Second Report, 31.
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ments made by Vice Admiral Zhang Lianzhong to the effect that China had to be pre
pared for military conflict in the region against other disputants, which the admiral be
lieved would become increasingly likely as Chinese exploitation of the maritime re
sources intensified, and similar bellicose statements and actions undertaken by Beijing
preceding the third workshop insured a more suspicious and cautious attitude among the
ASEAN delegates concerning China.

1 37

As such, the delegates representing the People’s

Republic at the workshop had a more difficult time reassuring the ASEAN states of
China’s benign intentions in the South China Sea. They returned to China with a clear
understanding that the South China Sea issue was becoming an obstacle for China that
had the potential to jeopardize Beijing’s strategy of forging closer relations with ASEAN.
At the workshop, Chinese participants vigorously defended China’s right to award
Crestone Energy Corporation a contract to explore for oil in an area long-claimed by
China, and argued that China’s 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
was the culmination of years of hard work and careful consideration, and only served to
give legislative backing to Beijing’s long-held position on the South China Sea issue.
They maintained that Beijing was sincere in its desire for, and efforts toward, a peaceful
and cooperative relationship with the ASEAN states, and did not believe that recent Chi
nese actions would hinder efforts towards greater cooperation. Toward that goal, the
Chinese suggested that it would be better to put the issue of sovereignty aside and instead
focus on joint development efforts, such as ensuring the safety of maritime traffic.

138

At

the same time, however, the Chinese let it be known that they would not accept any non-

137 Lee points out that these more assertive actions, and hawkish statements by some senior PLA officers
concerning the South China Sea that seemed to contradict the position taken by the Chinese Foreign Minis
try, revealed differences o f opinion among Chinese leaders on handling the territorial disputes. Lee, 63-67.
138 The Straits Times, 2 July 1992.
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regional power(s) becoming involved in the territorial dispute between China and some
ASEAN states.139 Ultimately, an agreement was reached to form two Technical Working
Groups (TWGs) to look into possible joint evaluation of the natural resources and means
of joint development, and to conduct joint scientific research in the South China Sea.
When it was suggested that it might be advisable, at some time in the future, to involve
extra-regional powers or organizations such as the UN Development Program (UNDP) to
lend technical assistance, the Chinese noted their displeasure but accepted the possibility
that non-regional participation might be possible on specific projects agreed to by the
disputants.140
Beijing seemed quite willing in 1992 to move forward on joint development and
other cooperative activities in the South China Sea, but remained wary of internationaliz
ing the dispute over the Spratlys, as this might constitute a Trojan horse through which
some states (the Philippines) might bring in the United States to balance or even contain
China. While promoting an image of China as an increasingly cooperative and reason
able dialogue partner and “good neighbor” of the ASEAN states, Beijing at the same time
had agreed to nothing that might have infringed upon China’s claim of sovereignty in
both the Paracel and Spratly islands. For the moment, the issue of territorial sovereignty
in the South China Sea had not become an inhibiting factor in the growth of ChinaASEAN cooperation in general.141
By the time of the fourth workshop held in Surabaya in 1993, the two TWGs had
met but had not reached any real agreements. Two stumbling blocks prevented progress;
disagreement on whether or not the discussions should be raised to the formal level, and
139 The Straits Times, 3 July 1992.
140 Lee, 65-66.
141 T

tin
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whether or not non-South China Sea states should participate in the workshop.142 The
Chinese indicated that Beijing was not in favor of moving discussion to the official level,
as conditions were not right given the complicated nature of the South China Sea issue.
They argued that it would be more helpful to continue discussion at the informal level
where participants acted in their personal capacities.143 Regarding the dispute over own
ership of the Parcel and Spratly archipelagos, the Chinese objected to raising the issue as
an agenda item at the workshop. The PRC delegates argued that the workshop was not
the correct venue for discussions concerning such political controversies, as it would only
cause animosity and endanger cooperation. They then reiterated the familiar mantra that
such discussions should take place between China and the other disputants on a bilateral
basis.144 Beijing had not altered its traditional position concerning the Paracel and Spratly
islands (and most of the South China Sea, for that matter) —they belonged to China.
Therefore, the issue of sovereignty should not be an item on the workshop agenda.
The Chinese delegates were more enthusiastic about joint development, and had
actively participated in the various TWGs investigating ways of establishing cooperation
and CBMs between China and ASEAN. Concerning the TWG on marine scientific re
search, the Chinese agreed to develop proposals for cooperative sharing of scientific in
formation via networked databases, and agreed to host the first meeting of a newly estab
lished TWG on the environment.145 By the end of the fourth workshop, it was clear that

142 Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas suggested a need to move the talks to a more formal govemment-to-govemment format to maintain the momentum o f the workshop process and deepen dialogue, co
operation, and self-restraint among the concerned parties. See Singgih M. Hadipranowo, ed., The Fourth
Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (Jakarta: Research and Development
Agency, 1993): 72; hereafter, The Fourth Report.
143 The Straits Times, 24 August 1993.
144 The Fourth Report, 36.
145 The Fourth Report, 76.
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China was willing to cooperate in CBMs concerning technical, scientific matters, but re
mained steadfastly against any CBMs focusing on political and security issues.
By the fifth meeting of the Track II workshop on conflict in the South China Sea,
China was a consultative partner of the ARF and could therefore join ASEAN Track One
processes. As discussed earlier, China appeared reasonably comfortable with the tone
and pace of multilateral discussions at the official Track I level, as they had agreed in
principle to hold Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOMs) on political and security issues.
This was not the case, however at the informal Track II level, were the Chinese delegates
continued to resist discussion about the “Spratly and Paracel Issues” and the participation
of non-South China Sea states in projects proposed by the TWGs. It seemed that Beijing
would only discuss such issues at the Track I level.146
The sixth meeting of the workshop held in Balikpapan in October 1995 was
strongly influenced by the Mischief Reef affair earlier in the year between China and the
Philippines, as well as Vietnam’s July entry into ASEAN. Additionally, as discussed
above, the Chinese were forced into discussing the South China Sea conflicts at the Track
One discussions with ASEAN in both April and August of 1995,147 which undoubtedly
brought Beijing to the realization that the maritime territorial disputes between China and
several South China Sea states could not be kept on the back burner any longer without
jeopardizing China’s efforts of engaging ASEAN. Through interaction, the Chinese
learned that ASEAN viewed China in more ominous and threatening terms than Beijing
believed to be the case. China’s “good neighbor” image in Southeast Asia was appar
ently tarnished. At any rate, Beijing acted bilaterally on this “shared” knowledge obtained
146 Lee, 71-74.
147 In April 1995, the first Senior Official’s Meeting (SOM) between China and ASEAN took place in
Hangzhou, and the second ARF meeting convened in August o f that year.
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through interaction with ASEAN by agreeing to a code of conduct and cooperation with
the Philippines in the Spratlys (as discussed above) and multilaterally by stressing at the
China-ASEAN consultative meeting of July 1995 that the PRC was prepared to settle the
disputes according to international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).148 Beijing was determined not to allow the South China Sea dis
putes to tarnish China’s “good neighbor” image in the region and jeopardize improving
China-ASEAN relations. However, as revealed at the informal workshop in 1995, Bei
jing’s efforts of promoting China as a “good neighbor” were not yet uniformly imple
mented in Chinese regional diplomacy.
At that year’s informal workshop on conflict in the South China Sea, the Chinese
delegates refused to allow the South China Sea disputes to become formalized in the dis
cussions because, as Beijing saw things, they were already being discussed at the Track I
level. As for suggestions made by some workshop participants that new CBMs be set-up,
the Chinese refused, stating that the Workshop itself was a CBM, and therefore no other
CBMs were necessary.149 In fact, the Chinese successfully had deleted from an earlier
draft of the workshop statement specific measures suggested for the claimants to ease
tensions in the South China Sea, and were able to limit projects for joint development of
shared maritime resources to only three: a biodiversity study; monitoring tide and sealevels; and developing an exchange network of marine science data and information.150 It
was clear that Beijing would not discuss issues of territorial sovereignty at the informal
level, and favored a slow approach at the time toward joint development projects. Bei
jing’s “good neighbor” strategy had, at the time, obviously not yet fully matured. The
148 Lee, 74-75.
149 The Straits Times, 13 October 1995.
150 Lee, 76.
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issue of territorial sovereignty was far too serious for the Chinese to address at a Track II
dialogue.
The Seventh Workshop held in Batam in December 1996, following the Taiwan
Straits Crisis, failed to produce any substantive progress in addressing the Spratlys dis
pute or, for that matter, any of the problematic issues between the PRC and ASEAN
states in the South China Sea. Indeed, it appeared as though the workshop participants
were prepared to focus only on promoting the joint ventures already agreed upon (the
various TWGs mentioned above) and leave the more contentious South China Sea issues
for Track I discussion, now that many of the associated issues had become part of the
ARF agenda. Indonesia’s foreign minister Ali Alatas underlined the point that Indonesia
did not intend to transform the workshop into an intergovernmental forum, adding his
hope that “the cooperative projects proposals which the workshop has approved will soon
be implemented with the full support of the authorities concerned.”151 Much of the work
shop discussions focused on the mechanics of implementing some of the joint projects
and, as such, it was decided that many technical meetings were necessary within both the
TWGs and Groups of Experts Meetings (GEMs), and that each participating state was
entitled to host a TWG or GEM meeting.

im

Beijing agreed to host the second meeting of

the TWG on protecting the marine environment in 1997, while at the same time indicat
ing that China was not yet prepared to commence on implementing the joint project on
biodiversity in the South China Sea.

1 S3

Since China’s initial participation in the South

China Sea workshop in 1991, Beijing had intrinsically remained true to its original posi

151 Statement o f the Seventh Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, 17 De
cember 1996, 78; hereafter as Seventh Report.
152 The Fourth Report, 72.
153 Seventh Report, 78-79.
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tion of avoiding direct discussion of territorial sovereignty and instead moved slowly
forward on certain CBMs such as the TWGs and GEMs. The direct impact of the work
shops on Beijing’s regional foreign policy to this point in time was minimal. However,
as we shall see in the following chapter, “complex” learning and knowledge gained of
Self and Other through multilateral diplomatic interaction during the yearly workshop
process (shared knowledge) would impact subsequent Track I interaction (both bilateral
and multilateral) as an nascent “collective identity” was beginning to emerge. In other
words, “complex” learning gained through multilateral interaction was beginning to af
fect a change in China’s cognitive base and thus a change in China’s national identity.
This, of course, did not occur at once. In fact, as we shall see in the following chapter,
Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy concerning the territorial disputes appeared to confirm
China’s traditional Cold War image in Southeast Asia, while at the same time Beijing’s
multilateral diplomacy revealed (at least tentatively during 1995 -1996) a changing Chi
nese cognitive base (Cognitive BaseA

Cognitive Bases) and self-image away from

China’s traditional “Cold War” image based upon revisionist ideology and egoistic pur
suit of self-interest (Realpolitik politics), towards a “post-Cold War” image based upon
status-quo entente ideology and a more holistic or collective pursuit of mutual interests.
As discussed in the next chapter, the pace and intensity of China’s “complex” social
learning at multilateral venues which began during the last year or so (1995 - 1996) of
this first period of our case study, increased over time during the second period of our
study (1997 - 2006) and led to the emergence of a noticeably changed Chinese cognitive
base and national identity by 2002. This change in China’s identity due to “complex”
learning gained through multilateral diplomacy would affect a change in Beijing’s bilat
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eral diplomacy exemplified by the 2005 Tripartite Agreement between China, the Philip
pines, and Vietnam for joint offshore oil and natural gas exploration and development in
and around the Spratly Islands.
CONCLUSIONS
Several observations are in order concerning Beijing’s diplomatic approach to
China’s territorial disputes during the first half of the 1990s. Certainly, the territorial dis
putes proved to be one of the most difficult issues in China’s ongoing relations with

ASEAN. Beijing’s courtships of ASEAN, initiated at the end of the Cold War as a means
of breaking China’s Western-imposed isolation after Tiananmen, limiting both American
and Japanese influence in the region and resist a perceived American strategy of contain
ing China, and also to counter the China threat thesis, were on several occasions almost
ruined by the South Sea disputes. Beijing’s ratification of its Law on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone in February 1992, which legally established China’s territorial
claim over most of the South China Sea, certainly reinforced traditional views and images
held by ASEAN states of China as a rising threat. Further, Beijing’s contract with
Crestone Energy Corporation to explore for oil and gas in disputed waters in the South
China Sea, signed in May 1992, reinforced the traditional image in Southeast Asia of
China as a “threat” or even as an “enemy.” The Mischief Reef affair between China and
the Philippines early in 1995 only reiterated China’s threatening image in the region (as
did the Taiwan Straits crisis which occurred during the same approximate period) and
risked souring the burgeoning China-ASEAN relationship.
During 1995-1996, it became apparent to the Chinese leadership that a new approach
needed to be found in dealing with the troublesome South China Sea issues if Beijing
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were to pursue successfully its strategy of forging closer relations with ASEAN.
Through diplomatic interaction with ASEAN and member states, Beijing learned that the
Southeast Asians placed a high level of importance on resolving issues through multilat
eral dialogue (the “ASEAN Way”), and that they expected China to conform to the
ASEAN norm of consensus-based multilateral dialogue. The Chinese also learned that
the ASEAN states were no longer willing to overlook the conflicting territorial claims
over the Spratly islands because of a fear that doing so might cause ASEAN’s “engage
ment” of China to fail. Mainland Southeast Asia was peaceful now that the Cambodian
issue was resolved with Chinese help in 1991, so ASEAN no longer felt the same need as
before to “tread lightly” in its dealings with China. Beijing also learned through its inter
action with ASEAN that China’s “engagement” of ASEAN was being jeopardized by the
South China Sea disputes and, if Beijing could not find a better way to alleviate fear in
Southeast Asia of Chinese territorial aggression in the South China Sea, then the PRC’s
regional strategy in Southeast Asia would also fail. High-ranking civilians within
China’s foreign policy establishment had come to realize that aggressive and provocative
actions by China in support of its territorial claims over the Spratlys were ultimately anti
thetical to Beijing’s overall foreign policy and security strategies in the region. In addi
tion, Beijing’s reluctance to directly discuss the disputes within ASEAN’s multilateral
framework, where the smaller, weaker ASEAN states might have a better position vis-avis China as a collective group, directly contradicted the “cooperative” image of China
that Beijing wished to promote. The lessons “learned” resulted mostly from “simple” so
cial learning at the bilateral level that translated into mostly instrumental changes in Bei
jing’s GND. However, having said that, it is important to note that “complex” learning at
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the multilateral level (mostly Track II venues) began to influence China’s cognitive base
during this first period of our case study. As a source of change in Beijing’s GND, how
ever, “complex” learning would exert a much stronger impact on Chinese policymaking
during the second period of this study (especially after 2001).
Beijing’s dilemma concerning its tenuous relations with ASEAN vis-a-vis the territo
rial disputes did have a solution. The solution was illuminated several times during
1995-1996. Chinese vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan realized in 1995 at the inaugural
ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou that the Chinese would have to move forward on the
territorial disputes multilaterally if the PRC were to foster any trust among the ASEAN
states. His promise to bring the issue to the table at the 1996 ASEAN-China SOM allevi
ated some concern among the ASEAN officials about Chinese territorial intentions by
reinforcing a “cooperative” image of China. By making good Tang’s promise at the sec
ond ASEAN-China SOM, China’s “cooperative” image strengthened while the image of
China as a “threat” or “enemy” diminished. By agreeing to multilateral discussions on
the issue, China could assuage fear, promote a more positive, cooperative image in
Southeast Asia, and thereby realize Beijing’s wider geo-strategic goals in the region. Be
cause of Tang’s new approach to the territorial disputes, senior ASEAN officials agreed
to recommend to their respective foreign ministers that China be accepted an ASEAN
dialogue partner in 1996. As a result, relations between China and ASEAN continued to
widen and deepen despite the contentious situation in the South China Sea. Additionally,
Qian Qichen’s diplomacy during the May 1995 Brunei ARF-SOM and the subsequent
July ARF meeting in Jakarta also began to promote a cooperative, friendly image of
China in Southeast Asia by agreeing to address the South China Sea disputes multilater
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ally. The Chinese were learning that they could assuage fears of China by promoting a
more favorable image in the region, while at the same time using the “ASEAN Way” to
China’s advantage by circumventing the issue of territorial sovereignty.154
In short, China’s traditional bilateral approach to the South China Sea disputes was,
by 1995-1996, becoming increasingly problematic for Beijing. In order to promote
deeper Sino-ASEAN relations, some within China’s foreign policy establishment began
to understand and appreciate the necessity of pursuing a more cooperative, accommodat
ing, and friendly approach with China’s small neighbors to the south. As discussed in the
following chapter, shared knowledge (“simple” learning) obtained through interaction
with the ASEAN states caused a change in Chinese regional foreign policy toward in
creased participation in multilateral dialogue as a means of promoting a favorable image
of China aimed at countering perceptions of a China threat and thus also intended to
downplay the South China Sea issue in Sino-ASEAN relations. Promoting and deepening
economic relations between China and the ASEAN states was not enough. The diplo
matic element of China’s regional strategy had to be better developed and more intelli
gently utilized in future relations with ASEAN if Beijing were to realize any substantive
gains in China’s relationship with ASEAN. In effect, by the mid-1990s a new approach
to China-ASEAN relations was beginning to crystallize in Beijing due, in part, to lessons
learned from China’s earlier efforts at handling the territorial disputes in the South China
Sea, and also due to subtle changes in the identity and interest of each actor, as explained
154 The “ASEAN Way” is premised on informal discussion, peaceful settlement o f disputes, and consensus.
In other words, the ASEAN processes move at the pace o f the slowest member. By allowing China to be
‘socialized’ into the “ASEAN Way,” Beijing could better control the pace at which discussion o f the South
China Sea issues progressed. The Chinese could use ASEAN’s multilateral norms o f behavior instrumentally to both mitigate the Spratlys issue as a point of contention in PRC-ASEAN relations, while at the
same time slow down the pace o f discussion concerning the territorial disputes. PRC-ASEAN relations
could move forward without any substantive Chinese concessions regarding its claim of territorial sover
eignty.
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and discussed in the following chapter. As such, changes in Chinese foreign policy in
Southeast Asia during 1989 - 1996 resulted mostly from “simple” social learning ac
quired at the bilateral level. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, “complex” so
cial learning, which initially occurred at multilateral Track II forums during the early-tomid 1990s, intensified during the second period and increasingly affected a change in
China’s cognitive base and identity, ultimately causing a reorientation of Beijing’s GND.
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CHAPTER III
CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 1997-2006:
BECOMING A GOOD NEIGHBOR.

“Joe Nye talked about soft power, and in traditional [Chinese] culture emphasized by
Confucius and Lao-tzu, if you are powerful it is better to follow the kingly way [wang
dao] than the way of the hegemon [ba dao]. So China in Asia is trying to use soft power.
. . . China . . . [has] cultural power; there are many Oversees Chinese in Malaysia, Sin
gapore, [and] Indonesia, and China’s culture is important in the region.”
- Chinese Scholar, November 2003 -

“China’s intention to increase economic relationships has been well received in
Southeast Asia since it is seen as part of a “comprehensive security” strategy that
intertwines economic benefits, diplomacy, and national security to provide a
partnership for the developing nations. As a result, Beijing has garnered greater support
in regional capitals than what is perceived as Washington’s single-minded focus on
terrorism, which comes at the expense of a broader relationship, including issues of
importance to Southeast Asian nations.”
- Bruce Klingner, March 2004 -

This chapter continues our construedvist-interactionist analysis of Beijing’s
evolving foreign policy in Southeast Asia by examining the impact of interaction and so
cial learning on the reorientation of Beijing’s GND during the second period of our case
study (1997 - 2006). As we have seen, by 1995 - 1996 interaction between China and the
ASEAN states concerning the territorial disputes affected a reorientation of Beijing’s
GND to agree to address the South China Sea disputes with ASEAN as a group at Track I
dialogue processes (ARF-SOM, ARF, ASEAN Plus One). Beijing’s acceptance of offi
cial multilateral discussion concerning the disputes clearly evidences a change of China’s
cognitive base, but does it also evidence a change of state identity and interests? Accord
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ing to our constructivist-interactionist model, any change in China’s identity can only oc
cur through an acknowledgment of the new identity by the Other (Wendt’s “reflectedappraisals”).155 Our analysis of China’s image in Southeast Asia indicates that by 1996
China’s role-identity had not yet changed from that of “enemy” or “rival.” Increased
multilateral interaction between China and ASEAN during 1997 - 2006 concerning the
disputes, however, ultimately led to the social construction of a new Chinese role-identity
(“partner”) and thus to China’s “post-Cold War” identity. China’s “post-Cold War” iden
tity, however, first revealed itself within Beijing’s Track I multilateral relationship with
ASEAN in 2002 - 2003, and then later within China’s Track I bilateral diplomacy by
2005. I therefore argue below that most “complex” social learning occurred as a result of
multilateral interaction (especially Track II), which ultimately had a “spill-over” effect on
Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy. Only in 2005, when China’s “post-Cold War” identity fi
nally replaced China’s traditional “Cold War” identity in Beijing’s official bilateral rela
tions can we conclude that China’s identity and interests have indeed changed as a result
of “complex” social learning. In order to illustrate and explain this social process of
identity and interest construction which led to China’s new identity by 2005, our analysis
focuses specifically on the territorial disputes between China and the two “frontline”
ASEAN states Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as between China and ASEAN as a
group.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. China’s increasing participation in
multilateral dialogue with ASEAN concerning the South China Sea disputes as well as its
influence on Beijing’s GND is discussed first. Specifically, the continuing metamorpho
sis of China’s identity due to “complex” social learning, which began in 1995 - 1996 at
155 Social Theory o f International Politics, 327.
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the multilateral level, is addressed and analyzed. We next discuss Beijing’s bilateral di
plomacy with Vietnam and the Philippines concerning the disputes, and analyze the in
fluence of social learning on China’s “Cold War” identity (Cognitive BaseA) and tradi
tional bilateral diplomacy. The effects of an emerging China-ASEAN “collective” iden
tity on China’s South Sea disputes are discussed and analyzed, and an explanation of the
importance of the South China Sea issue to Sino-ASEAN relations is offered below. As
we shall see, both China and ASEAN came to see the territorial disputes as a side issue
that neither side would allow to damage Sino-ASEAN relations. After all, economic and
security “partners” can agree to disagree on certain issues and remove them from discus
sion, while “rivals” cannot. China had passed ASEAN’s “litmus test” in the South China
Sea by overcoming the territorial dispute issue through becoming an economic-security
“partner” of ASEAN —and by behaving as a good neighbor. Most importantly, ASEAN
threat perceptions of China (“Cold War” image) have changed. China is no longer per
ceived in the region as a serious threat to the national security and territorial integrity of
ASEAN states. Instead, China is increasingly perceived as a “good neighbor” and as an
important economic and security opportunity in Southeast Asia (“post-Cold War” image).
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY
Beijing’s initial moves towards accepting limited multilateral discussion on the
South China Sea issue during 1995-1996, taken to reassure ASEAN and member states
that China was not a threat, but rather a cooperative and responsible “friend” willing to
settle its disputes peaceably, were followed and supported by moves demonstrating that
“friendship” between states meant more than agreeable talk alone —it also meant helping
a friend or friends overcome their troubles. As discussed later in the chapter, Beijing
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took advantage of the opportunity presented by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Aided
by related perceptions held in Asia that the West (Washington) was not genuinely inter
ested in making any sacrifice or taking any meaningful action to help Asian nations (es
pecially those in Southeast Asia, where the crisis began and had the greatest impact) in
their time of need, China demonstrated its friendship with Southeast Asian countries by
assisting in the economic recovery of the financially-crippled states.
Besides widening the scope of China’s GND from its initial bilateral security ap
plication in the South China Sea disputes with Manila and Hanoi into financial and eco
nomic aspects of Sino-ASEAN relations, Beijing also began in 1997 to greatly deepen
China’s multilateral interaction with ASEAN and thereby facilitate a continued strength
ening of China-ASEAN relations by reiterating an image of China as a friendly, coopera
tive, and responsible “good neighbor” that need not be feared. Beijing’s strategy of ex
panding Chinese-ASEAN relations (especially in the realm of trade and economics) was
subtly linked with Beijing’s bilateral approach in handling China’s territorial disputes
with Vietnam and the Philippines. When China found itself facing amplified pressure
from Manila or Hanoi over the South China Sea disputes, Beijing’s usual diplomatic
countermove was to demonstrate China’s friendly and non-threatening intensions in the
region by making concessions at either the bilateral or multilateral level. Examples of bi
lateral concessions include joint cooperation in CBMs, proposals for joint offshore oil
exploration and development in disputed territories, agreements to settle disputes peace
ably, and favorable economic or trade agreements. On the multilateral level, an excellent
example of Chinese concessions to ASEAN is increased participation in the various
ASEAN processes demonstrating to the ASEAN states that China was indeed becoming
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“socialized” to the “ASEAN Way” (normative as well as constitutive norms). Beijing
repeatedly demonstrated that China valued cooperation and dialogue over the use of
force. Other examples of multilateral concessions include participation in the Indone
sian-sponsored Workshop on Preventing Conflict in the South China Sea and the ARFsponsored Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) workshops
on maritime security, cooperation on transnational crime, CBMs, and human trafficking
(both Track II mechanisms), and agreeing to discuss the South China Sea issue at the
ARF, China-ASEAN summits and APT meetings. In the economic realm, Beijing made
numerous concessions in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with ASEAN and
individual member states. Beijing’s proposal and support of the China-ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is perhaps the best example of Chinese economic conces
sions as it gives preferential treatment in some issues to China’s ASEAN trading part
ners). Obviously, Beijing undertook these moves to widen and deepen Sino-ASEAN re
lations in a general sense; but, as we shall see, these actions were also intended to exert a
favorable influence (directly or indirectly) on China’s position in the South China Sea
disputes by emphasizing and strengthening China’s positive image in the region. Con
currently at the multilateral level, Beijing would strengthen China’s “cooperative” and
“responsible” image in Southeast Asia by widening its participation with ASEAN in gen
eral, and by agreeing to expand multilateral discussion of the South China Sea issues
within certain ASEAN forums. Also, by employing an adapted version of the “ASEAN
Way” of informal, consensus-based approach in Sino-ASEAN relations, Beijing could
demonstrate good faith by discussing the Spratlys and thus mitigate the “China threat”
thesis by strengthening China’s “good neighbor” image in the region while, at the same
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time, stall on the territorial sovereignty issue through participating in protracted talks,
working groups, and cooperative projects in less controversial areas such as scientific re
search and search and rescue operations in the South China Sea.156 As discussed later in
the chapter, Beijing could sublimate the territorial disputes within the larger context of
China’s improving and deepening economic and political relations with ASEAN and with
its member states. Moreover, importantly, Beijing could accomplish this without directly
compromising China’s claim of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. China
could “have its cake and eat it too.”
1997 Asian Financial Crisis
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 marked an important turning point in
Sino-ASEAN relations for several important reasons. First, Washington’s shortsighted
and imperceptive response to the Asian financial crisis damaged American political capi
tal and legitimacy in the region while at the same time presented Beijing with an excel
lent opportunity both to underscore its GND approach to Sino-ASEAN with concrete,
tangible action, and to increase Chinese influence and perhaps weaken the U.S. position
in Southeast Asia. Washington’s refusal to assist Thailand after the devaluation of the
Baht and support of a proposed Asian Monetary Fund, as well as the U.S. Treasury De
partment’s implementation of anti-dumping measures that retarded the recovery of Asian
export levels, clearly disappointed ASEAN and its member states. The United States
seemed to be indicating that Southeast Asia as a region was no longer as critically impor
tant as it had been during the Cold War. Second, by resisting a devaluation of the Ren

156 The consensus-based approach allows progress in matters to proceed at the pace o f the slowest, most
hesitant participant. In essence, by agreeing to discuss the territorial disputes within some o f the multilat
eral processes o f ASEAN, Beijing could better control the pace at which ASEAN handled the matter.
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minbi (Chinese Yuan) and taking actions to support and strengthen the weakened South
east Asian economies, Beijing intensified China’s image as a “good neighbor” willing to
act altruistically (indeed -- even act against China’s immediate self-interest) and coopera
tively to help its neighbors in distress and, as a result, overcame much lingering mistrust
of China in the region.157 Third, the 1997 Crisis reveals a changed Chinese “roleidentity” in Sino-ASEAN relations, from that of “economic rival” to that of “economic
cooperator.” Beijing’s understanding of global economic interdependence (interdepend
ence is one of Wendt’s four “master variables” of systemic change) led to the view that
Chinese security in the 21st Century could no longer be defined in traditional militarystrategic terms alone, but also defined in economic terms. For China and many of the
ASEAN states, national security after 1989 became defined in mostly domestic terms as
internal threats such as social-political instability, insurgency and separatist movements
posed the most immediate concern for the respective governments. Pronounced social economic disparities in many ASEAN states is the basis of much domestic instability
and, as such, economic growth and wealth creation are crucial factors in a government’s
ability to maintain its legitimacy to rule (or its ability to control power, as the case may
be). Therefore, Beijing’s promotion of “comprehensive security” in Southeast Asia link
ing economic and security issues together —the “economic-security nexus”158 —was

157 In June 1997 Thailand devalued the Baht setting-off a chain-reaction of devaluations in other Asian
countries, resulting in a 14% contraction o f Indonesia’s economy, Singapore’s worst economic recession in
40 years, and varying degrees o f economic stagnation in Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea. See
Paul Dibb, David P. Hale, and Peter Prince, “Asia’s Insecurity,” Survival 41 (Autumn 1999): 5-20. Also
see Hugh De Santis, “The Dragon and the Tigers: China and Asian Regionalism,” World Policy Journal
(Summer 2005): 24-25.
158 Thomas G. Moore makes a convincing argument that the emergence of economic security (jingji anquari) as a central concept in China’s foreign policy discourse is a major factor in breaking down traditional
conceptual barriers between security and economic affairs in the minds o f Chinese leaders. See Thomas G.
Moore, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age o f Globalization,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in
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well-received by ASEAN. As such, shared knowledge between China and the ASEAN
states that they defined national security in the same terms (focus on internal threats) and
had the same distaste for Washington’s human rights campaign in Asia (perceived as an
American intrusion into the internal affairs of sovereign nations), led to “complex” learn
ing of Self and Other, which began to change “role-identities” in the Sino-ASEAN rela
tionship. A collective identity between China and ASEAN as “Asian states” began to de
velop in 1997, which resulted in changing economic and social “role-identities” from
those of “economic rival” and “ideological rival” to those of “economic cooperator” and
“Asian-values state.” The change in economic “role-identities” in turn precipitated a
change, beginning in 2002, in China-ASEAN security “role-identities” from “security
cooperator” to “security partner.” Clearly, China was beginning to think and act in the
context of a budding “collective identity” (holistic Self) between China and the ASEAN
states by the time of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. In addition, besides not taking
advantage of the financial crisis by devaluing its currency, China also extended financial
help to both Thailand and Indonesia, an act that contrasted strongly with the austere
measures taken by western financial institutions and the United States. Finally, if the
West (U.S.) appeared to Southeast Asian leaders as being less-than-concemed about
Asia’s financial problems, then Beijing’s actions during and after the Asian Financial
Crisis demonstrated that China was concerned and was willing to help its neighbors to the
south in substantial ways. Beijing reassured the ASEAN states that together, “we” will
pull through these difficult times. Beijing demonstrated that its “good neighbor” diplo

Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers,
2005), 121-158.
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macy was more than empty words and that China was indeed sincere in its desire for co
operative, friendly, and mutually beneficial relations with ASEAN.
According to David Shambaugh, “[China’s] assistance punctured the prevailing
image of China in the region as either aloof or hegemonic and began to replace it with an
image of China as a responsible power.”159 Alice Ba explains the significance of the
Asian Financial Crisis to Beijing’s new diplomatic approach in Southeast Asia:
Specifically, the crisis provided China with opportunities to demonstrate its po
litical and economic value as a partner, even a regional leader. China was espe
cially able to take advantage of ASEAN’s disappointment with the international
response to the economic crisis. ASEAN found International Monetary Fund
(IMF) conditions intrusive, inappropriate, and insensitive to specific economic
and political conditions in affected countries; however, its greatest unhappiness
lay with the US, which was not only associated with the problematic IMF condi
tions but also was viewed as benefiting from Southeast Asia’s financial prob
lems.160
Beijing’s deft diplomacy and superb handling of the financial crisis gained China great
credibility and trust among the ASEAN states by decisively demonstrating that the PRC
was indeed a “good neighbor” whose actions were predicated upon cooperation, multilat
eralism, and a non zero-sum mentality. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 pro
vided Beijing the pretext and opportunity to widen the implementation of China’s new
GND and demonstrate that China was a rising yet cooperative and friendly neighbor.
Beijing’s actions in support of the ASEAN states’ economies during the Financial Crisis
demonstrated that China did indeed support its rhetoric about pursuing mutual benefit and
non-zero sum policies in its foreign relations with concrete, tangible action. Clearly, by

159 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” 68.
160 Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Centruy Asia,” Asian Survey 43, no.
4 (July-August 2003): 635.
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the end of 1997, China was viewed by ASEAN as being an “economic cooperator” and a
“good neighbor.”
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
Beijing used various multilateral forums to apply its GND approach directly to the
territorial disputes. China’s earlier pledges to discuss the South Sea disputes at the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was honored, but Beijing steadfastly refused to enter
into any discussion concerning issues of sovereignty, limiting Chinese participation to
discussions concerning CBMs. This refusal was based on China’s adamant rejection of
internationalizing the South China Sea disputes. And therefore, since the United States,
Japan, Russia, and other ethnically non-Asian powers were ARF members, Beijing
merely made minor concessions within the ARF mechanism designed to promote a coop
erative, responsible “good neighbor” image as well as prevent any meaningful movement
forward on the South Sea issue by stalling on substantial points and agreeing to cooperate
in less contentious joint activities such as working groups and CBMs.
Beijing worked assiduously within the ARF framework to deepen China’s rela
tions with ASEAN. In 1997, China and the Philippines co-hosted intercessional meetings
on confidence-building measures. The PRC also hosted several other meetings of the
ARF, such as the ARF Professional Training Program on China’s Security Policy, the
fourth ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges, and the ARF Seminar on military
logistics outsourcing (September 2002). Throughout the period, Beijing also regularly
submitted annual defense policy white papers to the ARF.161 In May 2002, Beijing pre
sented a position paper at the ARF arguing for improved cooperation on non-traditional
161 Bates Gill, “China’s Evolving Regional Security Strategy,” in Power Shift: China and A sia’s New Dy
namics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2005), 255-59.
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security issues. The paper committed China to playing a major role in working with
•

other countries to resolve these issues.

1(s)

•

•

Again, this action served to strengthen China’s

image as a cooperative and responsible “good neighbor” in Southeast Asia while in the
same instance permitted Beijing to side step any specific discussion over the territorial
disputes and prevent the issue from becoming internationalized. Most of Beijing’s dip
lomatic activity at the ARF concerning the South China Sea disputes was undertaken in
an indirect fashion. Substantive Chinese multilateral action directly concerning the dis
putes, as we shall see below, took place within other ASEAN dialogues outside the ARF
process.
Concerning the territorial disputes specifically, Beijing did expand its discussion
of the South China Sea issues to several indigenous ASEAN Track I venues such as the
ASEAN-China Summits, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Senior Officials Meetings
(SOMs), Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs), and ASEAN Plus Three (APT), while
avoiding discussion of the disputes at other multilateral venues where non-Asian powers
(the United States and its allies) were present. However, China refused to discuss (and
continues to refuse) the issue of territorial sovereignty at multilateral forums while, at the
same time, promoting a cooperative, friendly image of China in the region by proposing
joint development of the disputed areas as well as increasing economic, technical, scien
tific and social interaction between China and the ASEAN states in general. At the same
time, Beijing deemphasized the military component of its grand strategy. The fact that the
territorial disputes have not had a detrimental effect on the deepening of China’s relations
with ASEAN and ASEAN member states (especially Vietnam and the Philippines) offers
162 Ministry of Foreign Affairs o f the People’s Republic o f China, China’s Position Paper on Enhanced
Cooperation in the Field o f non-traditional security issues, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn /eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/
gizzyhy/2612/2614/tl5318.htm (accessed 6 February 2006).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100

evidence of the salience and success of Beijing’s GND in Southeast Asia. As in China’s
bilateral relations with Vietnam and the Philippines, Beijing has pursued a strategy since
1996 of defining security in much wider and inclusive terms (“comprehensive security”
or “new security”) to include, in addition to military security, political, economic, and
cultural security.163
The New Security Concept
The “economic-security nexus” constitutes the foundation of what Beijing has
come to call the “New Security Concept” (xin anquan guandian, or NSC). At the multi
lateral level, Beijing’s application of the NSC as a component of China’s GND approach
to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea allows Beijing to deemphasize military
security —and thus lessen perceptions in Southeast Asia of possible Chinese military ag
gression —by placing much greater emphasis on economic security. In this way, Beijing
has linked the South China Sea issue to wider aspects of Sino-ASEAN relations in which
the PRC has more latitude in making concessions to promote China’s “good neighbor”
image in the region and thereby dispel the “China threat” thesis. Most of these concilia
tory moves have been in the form of increased Chinese trade and intensifying economic
relations with the ASEAN states —areas in which Beijing can utilize China’s expanding
economy and increasing national wealth in pursuing the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.
This became especially true during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 - 1998, that sub
stantially weakened the Southeast Asian economies and led to related domestic security

163 See Tang Yongsheng, “Zhonghe anquan yu zongti zhanlue,” [Comprehensive security and grand strat
egy], Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs] (Beijing), no. 20 (October 16, 1996): 16-17 cited by Fei-ling Wang,
“Beijing’s Incentive Structure: The Pursuit o f Preservation, Prosperity, and Power,” in China Rising:
Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowan
& Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 26.
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problems for some ASEAN states (Philippines and Indonesia). By emphasizing eco
nomic aspects in Sino-ASEAN relations and lessening the traditional political-military
focus of China’s grand strategy, Beijing successfully refuted the “China threat” thesis
and, more specifically, greatly diminished perceptions in Southeast Asia of the use of
force by China in asserting its claims of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.
China’s NSC represented a conclusion reached by the Chinese leadership in 1997
that economic and security issues were becoming increasingly linked in the 21st Century
due to the effects of economic globalization on world order. As early as 1999, the NSC
was used as a medium by Beijing for applying the GND indirectly to the South China Sea
disputes —the “economic-security nexus.” China’s NSC stresses that relations among
states should be based upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, that states
should not interfere in others’ internal affairs, that the promotion of mutually beneficial
economic contacts creates a stable security and economic environment, and that greater
dialogue promotes trust and allows the peaceful settlement of disputes.164 Even without
mentioning the South Sea disputes directly, the broad design of China’s NSC was also
salient vis-a-vis China’s territorial disputes as they represented one, if not the most seri
ous security concern for ASEAN in the South China Sea. The stipulations and reasoning
behind the NSC would be meaningless and empty (and therefore most likely rejected by
ASEAN) if not also applied to the South China Sea issue. The linkage between the allencompassing design of China’s NSC and the territorial disputes did not need to be stated
specifically. Chinese leader Jiang Zemin elaborated on the NSC in a major foreign pol
icy speech given in March 1999:
164 Robert Sutter gives a good overview o f similarities between ASEAN’s cooperative security concept and
China’s NSC. Robert Sutter, “China’s Regional Strategy and Why It May Not Be Good for America,” in
Power Shift, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2005), 289-305.
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The world is undergoing profound changes which require the discard [sic] of the
Cold War mentality and the development of a new security concept and a new in
ternational political, economic, and security order responsive to the needs of our
tim es.. . . The core of the new security concept should be mutual trust, mutual
benefit, equality and cooperation. The UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peace
ful Coexistence and other universally recognized principles governing interna
tional relations should serve as the political basis for safeguarding peace while
mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity are its economic guaran
tee. To conduct dialogue, consultation and negotiation on an equal footing is the
right way to solve disputes and safeguard peace.. .. Only by developing a new
security concept and establishing a fair and reasonable new international order
can world peace and security be fundamentally guaranteed.165
Jiang’s Geneva speech in 1999 articulated publicly a conclusion reached by the Chinese
leadership in 1997 concerning economic globalization and its influence in shaping a new
21st Century world order; economic and security issues would increasingly share a com
mon vision and, as such, the “economic-security nexus” should become the central focus
of Chinese foreign policy discourse.166
In May 2002, China presented a position paper at the ARF arguing for improved
cooperation on non-traditional security issues. The paper committed China to playing a
•

•

♦

major role in working with other countries to resolve these issues.

1 f\l

A formal position

paper followed in July, explaining China’s New Security Concept (NSC) and linking the
NSC to the mission of the ARF.168 In a speech made on 31 July at the 2002 ARF Minis
terial Meeting (AMM), Tang Jiaxuan referred to a change in the global security situation
“in which traditional and non-traditional security factors are intertwined,” and stressed
165 "Promote Disarmament Process and Safeguard World Security," Address at the Conference on Disar
mament, Geneva, by Jiang Zemin, President o f the Peoples Republic of China (26 March 1999).
http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/jiang99.htm (accessed 24 June 2006). The principles o f China’s New
Security Concept were reiterated in China’s National Defense (Beijing: Information Office o f the State
Council, October 2000).
166 For a clear explanation of the economic-security nexus in Chinese foreign policy, see Moore, “Chinese
Foreign Policy in the Age o f Globalization,” 121-158.
167 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the People’s Republic o f China, China’s Position Paper on Enhanced
Cooperation in the Field o f non-traditional security issues, http://www.finprc.gov.cn /eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/
gizzyhy/2612/2614/tl5318.htm (accessed 6 February 2006).
168 “China’s Evolving Regional Security Strategy,” p. 256.
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the need for countries to address security issues in a new, mutually cooperative way.
Tang maintained that individual states could no longer adequately deal with the new
global security issues by themselves, and that “multilateral cooperation is the only way to
tackle them.”169 Interestingly, the NSC (as explained by Tang) strongly resembled the
“ASEAN Way” as the NSC was based “on building mutual trust through dialogue, set
tling disputes through negotiation, and seeking security through cooperation.”170 China’s
concept of mutual security was subsequently reiterated that same year during Tang Jiaxuan’s address of the UN General Assembly.
In his UN speech of 2002, Tang declared, “security is no longer a zero-sum game.
Its mutuality is obviously on the increase, as countries have to come to realize that they
have common security interests and feel a greater sense of interdependence.”171 Tang
continued, stating that in response to the new global security environment, China had de
veloped a New Security Concept (NSC) based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality,
and cooperation:
By mutual trust, we mean that countries should rise above their differing ideolo
gies and social systems, abandon the Cold-War mentality and power politics
mindset, and refrain from misgivings and hostility against each other. Instead,
they should go in for frequent dialogues and briefings on their security and de
fense policies or the major actions they are about to take.
By mutual benefit, we mean that a country, in keeping with the objective re
quirements of the development of globalization, should respect the security inter
ests of others while pursuing the interests of its own, help create conditions for the
better security of others while making itself more secure, thus achieving universal
security.
By equality, we mean that every country, big or small, strong or weak, is a mem
ber of the international community. All countries should respect each other, treat
each other as equals and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs, so
169 Tang Jiaxuan, speech at the 9thARF Foreign Ministers Meeting, 2002.
170 Ibid.
171 Tang, speech to UN General Assembly, 14 September 2002.
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that international relations will become more democratized.
By cooperation, we mean that countries should resolve their disputes through
peaceful negotiations, carry out extensive and deep-going cooperation on their
shared security concerns and help eliminate hidden dangers and prevent wars and
conflicts from happening.
All in all, our new security concept is aimed at increasing mutual trust through
dialogue and promoting common security through cooperation.
It is in the spirit of this new security concept that we in China have been working
hard to promote the mechanisms for regional security dialogue and cooperation,
cherishing and actively participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and the ASEAN Regional Forum and endeavoring, together with other countries
in the region, for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific security framework geared
to dialogue, rather than confrontation.172
David Shambaugh argues that Chinese participation in multilateral organizations,
especially the various ASEAN forums, precipitated a change in Beijing’s view of multi
lateralism from traditional suspicions that the U.S. used such venues as a means of con
taining China, toward a new supportiveness of the multilateral process:
After a year or two of sending observers to the meetings of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP),
and nongovernmental track 2 meetings, China’s Foreign Ministry became more
agnostic and more open to learning about them. Chinese analysts soon discovered
that the United States did not control these organizations; to the contrary, it be
came evident to China (and other Asian participants) that Washington tended to
dismiss of ignore them. Chinese delegates to these organizations further discov
ered that the cooperative security approach adopted by these organizations, as
pushed by the ASEAN states and Japan, was compatible with China’s new secu
rity concept (NSC), which Chinese officials had begun to discuss in the late
1990s.173

Interestingly, while China’s image as a friendly, cooperative, and peaceful ascending
power in Southeast Asia was becoming stronger, the United States was increasingly per

172 Tang, speech to UN General Assembly, 14 September 2002.
173 “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” 69.
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ceived in the region as a growing threat to world peace due to Washington’s preparation
for the American (almost) unilateral invasion of Iraq. Considering the authoritarian na
ture of some ASEAN states, it is not surprising that Washington’s intervention policy
(regime change) in the Middle East was not well received in some Southeast Asian capi
tals —especially in the Islamic states of Malaysia and Indonesia. As such, Beijing’s
championing of state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sover
eign states was well received in Southeast Asia and helped to promote a favorable image
of China in the region. As one Singapore businessman observed, China was trying to
help its neighboring countries while, at the same time, the United States was perceived in
Southeast Asia “as a country involved more and more on it own foreign policy agenda,
and strong-arming everyone onto that agenda.”174 Beijing capitalized on the world’s in
creasing concern about Washington’s hawkish and aggressive unilateral foreign policy by
stressing and strengthening China’s image in Southeast Asia as a peaceful, cooperative,
and responsible neighbor.
The “Peaceful Rise” Thesis
In addition to the NSC component of the GND, Beijing began in early 2003 to ar
ticulate the “peaceful rise” (hepingjueqi) thesis that China could ascend to great power
status in Asia without upsetting the international order. The “peaceful rise” thesis di
rectly contradicted the conventional realist wisdom underwriting the “China threat” thesis
promoted by mostly American analysts, that rising powers pose an increasing challenge
to the hegemonic power (as well as threaten the international system organized and main

174 As quoted in Jane Perlez, “Asian Leaders Find China a More Cordial Neighbor,” New York Times, 18
October 2003.
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tained by the hegemon), that necessarily results in conflict between the rising and hege
monic powers.
Zheng Bijian, senior CCP adviser, first advanced China’s “peaceful rise” thesis in
Spring 2003. According to Ming Wang, the Chinese leadership became greatly con
cerned about foreign perceptions of a growing “China threat” after Zheng returned from
heading a Chinese mission to Washington in December 2002. Zheng, a former executive
vice president of the Central Party School and currently head of the China Reform Fo
rum, used his high standing in the CCP to empress upon the Chinese leadership the im
portance of alleviating foreign (American) concern of China’s rise. Zheng argued that
China’s peaceful rise, begun in 1978 and continuing into the mid-twenty-first century,
would mark a transition in Chinese foreign policy from a traditional approach based upon
China being a developing country focused on domestic issues to one predicated upon
China’s potential as a regional and global power.175 Zheng was subsequently placed in
charge of the Central Party School’s large “Peaceful Rise” project in early 2003.176 Ap
parently, Hu Jintao personally and promptly approved the project (as well as Zheng head
ing the project) and decided to allow the school to take a leading role in formulating Chi
nese foreign policy as evidenced by the project’s “unheard of sum” of over 2 million
Yuan funding.177 In late 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated the “peaceful rise”
theme in a speech at Harvard University. In his 11 December speech, Wen stressed
China’s peaceful intentions, stating, “we are determined to secure a peaceful international
175 Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States,” Journal o f
Contemporary China 14, no. 44 (August 2005): 412-413. Also see Yiwei Wang, “The dimensions of
China’s peaceful rise,” Asia Times. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html (accessed 16 April 2006).
176 Ming Wang, “Democracy and Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China Rising: Power and
Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowan & Little
field Publishers, 2005), 296.
177 Wang also points out that Zheng’s team included scholars outside the Party school, also indicating the
great level o f importance given the project. Ming Wang, 296.
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environment and a stable domestic environment in which to concentrate on our own de
velopment and, with it, to help promote world peace and development."178
One of the central tenets of the peaceful rise thesis, stressed repeatedly by Chinese
political leaders and academics, is that the PRC would never seek regional hegemony in
Asia and that China’s rise would benefit other Asian nations. Li Junru, Vice-President of
the Central Party School, pointed out the benefits of China’s rise to neighboring coun
tries, stating that it would not “damage the interests of other Asian countries. That is be
cause as China rises, it provides a huge market for its neighbors. At the same time, the
achievements of China’s developments will allow it to support the progress of others in
the region.”179 Ruan Zongze, Vice Director of the China Institute of International Stud
ies, furthered the benefits argument concerning China’s rise by emphasizing that a
stronger China could play a larger role in regional stability. Ruan argued that China’s
development “is conducive to security and stability in the region.” He continued:
China lies at the joint of the “curve of turbulence” through Eurasia continent to
northeast Asia and this region is where the interests of major powers converge
and therefore has many “hotspots.” A stronger China would have more leverage
in mediating regional conflicts, and thus contributing to cooperation.”180

ASEAN-China Summits
Quite interestingly, China’s approach to the South Sea disputes and to Southeast
Asian security issues in general, from the late 1990s on has been based upon initiating
many dialogue processes with ASEAN outside the ARF framework. Beijing’s growing

178 Chinese Embassy in the United States, “China’s Peaceful Rise Relies on Own Efforts for Development:
Premier.” http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/first%20beginning/t56059.htm (accessed 15 May 2006).
179 Jifan Zan, “Peaceful Rise,” Beijing Review. http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200416/BoaoSpecial200416(B).htm (accessed 9 July 2006).
180Zongze Rong, “What are the implications of China’s peaceful rise to the world?”
http://www.crf.org.cn/peaceful rise/ruanzongze2.htm (accessed 12 February 2006).
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commitment to accept ASEAN norms continued within the annual ASEAN-China Sum
mits. At the 1997 summit, Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed a joint statement on
“ASEAN-China Co-operation towards the 21st Century” that outlined basic principles for
expanding PRC-ASEAN relations in economic, political, and security issues. Specific to
the South China Sea disputes, the joint statement reiterated earlier agreements between
China and ASEAN on the rejection of the use of force to settle outstanding territorial dis
putes in the region and the necessity of continuing dialogue based on international law
and the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Importantly, the state
ment also made clear the fact that both the ASEAN states and China desired a more co
operative and mutually beneficial relationship, and that both sides agreed, “not to allow
existing differences to hamper the development of friendly relations and co-operation.”

1O 1

By signing the joint statement, Jiang also reaffirmed China’s support of other ASEAN
initiates, such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and the Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in Southeast Asia.182 In return for Beijing’s expanded ac
ceptance of ASEAN norms, the joint statement included a brief declaration of ASEAN’s
continued support of the “one China” policy.
During the November 2002 China-ASEAN meeting, Beijing took a significantly
different approach regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea by agreeing to the
terms of the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea of
1992. In doing so, China relaxed its traditional South China Sea strategy of pursuing bi
181 See BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia-Pacific, FED 3105(18 December 1997).
182 Jiang indicated that China had reservations about the wording o f the NWFZ concerning the accession of
nuclear weapons states to the protocol o f the treaty, and pointed-out that negotiations were still ongoing.
At the time, it seemed that China was concerned that ratifying the NWFZ treaty would adversely affect its
territorial claims over the South China Sea. However, Beijing overcame its reservations, and announced in
July 1999 that the PRC would be the first nuclear weapons state to accede to the NWFZ. See Lee, “China’s
Relations with ASEAN: Partners in the 21st Century?”, 65, 70, and The South China Morning Post, 28 July
1999.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109

lateral talks with other disputants while avoiding multilateral venues,183 by accepting an
essentially multilateral code of governance.

1S i

The Declaration was the first political

document signed between China and ASEAN concerning the territorial disputes, and
marked a most significant and important step toward lessening the possibility of conflict
in the South China Sea. The agreement stipulated that China and ASEAN reaffirm their
commitment to the principles of the UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the principles of international law,
and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). In addition, the dec
laration committed concerned parties to reject the use of force and pursue a peaceful reso
lution of territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly negotiations between
states directly concerned, as well as exercising self-restraint in conducting activities that
would complicate or exacerbate tensions, including refraining from inhabiting uninhab
ited islands, reefs, shoals, etc. The Declaration also stipulated that pending a comprehen
sive and lasting settlement of the disputes, disputant states could explore and undertake
cooperative projects concerning marine pollution, search, and rescue operations, scientific research, and combating transnational crime.

18^

China’s acceptance of the Declara

tion in 2002 represents the first manifestation of China’s changed security “role-identity”
from that of “security cooperator” to that of “security partner.”

183 Even as late as August 1999, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced a multilateral approach to the
South Seas issue. During a news briefing at the 1999 ARF Ministerial Meeting, Chinese spokesman Zhang
Qiyue, stated that the PRC did not favor discussing the dispute “at any multilateral forum because this can
only lead to further complication o f the matter. . . . The China Sea [disputes] should be resolved through
bilateral negotiations between countries concerned in peaceful means.” See “China Rejects ASEAN ‘Code
o f Conduct’ for Spratlys,” Kyodo News International, 2 August 1999.
184 See Gill, “China’s Regional Security Strategy,” 256-7.
185See Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Declaration on the South
China Sea (22 July 1992). http://www.aseansec.org/3634.htm (accessed 5 August 2005); “China, ASEAN
Sign Code o f Conduct on South China Sea,” Xinhuanet, 4 November 2002; and “ASEAN Cooperation
Surges Ahead,” China Daily, 6 January 2002.
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China-ASEAN “Strategic Partnership” and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
Beijing’s growing acceptance of multilateral cooperation in China’s relations with
ASEAN was strengthened when in October both parties established the Strategic Partner
ship for Peace and Prosperity and China acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co
operation (TAC). The declaration establishing the Strategic Partnership committed both
parties to, among other things, “implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea” and also to convene “ASEAN-China security-related dialogue to
•

•

•

•

enhance mutual understanding and promote peace and security in the region.”

1X fi

By

agreeing to enter into the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, China became
the first strategic partner of ASEAN.187 Following the National People’s Congress
(NPC) approval in June that year of China’s accession to the TAC treaty, China formally
joined the TAC treaty at the seventh ASEAN-China Summit held as part of the larger
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit that year in Indonesia. By doing so, the PRC became
the first non-Southeast Asian major power to sign the treaty.

1RR

The TAC committed all

signatories to employ peaceful means to settle disputes between themselves, including
territorial disputes. In the event that direct negotiations between disputants failed to re
solve the dispute, the TAC provided for the possibility of third-party mediation. Further,
the treaty stipulated that countries agreed not to “participate in any activity which shall
constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integ-

186 See Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Declaration o f the Heads o f State/Government o f the
Association o f Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic o f China on Strategic Partnership for
Peace and Prosperity (8 October 2003). http://www.asean.org/15265.htm (accessed 19 August 2006).
187 ASEAN is the first regional grouping with which China formed such a relationship, indicating an in
creased level o f political and strategic relations between China and ASEAN. See Wang, “China’s Multi
lateral Diplomacy in the new Millennium,” 171-172, and “ASEAN, China Forge Strategic Partnership,”
People’s Daily, 9 October 2003.
188 See “China Joins Treaty o f Amity, Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” People’s Daily, 9 October 2003, and
Jane Perlez, “Asian Leaders Find China a More Cordial Neighbor,” New York Times, 18 October 2003.
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rity” of other signatories.

1 OQ

By agreeing to accede to the TAC, Beijing enhanced

China’s image in Southeast Asia as a “good neighbor” and “cooperative” power which
would “foster cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony, and stability
in the region,” and not undertake or participate in any activity constituting “a threat to the
political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity” of the other signa
tory states and to “refrain from the threat or use of force” and settle disputes through
“friendly negotiations.”190 In addition, by signing the TAC, China also broke from its
traditional diplomatic posture by allowing ASEAN states essentially to dictate the norms
of behavior concerning the South China Sea disputes.191
By acceding to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
in 2002, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and participating in the
ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership in 2003, Beijing significantly reinforced China’s
peaceful, cooperative “good neighbor” image in Southeast Asia while, at the same time,
substantially decreased perceptions in the region of a “China threat.” Further, Beijing’s
diplomatic activity demonstrated to the ASEAN states that China was indeed becoming
“socialized” as reflected by China’s increased acceptance of ASEAN’s regulatory and
constitutive norms. 192

189 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Treaty o f Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia (24 February 1976). http://www.aseansec.org/1654.htm (accessed 18 January 2007).
190 The complete Treaty o f Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was first ratified 24 February 1976.
Also, see Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Instrument o f Accession to the
Treaty o f Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (8 October 2003). http://www.aseansec.org/15271.htm
(accessed 11 April 2006).
“China, Southeast Asia Conclude Strategic Partnership Pact,” Xinhua, 8 October 2003.
191 Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping argue that by doing so, Beijing is pursuing the “most effective way for
China to show that it is a responsible power” by demonstrating its “benign intentions by exercising selfrestraint and displaying willingness to be restrained.” See Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China’s Re
gional Strategy,” in Power Shift: China and A sia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: Uni
versity of California Press, 2005), 52.
192 Yuen Foong Khong provides a good analysis o f norm-building, the “ASEAN Way,” and Sino-
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ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
Another ASEAN multilateral process in which Beijing directly applied the GND
to the South Sea disputes is the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) forum. Constituted by
ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea, the APT mechanism was initially established as
an informal dialogue intended to increase regional economic cooperation. Beijing enthu
siastically supported the creation of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) in 1997 in response to the
Asian Financial Crisis. Beginning in 2000, however, the annual informal APT meetings
were upgraded in status to formal East Asia summits and thus became a key component
of the annual ASEAN gatherings on par with the ARF, AMM, and PMCs.193 Beijing was
instrumental in elevating the APT mechanism’s status within the ASEAN process, and
continues to actively promote the APT as a “main framework of East Asia regional coop
eration.”194 In fact, some of Beijing’s boldest initiatives in Sino-ASEAN relations have
been proposed at the APT. For example, in his speech at the 2001 annual APT summit,
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji suggested, “efforts should be made to gradually carry out
dialogue and cooperation in the political and security field.”195 In November 2002, China
signed a joint declaration with ASEAN to increase cooperation on nontraditional security
issues and, the following June, proposed the establishment of a new “ARF Security Pol
icy Conference” in which military and civilian personnel would participate in developing
an ARF security pact acknowledging the principles such as noninterference in the internal
affairs of other states, and the peaceful resolution of international disputes through diaASEAN relations in “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role o f Institutions and Soft Balancing in
Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Strategy,” in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Effi
ciency, eds. J. J. Suh, Peter Katzenstein, Allen Carlson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 172208.
193 Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” 176-177.
194 Ibid.
195 Rongji Zhu, “Strengthening East Asian Cooperation and Promoting Common Development,” 5 Novem
ber 2001. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/end/21861.html (accessed 14 March 2006).
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logue.196 Due largely to Beijing’s efforts, the APT process has expanded its scope to 16
areas of cooperation, including economic, monetary and finance, political, security, tourism, agriculture, environment, and energy.

1Q7

In regards to the territorial disputes, the

security area of cooperation is most salient.
Beijing’s new approach to the South China Sea disputes successfully prevented
the issue from souring Sino-ASEAN relations. By agreeing to discuss the disputes multilaterally and indicating a willingness for joint development of the disputed regions, Bei
jing was able to diplomatically prevent the South China Sea disputes from have a detri
mental effect on the intensification of Sino-ASEAN relations by reassuring the Southeast
Asian states that they had little reason to fear the rise of China. In short, the China threat
thesis in Southeast Asia was being incrementally reduced by Beijing’s proactive and co
operative diplomatic approach in the region. Moreover, Beijing accomplished this with
out compromising China’s claims of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea
Track II Diplomacy
Chinese diplomacy concerning the South China Sea disputes at the informal
Track II level has been less spectacular than that at the various Track I dialogues. Due to
the overall lack of tangible progress in resolving the disputes at both the unofficial Indo
nesian sponsored Workshops on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea and
the ARF sponsored Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), many
observers have discounted the effectiveness of these Track II venues, calling them “talk

196 For details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs o f the People’s Republic of China, China’s Position Paper
on the New Security Concept, http://www.finprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm (accessed 22 Decem
ber 2006).
197 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation (2004).
http.V/www.aseansec. org/16580.htm (accessed 23 March 2006).
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shops.” However, I disagree with this assessment. What is interesting and important
about the Track II processes it that they provided a venue and opportunity for the free ex
change of ideas, which allowed the participants to understand better the positions of the
other disputant states. Further, the workshops allowed for an exchange and sharing of
knowledge that facilitated progress at the Track I dialogues. Two good examples of
shared knowledge leading to tangible cooperation at the official Track I level are the
1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, and the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Both ASEAN initiatives were actually
first suggested and discussed at the Track II workshops. By the conclusion of the second
Workshop held in Bandung in 1991, a statement was issued on the need to resolve the
territorial disputes in the South China Sea by “peaceful means through dialogue and ne
gotiation” and that “force should not be used to settle territorial and jurisdictional dis
putes” and that the involved parties should “exercise self-restraint in order not to compli
cate the situation.”198 This statement was adopted at the Track I level as the 1992
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. The same holds true for the 2002 ASEAN
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, as the idea for a code of
conduct originated within the Indonesian workshop process.199 In addition, the notion of
joint development of the disputed areas in the South China Sea advocated by China in its
mid-1990s bilateral dialogues with the Philippines and Vietnam (and finally implemented
by the 2005 tripartite agreement between Beijing, Manila, and Hanoi) for joint offshore

198 See Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, “Preventive Diplomacy: Managing Potential Conflicts in
the South China Sea,” in Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. Hampson Crocker,
107-133, United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1999.
199 Hasjim Djalal, “South China Sea Island Disputes,” The Raffles Bulletin o f Zoology, Supplement No. 8
(National University o f Singapore, 2000): 9-21. http://rmbr.nus.edu.sg/exanambas/rbzs8-scs/Djalal.html
(accessed 23 August 2006).
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oil development in the Spratlys was first broached within the Workshop process.200 It
seems reasonable to assert that shared knowledge (“complex” learning) gained by the
Workshop participants at the Track II level facilitated the eventual agreements reached
concerning the South China Sea issue within the Track I ASEAN dialogues. The Track II
dialogues allowed the participants to socialize with one another on a personal basis, and
thereby better familiarize themselves with the positions and points of view of other par
ticipants. This process of “social learning” must be seen as an important factor that sub
sequently led to the formal agreements on the South China Sea discussed in this study.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Workshop meetings focused on establishing
confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the South China Sea in areas such as joint
search and rescue operations, scientific studies of the tide and sea level, and the maritime
region’s biodiversity, and scientific databases. Several technical working groups (TWG)
and groups of experts were established in the 1990s to study and facilitate cooperative
programs. By the sixth Workshop held in Balikpapan in 1995, the Chinese delegates re
sisted efforts towards additional CBMs, as they perceived the workshop itself as a CBM
and therefore did not believe that additional CBMs were warranted.

901

•

By the conclusion

of the Balikpapan workshop, it was decided to recommend only three projects to the re
spective governments —biodiversity studies, sea level and tide monitoring, and a marine
science data and information exchange network. Interestingly, while Chinese delegates
resisted efforts at the workshop to establish these CBMs, Beijing was simultaneously
moving slowly toward such talks at the Track I level.
200 Ibid. A Special Technical Working Group on Resources Assessment and Ways o f Development initially
met in Jakarta (July 1993) to discuss joint development o f the South China Sea, where the Chinese dele
gates expressed China’s willingness to shelve territorial or sovereignty claims in favor of joint develop
ment.
201 The Straits Times, 13 October 1995.
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Beijing’s initial refusal to cooperate in the biodiversity project was seen by others
as yet another example of Chinese stalling the process. In addition, the Mischief Reef
affair between Beijing and Manila (1995) continued to have a detrimental influence on
the workshop process. Carolina Hemandes, president of the Institute for Strategic and
Development Studies, commented that China’s 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef “shat
tered the image of China as a trustworthy neighbor,” while a Singapore analyst blamed
Beijing for intensifying the dispute: “So far, it has largely been a case of China ‘advancing’ in the region through the show and use of force.”

However, by the end of the

1997 workshop, an agreement was reached to implement several cooperative projects:
biodiversity; study on tide and sea level change; and database and information network
ing for scientists. By finally agreeing to the cooperative biodiversity study, the Chinese
delegates reinforced China’s “cooperative” and “responsible” image and at the same time
by doing so lessened negative fallout from China’s reluctance at the time to support the
workshop’s call for a code of conduct for the South China Sea.
BILATERAL DIPLOMACY
Throughout much of the second period of our case study, Beijing’s bilateral di
plomacy regarding the territorial disputes reflected a continuation of the traditional ap
proach to the issue associated with China’s “Cold War’ identity. At this level, most
learning gained through interaction was “simple,” which led only to instrumental changes
in Beijing’s GND. This, however, began to change as Beijing’s bilateral actions increas
ingly came into line with the new multilateral approach. “Complex” learning gained
through multilateral interaction influenced China’s bilateral diplomacy with the Philip

202 “The Smiling but Unrelenting Dragon,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, 7 November 1997.
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pines and Vietnam. Beijing’s schizophrenic identity (Cognitive BaseA —bilateral diplo
macy; Cognitive Bases - multilateral diplomacy) appeared to be on the mend.
The Philippines
The 1995 Mischief Reef Affair between China and the Philippines in the Spratlys
certainly marked a low point in relations between the two countries. Manila’s protests
and diplomatic activities concerning Beijing’s provocations in the South China Sea were
the most vociferous and concerted of the ASEAN states. Efforts made by Manila to in
ternationalize the Spratlys dispute, as well as a growing American interest in the disputes
and reproving statements from Washington, pressured Beijing, as discussed in the previ
ous chapter, to reappraise its approach to the territorial disputes. Following the initial
crisis, bilateral talks between Beijing and Manila produced a joint “code of conduct” to
defuse the situation in August 1995. This diplomatic breakthrough was made possible, in
large part, to Beijing’s new stance on accepting international law and UNCLOS in seek
ing a resolution of China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea, as well as China’s
increased flexibility concerning multilateral cooperation and the possibility of multilat
eral talks on the Spratlys at an “appropriate time,” as indicated by Chinese Foreign Min
ister Qian Qichen at the 1995 ARF meeting hosted in July by Brunei.203 In addition, per
sonal diplomacy on the part of Chinese leader Jiang Zemin and Philippines President
Ramos also played a significant role in mitigating tensions between both countries caused
by the Mischief Reef affair. However, actions taken subsequently by both sides in the
Spratlys in support of their respective claims of territorial sovereignty (as discussed in
Chapter 2), renewed tensions in Sino-Philippine relations. In March 1996, the Spratly

203 Lee, 107.
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disputes were one of the most urgent issues on the agenda during vice-ministerial level
talks between Manila and Beijing. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, agreements
were reached at the end of the talks for establishing cooperation through several CBMs
including military-to-military contacts, and both countries decided that the Mischief Reef
issue would be set aside for the time being. The March 1996 talks succeeded in reducing
tensions between China and the Philippines.
During the second half of 1996, Sino-Philippines relations were further improved
by personal interactions between leaders from both states. In June, Philippine Foreign
Secretary Domingo Siazon visited Beijing and was reassured that Beijing would resolve
the territorial disputes with Manila in a peaceful fashion within the framework of interna
tional law and UNCLOS.204 Siazon’s trip to China was reciprocated when Jiang Zemin
paid an official visit to the Philippines following the November APEC summit convened
at Subic Bay. During their talks, Ramos attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Jiang that
China should withdraw from Mischief Reef. Both men did agree, however, not to discuss
issues of sovereignty and instead work toward building confidence and develop disputed
areas of the Spratlys jointly.205 In addition, Jiang made a pledge that China would not
aggravate the situation by militarizing the disputed area.206 The improved atmosphere in
Sino-Philippine relations, however, was short-lived.
On Christmas Day 1996, Philippine Army Chief of Staff Amulfo Acedera for
mally opened an airfield runway on one of the more substantial islands in the Spratlys
and declared that Manila would develop the area into a tourist resort.207 Protest came

204 The Straits Times, 14 June 1996.
205 The Straits Times, 27 November 1996.
206 Lianhe Zaobao, 28 November 1996 as cited in Lee, 113.
207 The Straits Times, 31 December 1996.
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quickly from Beijing, admonishing and warning Manila to refrain from actions that could
threaten relations between the two countries.208 Then, after rounds of protests and
counter-protests, tensions between Beijing and Manila worsened in April 1997 when the
Philippines accused China of aggravating the situation by dispatching armed naval ves
sels in the Spratlys to patrol near islands occupied by Filipinos. Beijing responded by
accusing the Philippines of violating Chinese sovereignty in the Macclesfield Bank area
north of the Spratlys by removing Chinese territorial markers and hoisting a Philippine
flag on Scarborough Shoal.209 In addition, Filipino politicians made trips to Scarborough
Shoal to defend Philippine sovereignty in front of the Philippines press, while others
urged President Ramos to ask Washington to increase its military presence in the region
to counter China.

910

As tensions between Beijing and Manila mounted, Ramos did ex

plore diplomatic initiatives to prevent conflict with China in the Spratlys and Scarbor
ough Shoal.
The Ramos Administration argued that the code of conduct agreed to in 1995 by
both sides was not specific enough to prevent incidences of hostility in disputed waters.
Manila therefore suggested that the two countries establish clearer rules of engagement in
the South China Sea to prevent armed clashes between PRC and Philippines naval
units.

71 1

As a result, talks were held in Beijing late in May and it was agreed that a work-

208 The Straits Times, 30 December 1996.
209 Additional aggressive actions were taken by both sides in and around the Scarborough Shoal area that
heightened tensions in the dispute. Philippine moves to order Chinese Boats out o f the area and arrests of
more Chinese fishermen near the Shoal in May intensified the rift between the PRC and the Philippines. In
July, Philippine troops destroyed concrete markers and removed two of three Chinese buoys on Sabina
Shoal located 75 miles west o f the Philippines island o f Palawan. See The Straits Times, 14 May, 25 June,
and 5 July 1997.
210 The Straits Times, 29 May 1997.
211 General Amulfo Acedera suggested that a mechanism for cooperation be established through which
China and the Philippines could announce plans for military deployments before they are implemented.
See Lee, 114-115.
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ing group on CBMs be established to examine the legal issues of the conflicting territorial
claims and the movement of ships and personnel in the disputed regions, as well as the
possibilities of cooperation in issues such as search and rescue, exchanges between mili
tary garrisons in the Spratlys, and disaster relief.212 Endeavoring to promote good will,
Ramos later released Chinese fishermen arrested earlier near Scarborough Shoal, an
nounced that Chinese fishing boats could pass through Philippine waters in route to other
fishing grounds in international waters, and invited the Chinese navy to make a port call
to Subic Bay in May 1998.213 The “role-identities” of China and the Philippines were by
this point moving away from “enemy-enemy” toward “competitor-competitor.”
Because of bilateral negotiations begun in May 1997, China and the Philippines
reached a preliminary understanding on how to handle their disputes in the South China
Sea. It appears that both sides worked out the details concerning how Chinese warships
could approach (and Chinese fishing vessels transit through) Philippine waters. Addi
tionally, agreement was reached in principle for cooperation in areas such as marine sci
entific research, fishery, and search and rescue. From the Chinese perspective, Beijing’s
response to Manila’s provocative moves in the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal was re
strained. By avoiding moves that might have exacerbated tensions between China and
the Philippines and instead pursuing a diplomatic resolution, China reinforced its image
in Southeast Asia as a “good neighbor” willing to forgo the use of force and pursue a
peaceful settlement of its disputes with Manila. Beijing’s approach in handling the Sprat
lys crisis with Manila was also informed and influenced by wider considerations.

212 The Straits Times, 3 June 1997.
213 The invitation was accepted by Beijing, and in April 1998, three Chinese warships arrived in the Philip
pines and participated in celebrating Philippine independence. The Straits Times, 14 April 1998.
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Other ASEAN states having territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea
were monitoring the situation in the Spratlys and closely observing Chinese actions - es
pecially Vietnam. Beijing was aware that its announcements and actions concerning the
Philippines would affect China’s relations with other ASEAN nations and, as such, it was
extremely important that China not be seen by the wider audience in the region as a
threat. By talking instead of shooting, China could reinforce its national image in South
east Asia as a “responsible” and “cooperative” country —a “good neighbor” —and thus
prevent the South China Sea disputes from endangering Sino-ASEAN relations.
Talks between the two states continued until an agreement was reached on the
sidelines of that year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in
Kuala Lumpur in November 1998. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Philip
pine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon agreed in principle to joint use of disputed Mis
chief Reef once the “modalities for joint use (and) the technical details of access” were
negotiated by an expert working group on confidence-building measures that was sup
posed to meet in January 1999. This agreement was subsequently endorsed at the APEC
summit during a one-on-one meeting between Presidents Jiang Zemin and Estrada.214
Early the following year, however, accusations and recriminations over encoun
ters between fishing boats and naval patrols of both countries in and around Scarborough
Shoal, as well as continued construction projects in the Spratlys,

led to heightened ten-

214 “Philippines, Mainland China Agree to Jointly Use Mischief Reef,” Central News Agency (Taiwan), 22
November 1998.
215 According to Manila, the Chinese had constructed facilities in Mischief Reef o f the Spratlys “with pos
sible gun emplacements and navigational radar . . . , which could be used for military purposes.” See
“China remains firm on Spratlys,” BBC News: Asia-Pacific, 23 March 1999. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/
world/asia-pacific/301876.stm (accessed 7 October 2006).
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sions between China and the Philippines.

91 ft

Philippine Vice-Admiral Eduardo Santos,

the Navy Chief, and the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines,
commented to reporters that Chinese structures on Mischief Reef were “definitely not for
fishing alone,” and that these structures could become the next base of operations of Chi•

nese naval forces in the Spratlys.

917

Orlando Mercado, Secretary of Defense of the Phil

ippines, also underlined Manila’s perceptions of a growing Chinese threat at a press con
ference. Concerning the Chinese structures on Mischief Reef, Mercado stated “They
[Chinese] say these are structures for fishermen who may be marooned in a typhoon, but
of course we have never been naive enough to believe that.”

91o

During two days of talks

between Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Lauro Baja and Chinese Assistant Foreign
Minister Wang Yi concerning recent provocative actions and statements by both sides in
the dispute, Wang repeated Beijing’s assurances that the structures on Mischief Reef
were only shelters for Chinese fishermen and not intended for military purposes. Wang
added that once the structures were completed (and when China-Philippines relations improved), China would consider allowing Filipino anglers to use the facilities.

910

Manila

responded by demanding that China demolish the structures. The Chinese rejected the
demand, stressing that Mischief Reef was Chinese sovereign territory. Mr. Baja re
marked to reporters following the talks that he was “not deliriously happy” with the re-

216 In May, a Chinese fishing boat was sunk after a collision with a Philippine warship, and late in Novem
ber, China demanded that a “stranded” Filipino naval vessel near Scarborough Shoal be towed away as its
presence posed a challenge to Chinese sovereignty. See “Spratlys continue to loom as Asian flashpoint,”
World Socialist Web Site, 13 December 1999. http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/decl999/spra-dl3.shtml
(accessed 23 October 2006).
217 See “The Mischief Reef Affair,” The Wall Street Journal, 16 December 1998 and “Mischief Reef a ma
jor Chinese fortress, says Philippine navy,” The Straits Times, 25 January 1999.
218 “Diplomatic Storm Over Islands,” Newsday, 4 February 1999.
219 “Philippines to discuss use o f Mischief Reef structures with China,” Associated Press Newswires, 19
March 1999.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123

suits.

Philippine President Joseph Estrada indicated after the two-day talks with the

Chinese that he might “elevate the issue to the United Nations.”221
Shortly after the Chinese-Filipino meetings, Manila intensified its protest by re
porting that Chinese forces on Johnson Reef had recently opened fire against a Philippine
Air force plane-an incident that had not been made public at the time.222 A week later
President Estrada announced a postponement of his planned trip to Beijing.223 Two
weeks later at the Inter-parliamentary Union meeting in Brussels, Bias Ople, head of the
Philippine 18-man delegation and Senate President Pro Tempore, demanded a Chinese
withdrawal from Mischief Reef during his speech at the IPU, which triggered a dispute
with the Chinese representatives: “We ask that the parties commit themselves to the
status quo in the area. This means that China must withdraw from Mischief Reef which
it has illegally occupied since 1995 in violation of the Manila Declaration of 1992.” Lia
Daoyu gave the Chinese response, accusing Ople of “distorting the facts and making false
accusations.” Lia stated, “we are deeply surprised at the intervention of the Philippine
delegation. This intervention will have negative effects on the Filipino people.”224
China’s cooperative image in the Philippines was quickly becoming tarnished, as the tra
ditional ‘China-as-a-threat’ image strengthened. Relations between Beijing and Manila
worsened the following month.

220 “China remains firm on Spratlys,” BBC News: Asia-Pacific, 23 March 1999. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/
world/asia-pacific/301876.stm (accessed 14 November 2006).
221 Ibid. Shortly thereafter Estrada met with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York asking him to
help find a peaceful resolution to the disputes with China. Also see “Trouble brews on Mischief Reef,”
BBC News: Asia-Pacific, 22 January 1999.
222 “Spratlys pose multiple problems for China-Philippine relations,” Agence France-Presse, 24 March
1999.
223 “Estrada delays Beijing trip over Mischief Reef spat,” The Straits Times, 1 April 1999.
224 “Chinese mischief at Reef to IPU,” Manila Standard, 16 April 1999.
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On 20 May 1999, Beijing called for a settlement of its dispute with the Philip
pines over Mischief Reef. Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said that China
“deeply regrets” the comments made by President Estrada in Hong Kong that Chinese
territorial ambitions in the South China Sea were harming regional security, but stated
that China desired a peaceful settlement of the dispute in accordance with international
maritime laws including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Zhu continued;
“China hopes the parties concerned will jointly commit themselves to peace and stability
in the South China Sea region. Remarks or actions that contradict this will not help solve
the problem and are not desirable.”

Two days after the Chinese statement, the Philip

pine House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning Chinese intrusions into
the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and commending the Philippine Navy for “gal
lantly protecting our territorial integrity.” The resolution stated that the “presence of the
Chinese fishing boat in the Scarborough Shoal is part of the ploy and strategy of the
PROC to maintain and gradually increase their presence therein like what they did in
Mischief Reef which ended up in the construction of concrete, high rise buildings, some
thing the PROC undoubtedly dreams of doing in Scarborough Shoal.”226 Manila also
widened its dispute with China when the Philippines proposed that ASEAN establish a
regional code of conduct to govern activities in the South China Sea.227 Manila’s relent
less diplomatic pressure against China continued through 2000 and into early 2001, when
former Philippine President Fidel Ramos characterized China as a threat to Southeast
Asia during the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland. At a

225 “China urges peaceful talks on Spratly Islands dispute,” Asian Political News, 24 May 1999.
226 “Legislative Resolution on Foreign Affairs,” House Resolution No. 944, House of Representatives, Re
public o f the Philippines (26 May 1999).
227 Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” 170.
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working dinner on “Security and Stability in Asia,” Ramos commented on the rise of
China and its implications for Asia:
Economic growth has also set off a sea change in Chinese strategic thinking. To
day, China’s ambition is to project power -beyond mainland East Asia, where its
strategic authority is already widely accepted-initially into East Asia’s maritime
regions, and ultimately into the world-ocean.
Because China has been a land-power since the early 15th century, its build-up of
sea-and air power is liable to become Asia’s key security issue over these next 1015 years. Already other powers with maritime interests-like India and Japan-are
beginning to react to what they must see as a threat to their own sea-lanes of
communication.
The Spratlys and Taiwan Straits problems are vital components of China’s mari
time interests.
How China exercises its potential political and military power must concern all
the countries of the Asia-Pacific-a«c/ none more so than we o f Southeast Asia,
who lie in the direction o f its historical expansion [emphasis mine].
China’s territorial dispute with the Philippines over the Spratlys was quickly be
coming a liability for Beijing that potentially could undermine Chinese efforts at
strengthening Sino-ASEAN relations. Beijing would have to dispel growing mistrust of
China by reinforcing China’s cooperative, friendly image in Southeast Asia by taking the
initiative at both the bilateral as well as multilateral levels. Through bilateral negotiations
with the Philippines, Beijing could make some measured concessions to Manila such as
increased Chinese cooperation in various CBMs in the South China Sea, as well as eco
nomic “carrots” such as favorable trade deals and increased Chinese technical assistance.
These measures would strengthen China’s “good neighbor” image by demonstrating that
the PRC was a “cooperative” and “responsible” rising power desiring peaceful, mutually
beneficial relations with the Philippines. By talking instead of shooting, and by demon
228 Remarks o f Fidel Ramos at Hotel Caprice, Davos Switzerland, during a working dinner on “Security
and Stability in Asia,” 29 January 2001. http://www.dfa.gov.ph/archieve/speech/fvr/ fVr_dinner.htm (ac
cessed 19 September 2006).
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strating that closer relations with China had substantial economic and political benefits
far outweighing any Manila might realize by continuing to focus on the issue of territorial
sovereignty, Beijing could maintain the status quo in the Spratlys while at the same time
strengthen and deepen economic ties between the two countries.
In December 2001, Beijing took a step forward by agreeing to discuss joint use of
the Mischief Reef structures with the Philippines.

This concession was apparently not

enough to assuage Filipino (and Vietnamese) suspicions of China’s ulterior motives in
the region. Beijing would have to make a larger concession; it appeared, to accomplish
the task of reassuring the ASEAN states that China was sincere in its efforts of coopera
tion and seeking a peaceful resolution of the disputes. In November 2002, Beijing made
such a move by signing the ASEAN Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea, crossing a new threshold in China’s direct application of the GND on the territorial
disputes. Even though the ASEAN states (especially the Philippines and Vietnam) had
pushed for a stronger, legally binding code of conduct but were, however, eventually per
suaded by the Chinese to accept a non-binding declaration, Beijing’s accession to the
Declaration was a major Chinese concession and marked a turning point for Beijing to
ward an increasingly liberal application of the GND in Sino-ASEAN relations. China’s
accession to the Declaration apparently reduced tensions between Beijing and Manila,
which allowed movement forward in the bilateral dialogue concerning their territorial
dispute in the South China Sea. As we have seen, the process of “collective” identity
formation is not unidirectional. As with personal relationships, in which shared knowl
edge of Self and Other can change because of interaction and affect the “role-identities”
in the relationship, the same holds true for corporate (state) relations. Sometimes interac229 Manila Standard, 9 December 2001.
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tion results in positive (holistic) identity change, sometime it results in negative (egoistic)
identity change.230
During Philippine President Gloria Arroyo’s state visit to China in late August
2004, an agreement to begin a joint three-year seismic survey of potential oil deposits in
the Spratlys was signed. Importantly, the agreement between Beijing and Manila stated,
“[tjhere is an understanding between the Philippines and China that the PNOC [Philip
pines National Oil Company]-CNOOC [Chinese National Offshore Oil Company] under
taking will be open to the participation of a third party, such as companies of other claim
ant states.” The “third party” mentioned was Vietnam’s offshore oil company PetroViet
nam, whose participation in the survey was strongly supported by Manila.231 The bilat
eral agreement between Beijing and Manila for joint oil exploration in the Spratlys by
their respective national oil companies marked a diplomatic success for China.
By undertaking joint offshore oil exploration in the disputed Spratlys, Beijing
strengthened China’s “cooperative” and “responsible” image in the region by demonstrat
ing a willingness to work with the Philippines in resolving the territorial dispute as well
as “share” the resources of the area despite the absence of a final solution of the dispute.
In doing so, Beijing both paved the way for closer China-Philippines relations and miti
gated the negative political fall-out in the region due to China’s most recent spat with the
Philippines over Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal. By agreeing to allow “third par
ties” to participate in the joint seismic survey, Beijing essentially indicated a softening in
230 Wendt argues that the kind of representational practice (“reflected appraisals”) that produces enemies is
known as Realpolitik, “which involves treating others in self-interested terms, casting them as if they were
nothing but objects, without standing or rights, to be killed, conquered, or left alone as one sees fit”, and
that which produces friends is known as “prosocial”, “which involves treating others as if one not only re
spected their individual security concerns but also ‘cared’ for them, a willingness to help them even when
this serves no narrowly self-interested purpose.” Social Theory o f International Politics, 341.
231 See “Philippines, China to map potential oil in Spratlys; Vietnam invited,” Agence France Presse, 2
September 2004.
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its position against multilateral approaches to the South Sea disputes. However, the joint
PRC-RP survey of the Spratlys caused friction between Beijing and Hanoi (as discussed
below) that was not mitigated until Hanoi finally agreed to join the seismic survey in
March 2005.232
The 2005 tripartite agreement between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines for
joint offshore oil and gas prospecting in disputed areas of the South China Sea, according
to Beijing, had turned a “sea of disputes” into a “sea of cooperation.” Chinese ambassa
dor Wu Hongbo stated that the trilateral accord, based on mutual understanding and
common interest, would set a good example for resolving the South China Sea issue in a
peaceful way, while Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo said that the agree
ment signified “the growing level of trust and confidence among claimants and their
commitment to pursue peaceful options on the issue.” Philippine Energy Secretary Vin
cent Perez also underlined the significance of the tripartite agreement by stating, “in con
trast to the gunbattle [sic] diplomacy of the last century, we call this seismic vessel di
plomacy.”233 Even former Philippine President Ramos, who had sounded the alarm bell
of a China threat so directly and impassionedly at the 2001 Davos meeting of the World
Economic Forum, had modified his analysis of the “China threat” by September 2005.
Demonstrating a new, more upbeat attitude concerning Chinese intentions in the Spratlys,
Ramos commented to reporters that the tripartite oil exploration deal between China,
Vietnam, and the Philippines was a win-win proposition for all participants. Ramos re
marked, “with the major claimants to the islands [Spratlys] supervising the oil explora-

232 See “Philippines, China, Vietnam to explore S. China Sea areas,” Kyodo News, 14 March 2005, “China,
Philippines, Vietnam sign joint South China Sea oil search accord,” Agence France Presse, 14 March 2005.
233 See “Turning “sea o f disputes” into “sea o f cooperation,” Xinhua News Agency, 15 March 2005 and
“Trio sign deal for Spratlys surveys,” Upstream, 18 March 2005 respectively.
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tions, we could also gain a defense and security benefit from it. Instead of fighting over
the islands we are coming together to bring about the joint exploration and development
of the islands.”

Vietnam’s accession to what had originally been a bilateral agreement

between Beijing and Manila for joint exploration of the Spratlys transformed the enter
prise into a multilateral undertaking. Significantly, this multilateralization occurred be
cause of bilateral talks outside of ASEAN’s multilateral processes. This diplomatic ac
complishment served to reinforce Beijing’s long-standing assertion that the disputes
should be resolved initially and primarily through bilateral dialogue between disputant
states.
Beijing’s concession towards multilateralism was viewed by Manila and ASEAN
positively and helped to reduce China’s image as a “threat” in Southeast Asia. From Ma
nila’s point of view, Beijing’s move allowed for the possibility of a joint PhilippinesVietnam position in the Spratlys vis-a-vis China, which would strengthen Manila’s nego
tiating position, while at the same time allow for increased trade and economic relations
with China. From ASEAN’s point of view (discussed in the following chapter), Beijing’s
agreement with Manila for joint development of the Spratlys further proved that the strat
egy of “engaging” and “socializing” China was working. Further, the invitation to Viet
nam to join the joint PRC-RP exploration project illustrated to ASEAN leaders that the
Chinese were becoming more comfortable with ASEAN’s special multilateral approach
to international relations and dispute resolution. In effect, it was obvious that China was
increasingly becoming “socialized” into accepting ASEAN norms. As such, perceptions
in Southeast Asia of a rising Chinese threat were greatly reduced. From Beijing’s per
spective, Chinese GND at the bilateral level had successfully prevented the Spratlys dis
234 “Ramos: Spratlys oil exploration deal to promote peace in region,” BusinessWorld, 2 September 2005.
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pute with the Philippines from derailing a further deepening of relations between the two
countries and, at the same time, reinforced the “cooperative” and “responsible” images of
China increasingly held by ASEAN leaders. Most significantly, Beijing accomplished
this without directly compromising China’s claim of territorial sovereignty.
A recent event in the Spratlys further exemplifies the success of Beijing’s “good
neighbor” diplomacy in China’s relations with the Philippines, as well as the remarkable
change in China-Philippine “role-identities.” On 26 April 2006, the Chinese fishing ves
sel Jinghai 03012 was attacked and boarded by unknown assailants while operating in an
area of the Spratlys disputed by China and the Philippines. The attack left four Chinese
dead and three others wounded.

According to the Chinese newspaper Southern Daily,

a survivor stated that a Philippine boat was behind the attack and that six of the attackers
“wore camouflage clothes while the other seven were casually dressed.”236 The incident
prompted Beijing on 3 May to request officially that Manila investigate the attack.
Commenting on the Chinese request, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita cautioned
against immediately assuming that the attackers were Filipinos, while at the same time
expressing his confidence that Sino-Philippine relations would not be hurt by the event:
“this is a very minor [incident] and our diplomatic ties remain strong.”

The Chinese

insinuation that the Philippines was behind the attack angered Philippine Senator Rodolfo
Biazon, who denounced the Chinese paper’s report and retorted that pirates were proba
bly responsible for the attack: “that area [Spratlys] is teeming with pirates, so it’s not fair

235 See “Beijing asks RP to probe killings,” Manila Standard, 4 May 2006, and “AFP probes Spratlys inci
dent,” Manila Standard, 5 May 2006.
236 “Beijing asks RP to probe killings,” Manila Standard, 4 May 2006, and “Spratly Ship Remains A Phan
tom,” The Manila Times, 7 May 2006.
237 “Beijing asks RP to probe killings,” Manila Standard, 4 May 2006.
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to accuse our nationals of being responsible for that [attack].”

After concluding its in

vestigation, Manila officially denied any role in the attack on Jinghai 03012. On 8 May,
Philippine military spokesman Colonel Tristan Kison told reporters “there were no [Phil
ippine] military units in the area when that incident happened,” and that pirates appeared
to be responsible.”

9TQ

As subsequent statements and counterstatements concerning the incident were is
sued by Beijing and Manila, the attack on the Jinghai 03012 might have led to renewed
friction and conflict between China and the Philippines —as had occurred in the past as
outlined in Chapter 2 —but this time the outcome was much different. In response to the
violent event, Beijing, Manila, and Hanoi agreed to strengthen security cooperation be
tween the three countries in the Spratlys. Commenting on the agreement, Philippine mili
tary chief General Generosa Senga stated, “we have agreed that we will continue our di
rect communication and direct cooperation. . . so that such problems in the area - piracy,
smuggling, transnational crimes and others, other issues and concerns that are bothering
all of us in common - will be resolved.”240 Unlike the past, when violent encounters in
the Spratlys led to worsening relations between the two countries, the April 2006 attack
on the Chinese fishing vessel led to increased cooperation and improved Sino-Philippine
relations. Even more significant, neither side made mention of its claim of territorial sov
ereignty in the Spratlys! Clearly, by 2006 the traditional enmity between Beijing and
Manila over the Spratlys had transformed into amity and cooperation. Perhaps more im
portantly, the “role-identities” between both actors had become “partner-partner” and
238 “AFP probes Spratlys incident,” Manila Standard, 5 May 2006.
239 “Philippines denies role in attack on Chinese fishermen in Spratly Islands,” AFX Asia, 8 May 2006.
240 See “Pirates attacked Chinese fishermen in Spratlys, says Philippine military chief,” Associated Press
Newswires, 19 May 2006, and “RP, China, Vietnam to cooperate in Spratlys security,” Manila Bulletin, 19
May 2006.
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showed no indication, now that the territorial dispute issue was willingly placed on a
back burner by both parties, of reverting to “competitor-competitor” or “enemy-enemy.”
Vietnam
As with China’s bilateral relation with the Philippines, so too would Beijing learn
that Chinese and Vietnamese interests shared much in common —a focus on domestic
economic development, and a desire for a stable, peaceful international environment. In
addition, Beijing learned that Hanoi was willing to put the South China Sea issue on the
“back burner” for the time being, as long as China exemplified its peaceful “good
neighbor” rhetoric with concrete action. Beijing’s initial “simple” learning and corre
sponding instrumental modifications in its GND, however, began over time to change
towards “complex” learning which caused a transformation of China’s cognitive base and
traditional “Cold War” identity bringing it in line with the “post-Cold War” identity al
ready discemable in China’s multilateral diplomacy with ASEAN. The shift in China’s
identity resulting from “complex” learning at the multilateral level took more time to oc
cur at the bilateral level. This is understandable, given the directly confrontational nature
of bilateral negotiations, as opposed to the more diffused, nuanced setting of multilateral
forums. As we shall see, a change in China’s identity eventually influenced Beijing’s
bilateral diplomacy and relations with Vietnam. The role-identities shared between
China and Vietnam had also changed from “enemy-enemy” to “partner-partner” by 2005.
Hanoi’s China threat perceptions decreased as China’s new “post-Cold War” identity be
came more discemable and believable to the Vietnamese.
As noted earlier, territorial disputes along the land and sea borders, and over the
Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea, had long been a major point of con
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tention in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Normalization of PRC-DRV relations in 1991,
along with an increase in bilateral diplomacy between Beijing and Hanoi, by 1996, had
produced tangible results even while the South China Sea disputes continued to threaten
improving relations. The resumption of rail links between China and Vietnam early in
1996 was perhaps the best manifestation of the positive change in relations, reflecting the
diligent efforts of both Beijing and Hanoi toward preventing conflict over territory as
both countries perceived a peaceful, stable Southeast Asia as being critical for their na
tions’ interests. Additionally, Chinese minesweeping along the border cleared previously
mined areas and restored farmland as well as increased border trade between China and
Vietnam. By 1997, border trade between the two countries increased to almost four times
that of 1992.241 However, even while trade and cross-border contact substantially in
creased between the PRC and DRV, territorial disputes continued to menace relations
between both socialist countries.
Mistrusting one another, both Hanoi and Beijing took unilateral steps to consoli
date their respective territorial claims even while Sino-Vietnamese relations deepened in
other areas. The “role-identities” of China and Vietnam were no longer “enemy-enemy,”
now rather “competitor-competitor.” One strategy employed by both sides was to grant
oil and gas exploration and drilling concession areas to foreign oil companies in disputed
regions of the South China Sea. In March 1997, the Chinese drilling rig Kan Tan III was
observed to be operating in an area between Hainan Island and the central coast of Viet
nam, at the entrance of the Gulf of Tonkin.242 When Hanoi protested, the Chinese with
drew Kan Tan III from the area and entered into special talks with their neighbor to the
241 The volume o f border trade in 1992 was 100 million dollars; in 1997, the volume o f border trade had
risen to 360 million dollars. BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED3135, 01/27/98.
242 The Straits Times, 8 April 1997.
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south to resolve the new territorial dispute.243 Even as Beijing took a conciliatory posi
tion regarding the incident by withdrawing the oilrig from the disputed waters and enter
ing into new talks with Hanoi concerning that specific territory, the Chinese leadership
did not waiver in its claim of Chinese territorial sovereignty.244 After the March incident
and subsequent Sino-Vietnamese talks, however, Beijing renewed tensions with the DRV
by granting in October 1997 offshore oil and gas exploration rights to Atlantic Richfield
Corporation (ARCO) nearby the area where Kan Tan III had operated in March.245
Early in 1998, a dispute over the land border near the Vietnamese town of Hoanh
Mo strained Sino-Vietnamese relations, indicating that both sides still mistrusted one an
other. Hanoi initiated this new round of squabbling over the land border by accusing
China of reclaiming land along a river border, which diverted the flow of water, and thus
causing flood damage along the Vietnamese side of the river. Beijing responded by as
serting that Vietnam had built an outcrop into the river initially, causing damage to the
Chinese river bank, forcing Beijing to reinforce its river bank to prevent damage to Chi
nese land and crops. 246 Yet, the working group on the Chinese-Vietnamese sea border in
the Gulf of Tonkin reached an agreement by the tenth round of talks in March 1998 to
accelerate the pace of negotiations that a resolution of the dispute could be reached by
2000.247 Qian Qichen and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam agreed in
July 1997 that the best way to speed up resolution of the outstanding territorial disputes
243 Apparently, Hanoi successfully played the “ASEAN card’ during the dispute with China by calling in
and presenting Vietnam’s case to the ASEAN ambassadors. See Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnamese Perspectives
of the ‘China Threat’” in The China Threat: Perception, Myths, and Reality, Herbert Yee and Ian Storey,
eds. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 227.
244 The Straits Times, 15 April 1997.
245 Arco and China’s state-owned offshore oil company CNOOC agreed to exploit jointly the Ledong gas
field near the Yacheng gas field where the two companies were building an offshore pipeline to the Chinese
mainland. The Straits Times, 24 November 1997.
246 The Straits Times, 24 and 26 January 1998.
247 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED3190, 04/01/98.
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between the two countries was to seek solutions to the comparably easier land and sea
borders first, and then work out the South China Sea disputes over the Paracel and
Spratly islands.

' JAQ

At the eleventh round of talks in January 1998, a draft agreement de

marcating the Sino-Vietnamese land border was reportedly commented upon by both
sides in preparation for a final resolution of that particular border dispute.249 Even while
Beijing and Hanoi were about to conclude an agreement on the mutual land border, the
South China Sea disputes continued to test the resiliency of Sino-Vietnamese relations.
Both countries continued to affirm their territorial claims in the region during 1998-1999
by awarding oil contracts to foreign companies to drill in disputed areas, as well as con
structing buildings and structures in the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes, such as the
ground satellite station in the Parcels and telephone booth in the Spratlys built by the
Chinese.250
However, irrespective of the intractable position taken by both sides in the South
China Sea disputes, the two countries finally signed in 2000 the Agreement on Friend
ship, Good Neighborliness, and Long-standing Stability, followed by additional treaties
that same year settling major points of dispute concerning the land border and outlining
the pathway toward resolving the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin.251 As for the
South China Sea claims, a forum was established to continue efforts of reaching a resolu
tion of the most difficult territorial dispute between the two countries. Talks between

248 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-97-196, 07/15/97.
249 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED3133, 01/24/98.
250 See Cheng Guan Ang, “Vietnam-China Relations Since the End o f the Cold War,” Asian Survey 38, no.
12 (1998), 1122-1141, and “Vietnam: Another Milestone and the Country Plods On,” Southeast Asian Af
fairs (2002), 352-353.
251 See “China and Vietnam Sign Land border Treaty,” (15 November 2000), Ministry o f Foreign Affairs of
the People’s Republic o f China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2631/tl5493.htm (ac
cessed 3 July 2006) and “China’s Maritime Demarcation and Bilateral Fishery Affairs,” (9 July 2001).
http://www.finprc.gov.cn/ eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/2628/tl5476.htm (accessed 9 July 2006).
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China and Vietnam concerning the Spratlys, as well as the remaining procedural issues
and problems inherent in the recent agreements settling the land border and maritime
boundary in the Tonkin gulf, continued the next few years as PRC-DRV relations
strengthened within wider (especially economic) context. Both sides realized that further
progress on territorial issues was essential for maintaining the forward momentum in
Sino-Vietnamese relations. However, both Beijing and Hanoi also realized that neither of
them had much room for maneuver on the Spratlys-Paracels dispute. Therefore, talks
between the two states focused instead on resolving smaller, easier territorial issues.
Progress in these negotiations ultimately led to subsequent agreements.
By 2002, China and Vietnam had essentially resolved their mutual territorial dis
putes concerning the land border and in the Gulf of Tonkin. The remaining outstanding
(minor) issues were subsequently resolved. On 24 February 2004, China and Vietnam
signed a supplementary protocol for cooperation in fisheries issues, demonstrating tangi
ble progress toward a resolution of remaining difficulties in the bilateral relationship.
While this supplemental protocol was not as monumental an agreement as one resolving
the Spratlys dispute might be, it was nonetheless important in furthering Sino-Vietnamese
relations. This was a point well stressed by both sides. At the reception given in honor of
the visiting Chinese delegation, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan praised
the common effort at reaching an agreement on fisheries in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf,
adding that the agreement was important to “long-term stability in the Gulf of Tonkin
while helping to strengthen trust, friendship and co-operation between the people living
on its shores [as] well as the people of Viet Nam and China.”252 However, even as both
sides were able to reach agreements settling the land border and outlining the necessary
252 Viet Nam News, 26 February 2004.
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steps for resolving the sea boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin, disputes over the Paracels and
Spratlys in the South China Sea continued to vex Sino-Vietnamese relations.
In March 2004, yet another row concerning ownership of the Spratlys erupted be
tween China and Vietnam. Conflicting claims of sovereignty over the Spratlys archipel
ago (or Truong Sa in Vietnamese) were made by both China and Vietnam. Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Dung rejected recent Chinese territorial claims in the
Spratlys, calling the claim “groundless.” Dung stated, “Viet Nam has time and time
again asserted its indisputable sovereignty over both the Truong Sa and Hoang Sa
(Paracel) archipelagos.” After reaffirming Vietnamese sovereignty, Dung continued by
stressing the 2002 Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea and advised all parties
to “restrain themselves and cease issuing unnecessary statements over the issue.”253 Sub
sequently, Vietnam announced plans to send tourists to the Spratlys, further complicating
relations with Beijing while at the same time gaining support for Hanoi’s plans from the
Philippines who, as we have seen, was keen at the time to foster better cooperation with
Vietnam vis-a-vis China.254
In September 2004, the row between Hanoi and Beijing-Manila intensified when
Vietnam accused China and the Philippines of planning surveying activities in its territo
rial jurisdiction. Within one week of the announcement of the PRC-RP deal for joint oil
exploration in the Spratlys, Hanoi accused Beijing and Manila of disregarding the 2002
ASEAN Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea. Vietnamese foreign ministry
spokesperson Le Dung stated, “as a signatory to the code of conduct on the South China

253 Viet Nam News, 26 March 2004.
254 Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Delia Albert was quoted to say that the Philippines did not oppose
Vietnamese plans to send tourists to the Spratlys and that Hanoi’s moves did not violate the Declaration on
the Conduct o f Parties in the South China Sea. See Viet Nam News, 8 and 19 April, 2004.
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Sea signed between ASEAN and China in November 2002, Vietnam has committed with
relevant parties to implement the code towards the maintenance of peace and stability.”
Dung went on to urge “all parties to seriously implement the agreement,” while at the
same time reiterating Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratlys.255 Still dubious of
China’s “smiling” diplomacy in Southeast Asia and uncertain whether Beijing’s recent
cooperative attitude with Vietnam would continue in the ongoing effort to reach a resolu
tion of the South China Sea disputes, Hanoi launched a new campaign reaffirming Vietnam’s territorial sovereignty in the Spratlys.

Shortly thereafter, Beijing responded by

accusing Vietnam of violating Chinese territorial sovereignty in the Spratlys by inviting
bids for offshore oil exploration in the region.257 The territorial dispute between China
and Vietnam over the Spratlys again threatened to tarnish Beijing’s GND in Southeast
Asia. With the intension of reinforcing China’s “good neighbor” image in the region,
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao suggested at the eighth ASEAN-China summit of Novem
ber 2004 that a senior-level working group be established to examine the issues of joint
development.258
The DRV undertook a conspicuous media campaign in 2005 and early 2006 that
stressed Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratlys and highlighted the determination and
dedication of the country’s armed forces in the archipelago.

9 SO

In April 2005, Vietnam

celebrated the 30th anniversary of the “liberation” of the Truong Sa archipelago (Sprat-

255 “Vietnam hits out at China, Philippines over Spratly oil plans,” Agence France Presse, 9 September
2004.
256 “Truong Sa Island celebrates 30th anniversary of liberation,” Viet Nam News, 29 April 2005.
257 See Gilbert Felongco, “Manila unfazed by Spratly Isles tensions,” Financial Times Information, 11 Sep
tember 2004 and “China protest Vietnam’s bid in South China Sea,” Agence France Presse, 20 October
2004.
258 “Major points of Premier Wen’s speech at the 8th China-ASEAN summit,” Xinhua New Agency, (30
November 2004).
259 For example, see “Gifts arrive for soldiers on Truong Sa islands,” Viet Nam News, 26 January 2006.
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lys). Speaking at a ceremony celebrating the anniversary, Deputy Chief of the General
Staff of the Vietnamese People’s Army, Lieutenant-General Nguyen Khac Nghien, hailed
the efforts and sacrifices of the Vietnamese people and soldiers in overcoming “difficul
ties to protect the sovereignty of the country.” Before ending his address, General
Nghien asked the armed forces in the islands to maintain their vigil in protecting Viet
namese sovereignty. Interestingly, Hanoi’s media blitz on the Spratlys was not only
aimed at foreign ears, but was apparently also intended for domestic consumption.
A 2006 article appearing in the Viet Nam News, an English language newspaper
published by the state Vietnamese News Agency, reported the arrival of gifts for the sol
diers stationed in the Spratlys for the Tet (Lunar New Year) celebration. The Viet Nam
News reported that in addition to fresh vegetables, fruits, and “healthy” pigs, soldiers also
received copies of nationalistic literature celebrating several Vietnamese heroes who martyred themselves in the war against the United States.

Clearly, the Vietnamese gov

ernment was concerned about the morale of its military garrison in the Spratlys, but it
seems more likely that Hanoi’s “media blitz” was largely intended to strengthen Viet
nam’s negotiating position in the South China Sea disputes vis-a-vis Beijing and Manila.
Hanoi had historically rejected proposals for joint development because Vietnamese
leaders felt that doing so would weaken Vietnam’s legal claims of territorial sovereignty
over both the Spratly and Paracel archipelagoes.
The reassertion of Vietnamese sovereignty in the South China Sea during 20052006 was most likely a consequence of this reasoning rather than a move undertaken out
of genuine concern that China might again flex its growing military might in the Spratlys.
260 The works, distributed by the Communist Youth Union o f Khanh Hoa Province, were “Mai mai tuoi hai
muoi, ” and “Nhat ky Dang Thuy Tram” (The Diary o f Dang Thuy Tram). Viet Nam News, 26 January
2006.
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It makes sense that if Hanoi indeed feared future Chinese territorial aggression in the
South China Sea, the Vietnamese would not have signed the tripartite agreement in
March 2005. One must consider, however, that the long history of enmity, animosity,
and conflict between Vietnam and China cannot be reversed overnight, and that the diffi
cult shared history must account for lingering suspicions between the two countries. The
momentous 2005 tripartite agreement for joint development in the disputed Spratlys,
along with increased PRC-DRV trade and Chinese economic and technical assistance, did
ease mutual suspicions to an appreciable extent. It remains doubtful that SinoVietnamese relations would have progressed as far as they have during the last decade if
Vietnamese perceptions of China as a “threat” had not lessened.
Beijing’s diplomatic activities in Southeast Asia, undertaken since the mid-1990s
to promote a friendly and cooperative “good neighbor” image of China had lessened
Vietnamese fears and suspicions of China to an extent that allowed this remarkable im
provement in Sino-Vietnamese relations. China’s friendly, “good neighbor” image in
Vietnam had strengthen to the point that dining a March 2005 visit to Hanoi, Chinese
leader Jia Qinglin commented to Vietnamese General Secretary Nong Due Manh that
China-Vietnam relations were at one of the most inimitable highpoints in history. Jia
continued:
China is ready to work with Vietnam to continuously enrich the content of the
guideline of long-term stability, orientation to the future, friendship and goodneighborliship [sic] and all-round cooperation and the goals of being good
neighbors, goodfriends, good comrades and good partners [emphasis mine]. All
these are aimed to pass on the friendship between China and Vietnam from gen
eration to generation, promote the profound development of bilateral cooperation
for more mutually beneficial results.261

261 “China-Vietnam relations in best time in history,” Xinhua News Agency, 21 March 2006. This was the
lead story for Xinhua.
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General Secretary Manh responded by agreeing with Jia’s comments, and then
praised China’s remarkable achievements in national development. Manh added that
China’s developmental model was an encouragement for the “reform and opening drive”
of Vietnam’s own development and that Vietnam placed “great importance” on learning
from the PRC’s experiences. Manh also stated that Vietnam was ready to expand the ex
change of high-level visits with China, increase cooperation in various fields, advance
bilateral and party-to-party relations between the two countries, and deepen coordination
in regional and international affairs.262 The statements made by both Jia and Manh were
not, as it turned out, premised upon polite, but empty words.
Both Beijing and Hanoi took further actions to demonstrate concretely their sin
cere desire for closer, more cooperative relations between the two socialist countries. On
the same day that Jia and Manh officially celebrated the improvement in Sinoth
Vietnamese relations in general, the 15 round of negotiations at the chairperson level of
the Vietnam-China Joint Committee on Land Border Delineation and Marker Planting
were underway. The event was described by the Thai News Service as “an event of
friendship and frankness where the two sides discussed effective measures to fulfill highlevel commitments on border demarcation and speed up the planting of border mark
ers.”263 In addition to demonstrating their “good neighborliness” by finalizing agree
ments on the land border and the maritime boundary in the Tonkin Gulf, China and Viet
nam confirmed cooperation in the security area by conducting the first joint PRC-DRV
navy patrol in the Tonkin Gulf during the 27thand 28th of April to mark the implementa
tion of an agreement between the armed forces and navies of both countries. The Viet

262 “China-Vietnam relations in best time in history,” Xinhua News Agency, 21 March 2006.
263 “Vietnam, China continue border negotiations,” Thai News Service, 21 March 2006.
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Nam News Agency remarked that the success of the first joint naval patrol helped “pro
mote friendly and cooperative relations between the two armed forces and navies of
Vietnam and China, and achieve the goal of peace, stability, prosperous development in
the Tonkin Gulf and the region.”264 These agreements were followed on 1 May by the
signing of 16 economic cooperation projects between Chinese businesses from Zhanjiang
City and their Vietnamese counterparts in Ho Chi Minh City worth $158 million US dol
lars, and on 11 May by the signing in Beijing of a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) concerning Chinese-Vietnamese cooperation in combating cross-border crime.
Clearly, Beijing’s diplomatic approach of the last decade or so to SinoVietnamese relations in general and to the territorial disputes specifically, was a stunning
success. The mutually held goal of achieving a closer, more friendly and cooperative re
lationship between the two countries in the economic and security sectors was largely
attained in spite o f the unresolved and emotionally charged territorial disputes in the
South China Sea. Beijing’s GND had successfully replaced the traditionally held image
in Vietnam of China as a “threat” with a new friendlier, cooperative “good neighbor” im
age of China to such an extent that the most problematic issue in Sino-Vietnamese rela
tions (the South China Sea issue) did not prevent the achievement of enhanced and deep
ened relations between both states. In addition, as in the above-mentioned incident be
tween China and the Philippines, another recent event in the Spratlys serves to illustrate
the great success of Beijing’s GND in Sino-Vietnamese relations.

264 “Vietnam, China make first joint navy patrol,” Thai News Service, 2 May 2006.
265 The MoU was reached at the 2nd Vietnam-China Meeting on Cooperation in Fighting Crime and Ensur
ing Security in Border Areas, mutually-chaired by Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Public Security Nguyen
Khanh Toan and his Chinese counterpart, Meng Hongwei, who spoke highly o f the regular meetings be
tween the two Ministries and considered them “an effective measure to promote . . . cooperation.” See
“Vietnam, China sign agreement on economic projects worth 158m dollars,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,
12 May 2006.
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In May 2006, Vietnam suffered substantial losses in both property and human life
during powerful typhoon Chanchu. On 19 May, the Vietnamese government sent an SOS
message asking for Chinese assistance in search and rescue operations in the Spratlys to
locate and help approximately 32 Vietnamese ships in the area. The Vietnam News Brief
Service reported on 22 May that, as of the previous evening, “the Chinese partnership
found and rescued 15 Vietnamese ships with 330 fishermen, including 21 deaths and six
injuries.”266 No mention was made by either side of their respective territorial claim in
the Spratlys during or following search and rescue operations in the disputed waters.
Obviously, Beijing’s GND had successfully sublimated the South China Sea issue within
a wider context —Moore’s “economic-security nexus” —of Sino-Vietnamese relations in
such a way as to lessen the comparable benefits of Vietnam pursuing a “hard” stance in
the territorial disputes, and increase the comparable economic rewards of a “soft” or “co
operative” Vietnamese approach to the South China Sea disputes with China. The bene
fits of increased trade and economic relations with the PRC far outweighed any benefits
Vietnam might gain by pushing China too hard on the South China Sea issue. After all,
Vietnam could, in a way, “have its cake and eat it too” by agreeing to put the sovereignty
issue aside for the moment and gain the economic benefits associated with joint devel
opment of the disputed regions as well as benefits associated with increased SinoVietnamese trade and economic relations. Beijing’s GND had transformed the tradi
tional zero-sum approach of both Beijing and Hanoi concerning the disputes into a shared
vision of a “win-win” methodology toward resolving (or at least diminishing the detri
mental effects of) the South China Sea issue.

266 “Vietnam Suffers Unforeseen Hugh Losses Caused by 1st Powerful Typhoon,” Vietnam News Brief Ser
vice, 22 May 2006.
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However, this transformation in bilateral relations between China and both
ASEAN states, the Philippines and Vietnam, away from conflict and toward cooperation,
could not have occurred without a corresponding transformation of “role-identities” of
all actors begot by a budding “collective” identity as “fellow Asians” established as a
result of “complex” learning from multilateral interaction. In short, as “enemies,” the
Sino-Vietnamese relationship, in all probability, would not have witnessed the positive
change that has occurred. In China’s bilateral (traditional) relations with Vietnam and the
Philippines during the first period of our study (1989-1996), little “complex” learning
took place because the “role-identities” of the actors were too egoistic and conflictual
(economic and security “rivals”). “Simple” learning about Self and Other served to rein
carnate a hostile shared Lockean strategic culture. Only through multilateral interaction
between China and the ASEAN states was “complex” learning possible because “roleidentities” other than those above were possible (“cooperator-cooperator,” “equal mem
ber-equal member,” “partner-partner,” etc.). In other words, the birth and growth of a
collective “we-ness” between China and the ASEAN states, conceived through multilat
eral interaction, made the transformation of bilateral relations possible.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter concludes that the positive change in economic and security relations
(territorial disputes) corresponds with two changes in China’s “role-identity” in SinoASEAN relations; from “enemy” or “rival” to “cooperator,” and then from “cooperator”
to “partner” (economic “cooperator” 1997, “partner” 2001; security “cooperator” 1996,
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“partner” 2003).

Further, these changes in “role-identity” resulted from “complex”

learning about Self and Other obtained through multilateral interaction. This is not to
say, however, that only “complex” social learning took place via multilateral interaction - “simple” social learning also took place because of multilateral interaction. What I am
arguing is that over time the frequency of “complex” learning increased (and thus its
causal impact on Beijing’s GND as well), while that of “simple” learning (and its causal
impact on Beijing’s GND) either remained steady or decreased, thus lessening its rele
vance in China’s evolving “good neighbor” diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Further, the
changes in Beijing’s GND invoked by “complex” social learning during this second pe
riod of our case study were not all constitutive changes —instrumental changes in China’s
“good neighbor” diplomacy also occurred, but in a decreasing frequency inversely related
to the change in China’s identity. In other words, as China’s cognitive base became in
creasingly influenced by “complex” learning via multilateral interaction, Beijing’s appli
cation of the GND became less instrumental and more constitutive. I argue, therefore,
that by 2002 - 2003 “complex” social learning via multilateral interaction became the
principal causal factor eliciting constitutive change in China’s identity (from China’s
“Cold War” identity to the new “post-Cold War” identity), and thus a change in Beijing’s
GND resulting in a positive change in Sino-ASEAN relations.
Beijing’s “good neighbor” diplomacy has met with stunning success in Southeast
Asia considering that Sino-ASEAN relations have never been better in spite of the still
unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This is remarkable, considering
that only a decade ago the South Sea disputes were seen as a likely point of regional con267 Wendt defines “role-identity” as “the meanings that actors attribute to themselves when seeing them
selves as an object. . . from the perspective of the Other.” Each actor is at each stage of interaction “jointly
defining who each o f them is.” Social Theory o f International Politics, 334-335.
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flict between China and some ASEAN states, as well as a probable obstacle in SinoASEAN relations. Yet Vietnam and the Philippines agreed in 2005 to ignore the sover
eignty issue for the time being and signed a Tripartite agreement with Beijing for joint
exploration and development of offshore oil reserves in and around the disputed Spratlys.
The two ASEAN states most wary and suspicious of Chinese intentions in the South
China Sea, and most vociferous in their demand for a stronger ASEAN position on the
disputes, are now partners with China in developing the natural resources of the Spratlys.
Moreover, who might have imagined in 2000 that an armed attack on a Chinese fishing
trawler in disputed waters by a “Philippine boat,” leaving four Chinese dead and three
wounded, would not precipitate a crisis in China-Philippine relations? The 2006 “pirate”
attack on Jinghai 03012 did not result in the traditional accusations, denials, and counter
accusations of the past. As we have seen, only one Chinese newspaper accused Manila of
culpability, and following a brief investigation of the incident, both Beijing and Manila
concluded that cooperation in the Spratlys between the Chinese and Philippine navies
should be increasedl How can we explain such an unexpected turnabout in the most con
tentious issue in China’s relations with ASEAN and member states?
The simple (and incomplete) answer is that China’s GND represents a stunning
success of hardnosed Realpolitik on the behalf of Beijing. Informed by knowledge
gained through interaction with ASEAN and member states, Beijing carefully de
emphasized the South Sea disputes in Sino-ASEAN relations to the degree that this most
difficult issue no longer poses a serious obstacle to good relations between China and the
ASEAN nations. With China’s superior economic wealth as advantage, Beijing manipu
lated Vietnam, the Philippines, and ASEAN to accept China’s position of putting the
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sovereignty issue on hold and, until a final resolution of the disputes is reached, pursuing
joint development of the contested areas. The 2005 tripartite agreement between China,
Vietnam, and the Philippines evidences this assertion, as do the other bilateral agreements
between China and Vietnam, and between China and the Philippines, as well as the multi
lateral agreements concluded between China and ASEAN. In short, Beijing’s skillful di
plomacy manipulated the ASEAN states into accepting China’s position of inviolable ter
ritorial sovereignty in the South China Sea in exchange for better economic relations with
China.
Some of the conclusions above are correct. Beijing did succeed in mollifying
ASEAN fears of a rising China “threat” and consequently was successful in sublimating
the South China Sea disputes within wider concerns and shared expectations in SinoASEAN relations. However, this rationalist (realist) mainstream explanation fails to ex
plain the rapidity and intensity of positive change in China’s relations with the ASEAN
states and in Beijing’s bilateral relations with Vietnam and the Philippines. After all,
China’s claims of “inviolable” territorial sovereignty overmuch of the South China Sea
still stand, and the power projection capabilities of the Chinese military continue to im
prove, increasing Beijing’s ability of using force to defend Chinese territorial sovereignty
in the region. The logical answer is that the ASEAN states no longer believe that China
has aggressive territorial intentions in the region. The PRC may be acquiring the neces
sary military capabilities to “resolve” unilaterally the territorial disputes, but that does not
mean that Beijing will do so. In fact, from the ASEAN perspective, the use of force by
Beijing in the region is now only a remote possibility.
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The more complete answer to the question is that China and the ASEAN states
have “learned” about one another (self and other) through multilateral interaction that,
because of shared knowledge and “complex” learning, challenged and changed tradi
tional “role-identities” in the relationship. Beijing learned that the “ASEAN Way” of un
official multilateral dialogue was not incompatible with Chinese interests and approach to
regional foreign policy. This knowledge came in part from participation in the Indone
sian workshops, and in part from interaction at various ASEAN processes such as the
China-ASEAN summits, ARP, APT, and PMC. The Chinese learned that the “ASEAN
Way” respected cultural and political differences among member nations, and valued the
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states —both China and
the ASEAN states identified with a “hard” conception of state sovereignty. This became
clear to China and ASEAN as both sides rejected the internationalization of the territorial
disputes issue. In this issue, a collective (holistic) identity associated with resisting U.S.
interference in the domestic affairs of other states (human rights campaign, military in
terventions) was further strengthened. The effect of this “complex” learning on the evolu
tion of Beijing’s approach to the disputes is obviously present in China’s NSC. The NSC
defines equality in holistic terms: “equality means that all countries, big or small, are
equal members of the international community and should respect each other, treat each
other as equals, refrain from interfering in other countries' internal affairs and promote
the democratization of the international relations.” The NSC also stresses diversity (plu
ralism, again a holistic idea) and presents China as a “member of the group” (holistic
identity):
China believes that ours is a world of diversity, and this is particularly true of the
Asia-Pacific region. Given such reality, only mutual-accommodation, mutual-
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learning and greater cooperation can serve to achieve common progress and de
velopment of all nations. Therefore, security cooperation is not just something for
countries with similar or identical views and mode of development, it includes
cooperation between countries whose views and mode of development differ.268

Another example of “complex” learning affecting China’s identity and interests is
found in Beijing’s decision to sign the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Par
ties in the South China Sea. As discussed above, Chinese participation in the Indonesian
Workshops on Preventing Conflict in the South China Sea allowed Beijing to gain a bet
ter understanding and appreciation of the positions of the other disputant states, as well as
become more familiarized and comfortable with the multilateral process. Beijing learned
through Chinese participation in the annual workshops that the ASEAN states (especially
the Philippines and Vietnam) placed great value on establishing a code of conduct for the
South China Sea. China’s hesitation in accepting such a code appeared to the ASEAN
states as being contrary to the cooperative “good neighbor” image Beijing actively pro
moted in the region. While China’s economic “role-identity” in Southeast Asia was
quickly becoming that of “economic partner,” her security “role-identity” at the time
seemed schizophrenic —wavering between egoistic (defender of Chinese sovereignty)
and holistic (supporter of NSC and “comprehensive” security) identities. Through multi
lateral Track II dialogue (interaction), Beijing learned that the ASEAN states could not
really trust China until this contradiction in China’s national identity was rectified. While
not acting on this knowledge at the Track II level, Beijing did employ this knowledge at
the official Track I level by acceding to the ASEAN Declaration on Conduct in the South
China Sea in 2002. This move served to greatly enhance China’s “good neighbor” image
268 See China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept (31 July 2002). http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/2614/tl5319.htm (accessed 27 March 2006).
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in the region by further lessening fears of future Chinese territorial aggression to support
its territorial claims over the Paracel and Spratly islands. In addition, Beijing learned
early on at the workshops that a joint development strategy might mitigate the detrimen
tal effects of the territorial disputes on Sino-ASEAN relations and allow China to cir
cumvent the issue of territorial sovereignty. As a result, Beijing has consistently pro
posed joint development of the disputed territories in both its bilateral dialogues with
Manila and Hanoi, as well as in China’s multilateral dialogue with ASEAN. This strat
egy, learned in part through Chinese participation in the Track II multilateral workshops,
finally bore fruit with the above-mentioned 2005 Tripartite agreement for joint offshore
oil exploration and development between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the
Spratlys. China’s schizophrenic security identity was “cured” by a dose of “complex”
learning, as China’s “role-identity” changed from that of “security cooperator” (19962001) to one of “security partner” (2002-present). This would not have been possible
without two key changes: a change in China’s national identity and interests (from egois
tic to holistic), and a corresponding change in ASEAN perceptions of China (from China
as a “threat” to China as a “partner”). The empirical evidence supporting this argument is
presented next.
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CHAPTER IV
THE IMPACT OF BEIJING’S GOOD NEIGHBOR DIPLOMACY
ON THE PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR OF SIX ASEAN STATES
TOWARD CHINA, 1989 - 2006

As regional integration process accelerates, China has found itself more and more
closely linked with the rest of East Asia. China's development could not be possi
ble without the common development of the countries in the region. Enhancing
regional cooperation is a major part of China's foreign policy of making friends
and partners with its neighbors and building a harmonious, secure, and prosperous
neighborhood. China will, as always, enthusiastically support and take part in East
Asian cooperation. I believe, with concerted efforts, East Asian cooperation will
surely have a brighter future.
- Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing -

This chapter analyzes the effects of Beijing’s Good Neighbor Diplomacy on
threat perceptions of China in Southeast Asia concerning the South China Sea disputes
specifically and the rise of Chinese economic and military power in general, as well as an
analysis of recent security behavior of six ASEAN states towards China. The previous
chapters make the argument that China’s identity and interests have changed because of
interaction with the ASEAN states, imparting a positive impact on Sino-ASEAN rela
tions. Over time, the ASEAN states have become less apprehensive of Chinese inten
sions in the South China Sea. In short, the ASEAN states no longer view China as a
“threat” because interaction and social learning have changed Beijing’s “role-identity” in
the relationship - and thus moved the regional strategic culture increasingly toward a
Kantian logic of anarchy.269 This chapter offers empirical support of my argument

269 Wendt argues that Kantian culture, like its counterparts (Hobbesian and Lockean), is susceptible to three
degrees o f internalization, 1st degree, 2nd degree, and 3rd degree, which are not mutually exclusive; “I be
lieve it is more useful to see them as reflecting three different “degrees” to which a norm can be Internal-
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through an analysis of China’s changing national image in six ASEAN states (Vietnam,
the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand) regarding the South China
Sea disputes, from that of “threat” to one of “partner.” The four additional states are in
cluded in our study to afford a more balanced assessment of regional perceptions of
China. As earlier discussed, Vietnam and the Philippines are the two ASEAN states with
the most pronounced China threat perceptions. Of the two, Vietnam is the ASEAN state
historically most distrustful of China. Besides Vietnam and the Philippines, Singapore
represents another difficult test for our case study of Chinese regional foreign policy.
While Singapore is largely responsible for initiating ASEAN’s “engagement” of China,
the city-state has the closest informal defense relations with the United States in the re
gion (construction of naval facilities for visiting American aircraft carriers, for example).
As such, while remaining open to the possibilities of improved relations with China, Sin
gapore “hedges” its security strategy by supporting a continuing American military pres
ence in the region. On the other hand, both Thai and Indonesian perceptions of China
have changed during the period of our study in almost an inverse relationship to one an
other. Thailand’s perception of China has changed from one of optimism (along with
Singapore, Thailand was an early advocate for a policy of “engaging” China) to a more
cautious position, given deepening Sino-Myanmar relations, while China’s image in In
donesia has changed from that of a troublemaker and threat to one as a cooperative “good
neighbor.” Malaysia represents the least challenging test of our thesis. Although both
countries share a territorial dispute over parts of the Spratly archipelago, Beijing and
ized, and thus as generating three different pathways by which the same structure can be produced ‘force,’ ‘price,’ and ‘legitimacy’. It is an empirical question which pathway occurs in a given case. It is
only with the third degree o f internalization that actors are really ‘constructed’ by culture up to that point
culture is affecting just their behavior or beliefs about the environment, not who they are or what they
want.” See Social Theory o f International Politics, chapter 6.
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Kuala Lumpur agreed early on in their relationship not to allow their differences in the
Spratlys interfere with the overall improvement of Sino-Malaysian relations.270
Data for this analysis were obtained from three sources. This study’s primary
data was obtained through content analysis of articles appearing in major regional Eng
lish-language newspapers during 1994-2006 concerning the South China Sea territorial
disputes. The second set of supportive data was obtained from regional and global opin
ion polls and surveys concerning security (threat) perceptions of China and Chinese for
eign policy. A third source of data was derived through an analysis of the security behav
ior of ASEAN states towards China. The six ASEAN countries where chosen for our
study because they represent a collectively “balanced” regional perception of China in a
region noted for its exceptionally diverse ethnic, cultural, religious, economic, and political composition.

971

THE DATA
Methodology of Content Analysis
Articles concerning China and the South China Sea disputes were collected from
the following regional English-language newspapers: The Manila Standard and the Phil
ippine Daily Inquirer (the Philippines); Vietnam News Service and the Saigon Daily
Times (Vietnam); the Straits Times (Singapore); The Nation and the Bangkok Post (Thai
land); the New Straits Times and the Malaysian National News Agency Bernama (Malay
270 It should be noted that Malaysia was the first ASEAN state to establish formal relations with Beijing in
1974. In addition, Malaysia established strong economic and military ties with Beijing during the 1990s,
and supported China’s position o f dealing with the South China Sea issue bilaterally. In fact, Malaysian
Prime Minister Bin Mohammad Mahathir’s foreign policy closely mirrored that o f China. Mahathir consis
tently refuted the “China threat” thesis, argued the need for a multipolar international system to balance
American power and influence, and took other anti-Western postures that pleased Beijing. See Lee 17-125.
271 D. R. SarDesai makes an excellent discussion o f ethnic and cultural diversity in Southeast Asia and
gives an informed explanation of its impact on the history o f the region. D. R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia:
Past & Present 5th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).
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sia); and the Jakarta Post (Indonesia). The articles were analyzed and coded according
to the image of China presented. Articles coded “favorable” presented a friendly, coop
erative, peaceful “good neighbor” image of China (“post-Cold War” identity). Friendly,”
in the sense that China’s actions and statements regarding the territorial disputes are per
ceived to be undertaken in a spirit of mutual benefit, as opposed to one based solely upon
self interest. “Cooperative,” in the sense that Beijing’s diplomacy, actions, and participa
tion in joint activities concerning the South China Sea disputes are perceived as sincere
efforts to reduce tension and seek rapprochement with the contestant states. “Peaceful,”
in the sense that China is not perceived as seeking a military resolution of the disputes,
but rather a political solution. Articles coded “unfavorable” expressed an unfriendly, un
cooperative, hostile or threatening image of China vis-a-vis the disputes (traditional
“Cold War” identity). Articles not clearly falling into either of these categories were
coded “neutral.” The data for each ASEAN state (percentage of “favorable,” “unfavor
able,” and “neutral” articles - Y-axis) was tallied by year (X-axis) and plotted on a graph.
Trend lines for each characteristic (“favorable,” “unfavorable,” and “neutral) were calcu
lated and plotted.
Opinion Polls and Surveys
The availability of this type of data concerning China’s image in Southeast Asia is
limited and does not necessarily represent the entire population of a country. Nonethe
less, these data are heuristic for out understanding of the ASEAN countries’ perception of
China. Therefore, opinion poll and survey data are utilized to supplement the primary
data set mentioned above. The available data reveal much about China’s image in South
east Asia (and globally) —especially since 2004.
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The earliest data available come from a 1995 Social Weather Stations Survey of
public opinion in the Philippines.272 A portion of the survey contains questions directly
concerning the Mischief Reef crisis with China, as well as more generalized (but impor
tant) questions concerning relations with China and with the United States that indirectly
inform our study. This Social Weather Stations survey also serves as a representative
“benchmark” of Southeast Asian perceptions of China in 1995 (as survey and opinion
poll data for the other ASEAN states is unavailable until 2004) that can be compared and
contrasted with the results of more recent and regionally-inclusive surveys and opinion
polls. These include two 2004 BBC World Service Polls, View o f China (22 nations)273
and Who Will Lead the World? (23 nations);274 a 2005 BBC News 22 Nation Poll on
•

China (March);

77*5

•

an April 2005 Globescan-PIPA (Program on International Policy Atti

tudes) Poll, Evaluating the World Powers (23 nations)276; the June 2005 Pew Global Atti
tudes Project 16-Country Global Attitudes Report: China;277 the November 2005 (up
dated 2006) Office of Research Opinion Analysis, Asian Views o f China (7 East Asian

272 Social Weather Stations. Social Weather Stations Survey [Philippines]: Quarter II, 1995 [Computer file]
ICPSR version. Quezon City, Philippines: Social Weather Stations [producer], 1998. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1998.
273 The study conducted by GlobeScan and PIPA for the BBC World Service polled 22,953 people in 22
countries. Available online at www.worldpublicopinion.org.
274 The poll of 23,518 people was conducted for the BBC by the international polling firm GlobeScan to
gether with the Program on international Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University o f Maryland during De
cember 2004. Available online at www.worldpublicopinion.org.
275 This BBC World Service Poll of people in 22 countries was undertaken by GlobeScan and PIPA from
November 2004 to January 2005.
276 This BBC World Service Poll o f 22,953 people in 23 countries was undertaken by GlobeScan and PIPA
in April 2005
277 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 16-Country Global Attitudes Report: China (23 June 2005).
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nations);278 and the February 2006 BBC World Service Poll, Global Views o f Countries
(33 nations). 279
THE RESULTS
Newspaper Content Analysis
China’s image in Southeast Asia concerning the South China Sea disputes im
proved in all six ASEAN states investigated in this study. Surprisingly, China’s image
improved the most markedly in the two “frontline” states Vietnam and the Philippines,
which previously viewed China as an “enemy” or “rival.” China’s “favorable” image
also rose dramatically in another claimant state in the scramble for the Spratlys, Malay
sia.
The Philippines
Figure 6 summarizes the results of the content analysis of the Manila Standard
and the Philippine Daily Enquirer. While data for the content analysis of the first four
years of this study was unavailable, it is not needed to establish that China’s image in the
Philippines during those years was quite unfavorable, given the history of Sino-Philippine
relations concerning the territorial disputes. Manila clearly perceived China as a threat
and a likely enemy by the time of the Mischief Reef affair in 1995. However, survey
data for 1995 concerning China’s image in the Philippines vis-a-vis the dispute in the
Spratlys does exist. When asked “If your trust/faith in China is very big, big, maybe
big/maybe small, small or very small?”, 32.5% answered “small,” 29.0% expressed a

278 U.S. Department o f State, Office o f Research and Opinion Analysis, Asian Views o f China (November
2005, updated 2006).
279 This poll o f 39,435 people was conducted in 33 countries for the BBC World Service by GlobeScan and
PIPA between October 2005 and January 2006.
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Figure 6.

China’s National Image in the Philippines (Manila Standard, Philippine
Daily Enquirer). Note: Total number of articles by year: 1998 (19),
1999 (29), 2000 (33), 2001 (13), 2002 (11), 2003 (4), 2004 (31),
2005 (20), 2006 (6). Data unavailable for 1994-1997.
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more cautious view of China by selecting “maybe big, maybe small,” while only 15% of
those polled expressed a “big” trust in China and roughly twice that amount (32.5%) ex
pressed a “small” trust in China. Only 1.5% of those polled had a “very big” trust in
China.

^ O fi

When asked if they agreed with the statement, “The Armed Forces of the Phil

ippines should be strengthened so that other nations will not be tempted to occupy the
national territories of the Philippines,” 80.1% agreed with the statement (64.1% “agree,”
16.0% “strongly agree”), while only 6.7% disagreed with the statement (5.9% “disagree”
•

and 0.8% “strongly disagree”).

781

•

•

•

Interestingly, even while most Filipinos believed that

the Philippine armed forces should be strengthened, most also believed that the best
course of action for Manila to take regarding the territorial dispute with China was to
pursue a diplomatic rather than a military solution of the problem (See figures 7, 8, and
9). China’s national image in the Philippines during the first half of the 1990s concerning
the Spratlys issue then, was clearly a threatening and hostile image.
In our content analysis, the trend lines in Figure 6 for both “favorable” and “unfa
vorable” during 1994-1997 confirm this initial unfavorable (threatening) image of China
in the Philippines. Beginning in the first year of available newspaper articles for our
analysis (1998), China’s image becomes less threatening as reflected by the substantial
increase in “favorable” images of China and a corresponding decrease in “unfavorable”
images. During the same period, “neutral” images also witnessed a marked increase in
frequency. Interestingly, this positive overall trend continues through 2001 for “neutral’
and “unfavorable” images of China, but “favorable” images witnessed a slight decline.

280 Social Weather Stations Survey [Philippines] (1995), question #91.
281 Social Weather Stations Survey [Philippines] (1995), question # 109.
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For 2002, the frequency of “neutral” images of China decreased slightly, while
the frequency of “favorable” images increased, probably representing the influence of
China’s accession to the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea in November of that year. In 2003, the frequency of “unfavorable” images of
China increased, as the frequency of “neutral” images witnessed a corresponding de
crease. However, the frequency of “unfavorable” images in 2004 decreased to only 7%
and, for 2005-2006, no “unfavorable” images of China vis-a-vis the Spratlys were ob
served. In 2005, “favorable” images increased in frequency to 86.7%, while the fre
quency of “neutral” images of China decreased to only 13.3% and, for the second year,
no “unfavorable” images were observed. Data for 2005 clearly reflects the influence of
the bilateral agreement that year between Beijing and Manila for joint offshore oil explo
ration and development in the Spratlys (which, as we have already seen, was expanded
later that year to include Vietnam). Data for 2006 indicate a 100% frequency of “neutral”
images of China. This is likely due to a lessening in importance of the South China Sea
issue in relations between Beijing and Manila because of the 2005 Tripartite Agreement.
China and the Philippines no longer view one another as an “enemy” in the South China
Sea. Rather, they have come to view the Other as a “partner.” While it remains true that
partners are not necessarily friends, it is difficult to conceive partners as enemies (usu
ally). Concerning the dispute with Manila over the Spratlys, China’s “role-identity” has
transformed from one of “enemy” or “rival,” to one of “partner.” As discussed later in
the chapter, data derived from opinion polls and surveys concerning China’s national im
age in the Philippines support the results of our content analysis.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

163

Vietnam
Collecting data for Vietnam was problematic due to a lack of newspaper articles
and Vietnam News Service reports before 1999, and the small numbers of relevant articles
and reports until 2003, when the volume of data increases almost exponentially the last
three years of our study. Nonetheless, a change in Vietnam’s perception of China regard
ing the territorial disputes is clearly discemable. Figure 10 summarizes the results of the
content analysis of the Vietnam News Service and the Saigon Daily Times. As this graph
indicates, since 1999 China’s national image in Vietnam concerning the South China Sea
issue changed from “unfavorable” to “favorable” in 2003 (where the “favorable” and
“unfavorable” trend lines intersect). The frequency of “unfavorable” images is highest in
1999, when Beijing and Hanoi had not yet concluded the land border agreement and Bei
jing appeared to be stalling on the issue of a code of conduct in the South China Sea.
However, in 2001 and 2002 the frequency of “unfavorable” images of China decrease,
and “neutral” and (in 2002) “favorable” images of China begin to emerge. This is under
standable in light of the 2000 settlement of the China-Vietnamese land border and mari
time boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin, as well as China’s decision to sign the ASEAN
Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea in November 2002.
China’s image in Vietnam improved the following year reflecting China’s accession to
the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). However, in
2004 China’s unfavorable image increased due to renewed tensions over the Spratlys. In
2005, China’s image in Vietnam changed considerably as the frequency of unfavorable
images dropped and the frequency of favorable images rose. This can be explained by
Hanoi’s decision to participate with China and the Philippines in joint development of
offshore hydrocarbon reserves in the Spratlys (Tripartite Agreement). As the plotted
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Figure 10.

China’s Image in Vietnam {Saigon Times Daily and Vietnam News
Service). Note: Total number of articles by year: 1999 (3), 2001 (4),
2002 (6), 2003 (9), 2004 (18), 2005 (22), 2006 (12).Data unavailable for
1994-1998, and 2000.
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trend lines indicate, China’s national image in Vietnam concerning the most contentious
issue in Sino-Vietnamese relations has clearly changed for the better. Beijing and Hanoi
no longer perceive one another as “enemies” or “rivals” in the South China Sea. Instead,
they now increasingly view the one another as a cooperative “partner.”
Thailand
The data for Thailand indicate that China’s national image as reflected by the ter
ritorial disputes improved only slightly, as the trend lines for both “favorable” and “unfa
vorable” remain flat in comparison with those of other ASEAN states (Figure 11). The
frequency of “neutral” images of China in Thailand is comparably high to that of the
other states, reflecting the fact that Thailand does not have a territorial dispute with China
and, therefore, Bangkok can be less critical of China concerning the South China Sea is
sue. In addition, the high frequency of “neutral” images also reflects Thailand’s chang
ing regional strategic relationship with China in mainland Southeast Asia (elaborated
upon below) vis-a-vis the growth in relations between the PRC and Myanmar, which the
Thais perceive as troubling. Not wishing to be provocative (nor timid) in relations with
China, Bangkok’s attitude has become more reserved toward China than during the late
1980s and early 1990s when both states faced a common enemy —Vietnam. The overall
neutral image of China in Thailand concerning the territorial disputes is consistent with
'JO'}

what one would expect of Bangkok’s famous “bamboo diplomacy.”

282 Thailand is the only country in Asia that successfully resisted Western imperialism and maintained its
independence. Like bamboo that is blown about by the high winds, from this side to that, bending but not
breaking, Thai foreign policy swayed with the “wind” o f imperialism without breaking.
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Figure 11.

China’s Image in Thailand (.Bangkok Post, The Nation). Note: Total
number of articles by year: 1994 (3), 1996 (4), 1997 (9), 1998 (7),
1999 (10), 2000 (9), 2001 (5), 2002 (5), 2003 (6), 2004 (3), 2005 (6),
2006 (5). Data unavailable for 1995.
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During 1997, “favorable” images of China increased in frequency, while a de
crease in frequency of “neutral” images was observed in Thailand. These results proba
bly reflect a positive impact of Beijing’s unselfish actions during the Asian Financial Cri
sis. Beginning in 1997, an increasing frequency in “unfavorable” images of China is ob
served, continuing until reaching a peak of 42.9% in 2000. The frequency of “unfavor
able” images of China from 2001 until 2004 falls to 0%. Beijing’s accession to the
ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, and to the
TAC the following year, played crucial roles in changing the image of China in Thailand.
The trend line for the frequency of “neutral” images of China decreases over time in an
inverse relationship with the trend lines for “favorable” and “unfavorable.” Further, the
height of the “neutral” trend line indicates that the Thais remain cautious in their percep
tions of China. Curiously, during 2002-2003 the frequency of “favorable” images of
China decrease markedly while, at the same time, the frequency of “neutral” images in
crease in a similar but opposite (inverse) relationship.
Singapore
Figure 12 represents the frequency of “favorable,” “neutral,” and “unfavorable”
images over time of China in Singapore concerning the territorial disputes in the South
China Sea. While data for 2000, 2001, and 2006 were unavailable, data for the remaining
years of the study is sufficient to reveal trends in Singaporean perceptions of China. As
with the other ASEAN states, China’s national image in Singapore has changed favora
bly. The trend line for “favorable” images rises, albeit less dramatically than those of
Vietnam and the Philippines, but more so than that of Thailand. “Unfavorable” images
are the most frequent during 1994-1995, and then again during 1997-1998, which reflect
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Figure 12.

China’s Image in Singapore {Straits Times). Note: Total number of articles
by year: 1994 (5), 1995 (32), 1996 (14), 1997 (8), 1998 (4), 1999 (12),
2002 (6), 2003 (3), 2004 (3), 2005 (4). Data unavailable for 2000, 2001,
and 2006.
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corresponding periods of increased tension between China and Vietnam, and between
China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. However, during 2003-2005 no “un
favorable” images of China are observed, reflecting again Beijing’s acceptance in 2002
of ASEAN’s Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and 2003
singing of the TAC. For 2004, the frequency of “neutral” images is 100%, while the fol
lowing year the frequency of “favorable” images is 100%. In sum, China’s image con
cerning the territorial disputes in Singapore is more benign and less threatening than it
was during the mid-to-late 1990s.
Indonesia
As with the data for the preceding ASEAN states, the data for Indonesia also indi
cate a measurable change of China’s national image during our period of study (Figure
13). As one would expect of the country that spearheaded efforts toward functional co
operation in the South China Sea, and since 1990 chaired the annual informal Workshops
on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea, the frequency of “neutral” im
ages of China is high, especially during 1999, 2001, and 2006. As the trend lines indi
cate, “neutral” and “favorable” images of China increase over time, while “unfavorable”
images decrease in frequency at a faster rate (steeper slope) than the rate of frequency
increase of the other images. No “unfavorable” images of China are observed for six of
the nine years for which we have data. Moreover, as with the other ASEAN states thus
far in our study, a decrease in “unfavorable” images of China is accompanied by a corre
sponding increase in frequency of “neutral” images. The frequency of “favorable” im
ages peaks at 60% in 2003, reflecting the positive influence of Beijing signing the 2002
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Figure 13.

China’s Image in Indonesia {Jakarta Post). Note: total number of articles
by year: 1996 (2), 1997 (8), 1998 (6), 1999 (5), 2000 (4), 2001 (3),
2003 (3), 2004 (4), 2006 (2).Data unavailable for 1994-1995,2002, and
2005.
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Declaration and acceding in 2003 to the ASEAN TAC. In short, Indonesian perceptions
of a China “threat” in the South China Sea decrease over time.
Malaysia
The data for Malaysia clearly indicate a sharp increase in frequency of “favor
able” images of China concerning the disputes in the South China Sea, and a significant
decrease in frequency of “neutral” images (Figure 14). The trend line for “unfavorable”
images of China decreases at a more modest rate than that of “neutral” images, but this is
understandable given the low initial frequency rate of “unfavorable” images (only 8.3%
in 1995) of China. As with Indonesia, no “unfavorable” images of China are observed in
six of the ten years (1996, 2000-2004) of available data for Malaysia. Most significantly,
a 100% frequency rate for “favorable” images is observed twice (2003, 2004). Singapore
is the only other country in our study with a 100% frequency for “favorable” images of
China (2005) -- and no territorial dispute exists between Singapore and China. The fre
quency of “unfavorable” images of China peaks in 1997 (22.2%), but steadily decreases
until 2000 when the frequency drops to zero percent for the remainder of the study.
China’s image in Malaysia, even though Beijing and Kuala Lumpur dispute ownership
over areas of the Spratly archipelago, is clearly the most favorable of all six ASEAN
states.
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Figure 14.

China’s Image in Malaysia (New Straits Times, Bernama - Malaysian
National News Agency). Note: Total number of articles by year:
1995 (10), 1996 (8), 1997 (8), 1998 (6), 1999 (22), 2000 (7), 2001 (4),
2002 (6), 2003 (4), 2004 (4). Data unavailable for 1994, 2005-2006.
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Poll and Survey Data Concerning China’s Image in Southeast Asia
Data derived from regional and global opinion polls and surveys concerning
China’s image support the findings of our case-specific analysis of perceptions of China
in regional newspaper articles. All opinion poll and survey data indicate that perceptions
of a China “threat” in Southeast Asia have lessened considerably, even though the distri
bution of capabilities and power in the region increasingly favor China. Steven Kull, Di
rector of PIPA, notes that “it is quite remarkable that with its growing economic power
China is viewed as so benign, especially by its Asian neighbors [emphasis mine] that it
could threaten or seek to dominate. However, this cordial view from around the world
does appear to depend on China restraining itself from seeking to convert its burgeoning
economic power into a threatening military presence.”283 As we have seen, even the ter
ritorial disputes in the South China Sea —the China “threat” as manifest in Southeast
Asia —have not prevented a favorable change in perceptions of China throughout the re
gion. The results of BBC World Service Polls for 2004, 2005, and 2006, and a 2005 U.S.
State Department study confirm the change in China’s national image observed in our
country-and issue-specific content analysis of newspaper articles.
The Philippines
Of the seven countries surveyed in the 2005 State Department survey Asian views
o f China, the Philippines still has a residual sense of a China threat due to past sparring
over territories in the South China Sea (only data for the four Southeast Asian states is

283 “22 Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries,” GlobeScan and PIPA (2004).
Available online at www.worldpublicopinion.org, and at www.pipa.org.
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presented here).

*)QA

When asked what group or nation threatens Philippine national secu

rity (Figure 15), only 9 percent of Filipinos select China, placing Iraq (16%) and Abu
Sayyaf, an insurgent group in the southern Philippines (15%), ahead of China. When se
lecting from two alternative visions of China, 56% of Filipinos see China as “a peaceful
country that is more interested in economic growth than in military adventures,” while
35% view China as “an expansionist power that is building up its military to enforce its
claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea.”

9 or

When identifying key images of

China, Filipinos overwhelmingly selected positive images over negative (Figure 16).
Sixty-two percent of Filipinos view Chinese as “hardworking people,” forty-two percent
have an image of China as being a “beautiful country,” while only eleven percent of Fili
pinos choose a “military threat” image of China and only seven percent believe that
China “bullies other countries.”
When selecting the greatest threat to world peace in the next five years from
seven choices,286 Filipinos see international terrorism as the leading threat (29%), the un
controlled spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the next most pressing
threat (21%), followed by the collapse of politically unstable countries (15%), Islamic
extremism (13%), and the U.S. use of military force (12%). Only three percent (3%) see
growing Chinese military power as the greatest threat to world peace in the next five
years (Figure 17). Filipinos see the U.S. as a greater threat to world peace than China!
This is most surprising, considering that a clear majority of Filipinos (72%) continue to

284 The seven countries are Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indone
sia.
285 Asian Views o f China, 5.
286 The choices are international terrorism, Islamic extremism, uncontrolled spread o f WMD, U.S. use of
military force, collapse of politically unstable countries, growing Chinese military power, and Japanese
militarism.
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see the U.S. as the Philippines’ “closest security partner in 5-10 Years.287 Additionally, a
strong majority of Filipinos (69%) expresses confidence that China deals with interna
tional problems responsibly (Figure 18), and most (81%) believe that bilateral relations
with China are good (Figure 19). The 2005 BBC World Service 23 Nation Poll “Who
Will Lead the World?” supports these findings, concluding that China’s image as a
“positive influence in the world” in the Philippines is among the highest of the 23 nations
polled (70%).288
China’s national image in the Philippines since the early 1990s has clearly be
come less threatening and more benign. By 2005, Filipinos were less mistrusting and farless fearful of China than during the mid-1990s. The remarkable change in Filipino pub
lic opinion is revealed by a comparison of the 1995 Social Weather Stations Survey data
with that of the 2005 U.S. State Department Asian Views o f China survey. As discussed
in Chapter 2, China’s image in the Philippines in 1995 was one of a hostile aggressor or
enemy. However, the U.S. State Department’s 2005 public opinion survey revealed that
only 9% of Filipinos viewed China as a national security threat (just 4 percentage points
higher than that of the United States!), only 11% viewed China as a military threat, and
only 7% perceived China as a “bully.” (Figures 15, and 16 respectively). Quite interest
ingly, more Filipinos viewed the use of U.S. military force as the “greatest threat to world
peace in the next five years” (12%) than China’s growing military power (3%)!
Public opinion surveys conducted in the ASEAN states since 2005 indicate that
China is no longer perceived as a revisionist state posing a rising military threat

287 Asian Views o f China, 8.
288 BBC World Service 23 Nation Poll, “Who Will Lead the World?” (conducted by GlobeScan and the
Program on International Policy Attitudes, April 2005), 4.
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to regional peace and stability. Instead, the 2005 - 2006 polls and surveys indicate that
China’s image among the ASEAN publics is currently one of a cooperative, responsible
rising power whose contributions to regional economic and political stability reflect an
increasing leadership role for China in Southeast Asia. In Thailand and Malaysia, the
public have more confidence in China than the U.S. to deal responsibly with international
problems, while almost 70% of those surveyed in the Philippines view China as responsi
ble in dealing with international problems (Figure 18). ASEAN public perceptions of
their respective country’s bilateral relations with China are extremely positive. This is
especially true in Thailand and Malaysia, where positive perceptions of the bilateral rela
tionship with China were almost unanimous (97%, 96%, respectively). Public perception
of bilateral relations with China in the Philippines (82%) and Indonesia (92%) were also
extremely positive while, by comparison, perceptions of bilateral relations with the U.S.
were much less favorable in Indonesia and Malaysia (70% and 74% respectively).
Vietnam
Opinion poll and survey data for Vietnam is quite limited due to the country’s all
but recent isolation from much of the international community. The only opinion poll or
survey data available for Vietnam is the Australian Morgan Poll (2005 and 2006 data
only), but this poll does not measure Vietnamese perceptions of China.
Thailand
The national image of China in Thailand is mostly favorable. Most Thais see
China as a benign power whose rising economic strength will benefit Thailand.

289 Asian Views o f China, 2.
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Thai have a favorable opinion of China (83%)290 and all most all (97%) say that ThaiChina relations are good (Figures 20 and 19, respectively). Most Thais have positive im
ages of China (Figure 16), selecting positive attributes such as “hardworking people”
(83%) and “beautiful country” (69%), while avoiding negative attributes such as “mili
tary threat” (22%) and “bullies other countries” (9%). Most importantly, China is not
viewed as a threat in Thailand. As indicated in Figures 15 and 17, only one percent (1%)
of Thais polled view China as a threat, and only two percent of those polled regard China
as the greatest threat to world peace in the next five years. This data set paints a more
benign perception of China as a threat than does the data for Thailand in our content
analysis above (Figure 11). However, the trend in Thailand toward a less-threatening
view of China is apparent in both studies.
Singapore
English-language poll and survey data concerning China’s national image in
Singapore are unavailable.
Indonesia
China’s national image in Indonesia is the most benign of all six ASEAN coun
tries in our study. The State Department’s 2005 survey Asian Views o f China concludes
that Indonesia neither views China as a potential threat to Indonesian national security
(Figures 15 and 17), nor as a likely security partner.

901

The strongest images of China in

Indonesia are “hardworking people” (77%), “economic superpower” (44%), and “long

290 Thailand has a more favorable opinion o f China than o f the United States (only 73% have a favorable
opinion of the United States. Asian Views a f China, 6.
291 Most Indonesians see ASEAN as their closest security partner in 5-10 years (39%). The United States is
the second choice (23%), then the EU (5%), Japan (8%), and finally China (4%). Asian Views o f China, 4.
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history” (40%), while China as a “military threat” (8%), “human rights violator” (11%),
and “bully” of other nations (7%) are the weakest images of China (Figure 16). Overall,
Indonesians view China favorably (66%) and (92%) view bilateral relations with China
as “good” (Figure 19). 292
According to results of the 2005 BBC World Service 23 Nation Poll “Who Will
Lead the World?”, China’s image as a “positive influence in the world” in Indonesia was
among the highest of the 23 nations polled (68%).293 The poll makes an insightful com
ment about China’s positive global image, stating that the “positive view of China is
closely related to its economic role in the world rather than its potential military power.”
The study concludes that countries “which have engaged the world primarily through
economic relations —or soft power —are widely seen as having a mostly positive influ
ence, while the countries that have very large militaries and have used them in a promi
nent way —the US and Russia —are more often seen as having a negative influence . . . .
While trade might buy you love, guns clearly do not.”294
Malaysia
Data concerning China’s image in Malaysia in the 2005 State Department Survey
Asian Views o f China clearly indicate that Malaysians do not view China as a threat (1%),
even though the dispute between Beijing and Kuala Lumpur in the Spratly archipelago
has yet to be resolved (Figure 17). 91% of Malaysians have a favorable opinion of China
(Figure 20) and almost all (96%) describe the bilateral relationship with China as “good.”

292 For the sake o f comparison, only 42% o f Indonesians have a favorable opinion o f the U.S., but trust the
U.S. to deal responsibly with international problems more (50%) than they trust China to do so (46%).
Asian Views o f China, 4.
293 BBC World Service 23 Nation Poll, “Who Will Lead the World?” (conducted by GlobeScan and the
Program on International Policy Attitudes, April 2005), 4.
294 Ibid.
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Malaysians are also much more likely to trust China (75%) than the U.S. (35%) to deal
with international problems responsibly (Figure 18). The strongest images held by Ma
laysians of China are “hardworking people” (77%), “economic superpower" (73%), “long
history” (69%), “beautiful country” (62%). Images of China as a “military threat” (14%),
“human rights violator” (7%), and “bullies other countries” (7%) are the weakest among
Malaysians (Figure 16).
All of the data presented thus far support the assertion that Beijing’s GND is suc
cessfully altering threat perceptions of China in Southeast Asia. Our newspaper content
analysis of China’s image in six ASEAN states concerning the South China Sea disputes
indicates a positive change in regional threat perceptions of China. The news media in
Southeast Asia clearly no longer view China as a serious threat to the national security of
their respective countries. The more generalized data obtained from public opinion polls
and surveys presented above concerning China’s image in the region support the findings
of our content analysis. The “man in the street” clearly no longer believes it likely that
Beijing will use force to alter the status quo in the Spratlys. China no longer has a public
image in the region of being a “bully of other countries” nor a “military threat.” How
ever, do the governments of these ASEAN states share the increasingly favorable view of
China expressed by the public? To answer this question, we must now turn our attention
to the security behavior of the ASEAN states.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES’ POLICIES TOWARDS CHINA
ASEAN Policy Towards China
The territorial disputes in the South China Sea represent one of the most serious
security concerns for ASEAN (especially for the Philippines and Vietnam), as discussed
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above. The fact that the ASEAN states have agreed with Beijing not to allow the dis
putes to stand in the way of closer China-ASEAN relations indicates that ASEAN threat
perceptions of China have decreased considerably. Even while China’s power projection
capabilities continue to improve and military expenditures continue to increase, the
ASEAN states appear less inclined to view the rise of China as a threat. After all, the two
“frontline” states in the territorial disputes with China, Vietnam and the Philippines, are
now partners with the PRC in developing the offshore oil potential in the Spratlys! If
this analysis is correct, then we would expect to see evidence of increased trust and
“partnership” in Sino-ASEAN relations manifest itself in the security behavior of these
states towards China. In other words, it is difficult to believe that Sino-ASEAN relations
could improve as dramatically as they have during the last decade if China were still per
ceived to represent a serious military threat in Southeast Asia. Therefore, if perceptions
of a China threat remain high in the region, we would expect the security behavior of the
ASEAN states to reflect such a condition. We would expect the ASEAN states to either
balance against or bandwagon with China. Given the continuing growth of Chinese eco
nomic and military power, any state that felt threatened by China would logically, over
time, view China as an increasing security threat due to the PRC’s increasing military
capability. As such, we would expect adjustments in the security policies of the threat
ened states such as internal balancing (increase military and economic strength), external
balancing against China via closer security relations with the U.S., or bandwagoning with
China. If, on the other hand, perceptions of a China threat were decreasing in Southeast
Asia, we would expect the security policies of ASEAN and member states to reflect this
condition as well. Given the economic troubles in the region since 1997, decreased threat
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perceptions should lead to decreased military spending as limited economic resources are
reallocated to other sectors. In addition, a decrease in threat perceptions of China would
allow the ASEAN states more maneuvering room in their relations with both the United
States and China —there would be less pressure to pursue or strengthen security relations
with either Washington or Beijing. As such, the ASEAN states could benefit through
pursuing good relations with both regional powers (the optimum situation).
As explained below, the security behavior of ASEAN and member states toward
China since the end of the Cold War has undergone and continues to undergo significant
change as China is increasingly viewed as a cooperative security partner in the region.
As we have seen in the earlier chapters, Beijing began in the late 1990s to promote
“comprehensive” and “cooperative” security in the form of the New Security Concept
(NSC), which echoes a number of ASEAN norms —non-interference in the internal af
fairs of other states (strong state sovereignty), mutual non-aggression, peaceful coexis
tence, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and mutual benefit,
and peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue.

The convergence of Chinese and

ASEAN security interests during the 1990s (regional stability and economic develop
ment), as well as the emergence of a collective identity in China-ASEAN relations, have
induced a change in both ASEAN perceptions and security behavior vis-a-vis China. Re
gional views of China have changed from China as a “threat” to China as a cooperative
economic and security “partner” as reflected by a change in ASEAN and member states’
behavior towards China. Increasingly, China and ASEAN are moving in the direction of
establishing an Asian economic and security community. ASEAN decided to pursue its
295 Muthiah Alagappa, “Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conceptions and issues,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University
press, 2003), 76.
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own security community as the Ministers agreed to contribute to the establishment of an
ASEAN Security Community (ASC) as declared by the ASEAN Heads of State and
Government at the ninth ASEAN Summit held in Bali, Indonesia, on 7 October 2003 and
mandated under the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP).296 Since then, Beijing has also
promoted the concept of a regional security community. In light of the above, it is clear
that threat perceptions associated with the rise of Chinese economic and military power
and with China’s historic national image as a “threat” in Southeast Asia have declined
considerably. China is no longer viewed in Southeast Asia as much a threat as an oppor
tunity for economic and military cooperation. This conclusion holds true as well for indi
vidual ASEAN states.
The Security Policies of Six ASEAN States Toward China
The security policies of the six ASEAN states studied above also indicate that re
gional threat perceptions of China have decreased. As discussed below, military expendi
tures as a percentage of GDP of five of our study’s six ASEAN states have decreased,
and these states have not sought to respond to growing Chinese military power by either
balancing against or bandwagoning with China, as Realist theory predicts. In an attempt
to correct this theoretical deficiency, realists are currently labeling this non-realist behav
ior “hedging.” By doing so, they continue to ground their analysis on power and threat
considerations while at the same time discount or ignore the social construction of state
identity and interest and the possibility that this is an endogenous process.297 In addition,

296 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Declaration o f ASEAN Concord II (Bali
Concord II), 7 October 2003. http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm (accessed 14 July 2006).
297 Evelyn Goh provides a good explanation o f the “hedging” strategy o f the ASEAN states through case
studies o f Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand. Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in
Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies,” Policy Studies 16 (East-West Center Washington, 2005).
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the very fact that these states have the luxury of pursuing so-called “hedging” strategies
regarding China indicates that the rise of Chinese power has not caused a corresponding
increase in regional threat perceptions of China —otherwise these states would be under
greater pressure to choose between balancing against or bandwagoning with China, due
to the asymmetry of national power between China and the small ASEAN states. The re
gional distribution of power in economic and military terms does influence perceptions
and security strategies of the ASEAN states toward China, but to a less extent now than
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even as Chinese economic and military power
continue to expand and a resolution of the South China Sea disputes has yet to material
ize, perceptions in Southeast Asia of a China “threat” are lessening as China is increas
ingly viewed in the region as being a cooperative partner and good neighbor. This is true
for all ASEAN states, but in differing degrees for each member state. Having said that, I
must add a caveat. It would be “stretching it” to suggest that China is presently viewed
as a true “friend” by any ASEAN state (except perhaps Myanmar, Malaysia, or Cambo
dia) -- after all, the positive change in Southeast Asian perceptions of China began barely
ten years ago and is still an ongoing process (and thus subject to change). Considering
the long history of enmity between China and Vietnam, it would be surprising indeed for
the Vietnamese to lose their apprehension of China in a mere decade. Trust is not easily
earned —it takes time to develop. Nonetheless, a trend towards “friendship” in SinoASEAN (as a group and as individual states) relations is discemable and is affecting the
security policies of ASEAN and member states. This trend will likely continue as long as
relations across the Taiwan Strait remain stable and the global economy does not experi
ence any serious downturns.
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Vietnam
Even though China remains the paramount security concern for Hanoi, the secu
rity behavior of Vietnam since the early 1990s indicates that perceptions of a China threat
are decreasing among the leadership in Hanoi. This is evidenced by Hanoi’s increased
emphasis on diplomacy in its China policy and a corresponding attenuation of attention
on military capabilities. While the armed forces of the PRC continue to modernize and
develop increased power-projection capabilities, Vietnamese military expenditures are
decreasing as measured as a percentage of GDP. After reaching a spending peak of 7.9%
of GDP in 1990, Vietnamese military expenditures drop off considerably during 19911993, then rise slightly (from 2.3% to 2.6%) during 1994 (Figure 21). Data on Vietnam
ese military spending for 1995-1998 is regrettably unavailable, but data does exist for
1999-2005. However, this data comes from a different source than that of the 1988-1994
data and measures military expenditures in $US Billions (as opposed to percentage of
GDP). While the two data sets are not directly comparable with one another, they both
indicate that Vietnam’s military spending remains comparatively modest with that of
other ASEAN states. According to the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,
Vietnam’s military budget increased slightly during 1999-2005 (Figure 22). In 2004
Vietnam’s military spending was $ 3.2 billion (US). To put this figure into perspective,
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Military Expenditures as Percentage of GDP. Source of Data: SIPRI
Military Expenditure Database (SIPRI, 2006). Data for China and
Indonesia are SIPRI estimates. Data unavailable for Vietnam after 1994.
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China’s 2003 military budget was $ 56.0 billion (U.S.).298 The overall decrease in Viet
nam’s military spending during our study’s period indicates that Hanoi does not antici
pate hostilities with China any time soon. This is quite remarkable considering that of all
the ASEAN states, Vietnam has the longest and most contentious history of armed con
flict with China. Given the overall history of enmity between Beijing and Hanoi, as well
as the more specific history regarding the territorial disputes over the Paracel and Spratly
islands, it is extremely difficult to account for Vietnam’s decreased military expenditures
since the early 1990s unless Hanoi’s threat perceptions regarding China have fundamen
tally changed.
The composition and capabilities of the Vietnamese Navy also indicate that Hanoi
does not perceive any clear and present China threat in the maritime environment. Viet
nam has only eleven major surface warships (6 frigates and 5 corvettes), eight missile
patrol craft, ten torpedo and coastal craft, and nineteen inshore (river) patrol boats. None
of the six frigates is armed with guided missile systems. Vietnam also has two obsoles
cent submarines (SS/SSK).299 Hanoi obviously does not currently perceive a need to
strengthen its military power to any significant degree. This is not the security policy one
might expect if Hanoi still perceived China as posing a national security threat to Viet
nam!
Vietnam’s external security policy also indicates that China is no longer perceived
as being the threat it once was. Hanoi has so far not pursued either a hard balancing
strategy against China nor has Vietnam moved towards bandwagoning with China.
298 U.S. Military Spending vs. the World, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 7 February 2005.
http://www.armscontroleenter.org/archives/001221 .php.
299 Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: Total
and Sub-Regional Balances; Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, June 2006), 73.
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Instead, Hanoi is pursuing a hedging strategy of cultivating closer economic and diplo
matic ties with China, while at the same time pursuing a soft-balancing strategy by press
ing for a more unified and explicit ASEAN security policy vis-a-vis China and through
seeking better relations with Washington. Hanoi’s strategy indicates that China is no
longer perceived as a likely, immediate military threat. However, at the same time Ha
noi’s hedging strategy also indicates that the Vietnamese remain cautious and suspicious
of China’s long-term goals in the region. As such, Vietnam’s strategy in coping with the
rise of China is to enmesh the major powers in Southeast Asia (U.S., Japan, and EU) dip
lomatically and economically to deepen their sense of having a stake in regional security
and induce a stronger interest in maintaining regional stability. Besides limited efforts of
cultivating closer ties with India and “testing” the viability of closer relations with the
U.S., Hanoi’s main enmeshment strategy is to focus on the “constructive entanglement”
of China. As such, Hanoi’s position regarding the engagement of major powers in the
region is unique among the ASEAN states in that China —not the United States —is the
main target of Vietnamese efforts. Vietnam therefore, follows a “defensive enmeshment
concept” based on the notion that greater interdependence between China and ASEAN
will raise the costs to China of any aggression against Vietnam.300 Rather than relying on
American military power to balance the rise of China, Hanoi views U.S. economic power
as crucial in developing Vietnam’s internal balancing ability.301
Since the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1991, Hanoi has assidu
ously promoted close diplomatic and economic ties with China. As outlined in Chapters
2 and 3, official contacts between the two countries, such as frequent exchanges between
300 Goh, 33.
301 Goh, 42. Also see Nayan Chanda, “A Balancing Act by Hanoi,” International Herald Tribune, 11 No
vember 2003.
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military and civilian officials and annual high-level meetings, are well established. Be
ginning in the late 1990s, talks between China and Vietnam concerning disputes over the
land and sea borders became almost habitual.302 Military-to-military contacts between
China and Vietnam also have become more frequent as well. The first visit of a Chinese
naval vessel to Vietnam occurred in 2001 at Nha Rong port in Ho Chi Minh City.303
Since then, such contacts have become routine in nature. Increased interaction among
Chinese and Vietnamese officials has led to a general improvement of Sino-Vietnamese
relations, as well as to progress in the most difficult issue in the relationship —the Spratlys dispute. After all, it is difficult to believe that Hanoi would have joined China and the
Philippines in developing the natural resources in the Spratlys had Vietnam still per
ceived China as constituting a serious threat to Vietnamese national security. By signing
the 2005 Tripartite Agreement, Hanoi deepened China’s “enmeshment’ in the region and
thus lessened the possibility of any hostile moves by Beijing in the Spratlys. By 2005,
Vietnam had seemingly realized its goal of constructively entangling China as articulated
in 1992 by a Vietnamese foreign ministry official:
Sino-Vietnamese relations will be meshed within the much larger network of in
terlocking economic and political interests . . . [creating] an arrangement whereby
anybody wanting to violate Vietnam’s sovereignty would be violating the inter
ests of other countries as well.304
In addition to Hanoi’s “enmeshment” strategy directed at China, Vietnam also at
tempted to balance against China through its membership in ASEAN (2000). As a mem
ber, Hanoi hoped to utilize the potential collective bargaining power of ASEAN to en
302 See Lai To Lee, China and the South China Sea Dialogues and “China's Relations with ASEAN: Part
ners in the 21st Century?” Pacifica Review 13, no.l (February 2001): 61-71 for an excellent discussion o f
Sino-Vietnamese dialogue concerning disputed sea borders in the Gulf o f Tonkin, and the territorial dis
putes in the South China Sea.
303 Goh, 21.
304 Nguyen Hong Thach, quoted in Goh, 33.
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hance Vietnam’s position regarding its giant neighbor to the north —especially concern
ing the Paracel and Spratly islands. Hanoi suggested that ASEAN’s decision to view
Vietnam as part of the group was due to “economic and defence [sic] reasons,” and also
reflected ASEAN fears concerning China’s aggressive stance on the Spratlys dispute.305
Vietnam’s strategy of emphasizing the China threat in the South China Sea has not met
with much success, however, due to the lack of a unified ASEAN position on contentious
issues with China. Beijing’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia has successfully divided
ASEAN on the South China Sea issue by pursuing bilateral trade agreements and eco
nomic relations extremely favorable to the individual ASEAN states. Several ASEAN
states have benefited economically through their bilateral relations with China, especially
Malaysia and Thailand (discussed below). As a result, these countries have reached a
more “understanding” positions in certain issues important to China, such as agreeing to
place sovereignty issues on hold in the territorial disputes dialogues and resisting Ma
nila’s calls to internationalize the South China Sea disputes with China. Vietnam has
also benefited economically through its relations with China. Vietnam, like China, also
requires regional stability during its period of reform and economic development. More
over, Hanoi is keenly aware of the crucial role played by China in the region’s economic
development and security. Since the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations, trade
between the two countries has significantly increased. Between 2000 and 2004, for ex
ample, China-Vietnam trade doubled in volume (from $2.4 billion to $5 billion).306 Bei
jing has thus skillfully utilized China’s growing economic power in its diplomacy to lev
erage some of the Southeast Asia states toward positions more sympathetic to Chinese

305 Straits Times, 21 July 1992.
3°6 “China-Vietnam Trade to Surpass 5b Dollars,” Xinhua News, 1 September 2004.
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interests. Thus, Beijing’s strategy has successfully divided ASEAN on the Spratlys issue
and thus countered any possibility of Vietnam building a unified ASEAN position on the
matter. Therefore, the only other potential balancer of China is Vietnam’s previous en
emy —the United States.
Since the normalization of relations between Hanoi and Washington in 1995, the
Vietnamese have also quietly pursued better economic and security relations with the
United States as a component of Hanoi’s hedging strategy vis-a-vis China. In 2000,
President Bill Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Vietnam, fol
lowed the next year by a bilateral trade agreement (BTA) which allowed Vietnamese
goods to enter the US market under normal trading status. In addition, military coopera
tion between the two former enemies began in the areas of searching for American MIAs,
clearing mine fields, and military medical programs.307 In November 2003, two signifi
cant events took place that indicate movement towards an American-Vietnamese military
relationship —an American warship made a port call to Ho Chi Minh City, and the Viet
namese defense minister visited the United States for the first time.308 Subsequent U.S.
naval visits to Vietnamese ports (most recently on 4 July 2006, when the USS Patriot and
the USS Salvor visited a Vietnamese port).309 The possibility of increased U.S.Vietnamese military cooperation was underscored by Admiral William Fallon’s July
2006 trip to Vietnam. In meetings with Defense Minister Colonel Phung Quang Thanh,
Fallon discussed possible joint military maneuvers and more visits of U.S. Navy vessels

307 Goh, 28.
308 Nayan Chanda, “A Balancing Act by Hanoi,” International Herald Tribune, 11 November 2003.
309 Sergei Blagov, “US, Vietnam scratch each other’s back,” Asia Times Online, 2006. http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HG21Ae02.html (accessed 23 August 2006).
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to Vietnamese ports, as well as joint search-and-rescue exercises at sea in the future.310
Thanh, however, did not give an immediate reply except to express that Vietnam did not
wish to cause any “misunderstanding with regional neighbors.”311
Presently, Vietnam and the United States cooperate in counter-terrorism and
counter-narcotics operations, and just recently, Hanoi agreed to participate in the Penta
gon’s international military education and training program with regional US allies. In
addition, Vietnam and the U.S. conduct annual defense dialogues among mid-level mili
tary officers (this year will be the third such meeting).312 Further, it is generally believed
that Washington wants access to Vietnamese military facilities, especially the former
American naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. High-level U.S. officials have recently visited (or
plan to visit) Vietnam for talks with their Vietnamese counterparts —U.S. House Speaker
Dennis Hastert, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary Condolica Rice, and President
Bush. It seems that they desire to take advantage of the 2002 Russian military with
drawal from Cam Ranh Bay.313 Hanoi, however, has plans to convert the naval base into
an economic hub, similar to Manila’s conversion of Subic Bay in the Philippines. In addi
tion, there are plans to upgrade Cam Ranh Bay’s airport into an international gateway,
and convert Ba Ngoi seaport into a container ship terminal.314
Improvements in U.S.-Vietnam relations, however, must be seen and measured
within the framework of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Hanoi clearly wishes to avoid of
fending China by pursuing relations with the U.S. too quickly or in such a manner that

310 Blagov.
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid.
313 Hanoi was unprepared for Moscow’s unexpected early withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay (Russia still had
two years remaining on its 25-year contract to use the naval base without charge).
314 Blagov.
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might be perceived by Beijing as being antagonistic. For example, the BTA between
Vietnam and the U.S. was reportedly delayed by Hanoi until China had reached agree
ment with the U.S. concerning trade, and Secretary of Defense Cohen’s 2000 visit to
Vietnam was postponed by Hanoi because of a Sino-Vietnamese summit and the Ameri
can bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and a Chinese naval visit of Vietnam
took place before the 2003 visit of U.S. Navy warships. Apparently, Hanoi will only de
velop relations with the U.S. at a rate determined and constrained by Vietnam’s relations
with China. For Hanoi, Sino-Vietnamese relations are the paramount concern, and there
fore relations with the U.S. are of secondary importance to Vietnam.315 Overtures to
wards Washington are useful to Hanoi as leverage on Beijing to maximize Vietnam’s
gains in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. By pointing to the future possibility of im
proved relations with the U.S., Vietnam can pressure Beijing into greater foreign aid and
trade concessions as inducements to lure Hanoi away from pursuing warmer relations
with Washington.
In short, Vietnam’s ability to actively balance against China is relatively weak.
ASEAN remains divided in its China policy, and therefore is not perceived by Hanoi as
being a significant balancing force against potential Chinese aggression. As such, lack
ing any meaningful partners with which to balance against rising Chinese power, Hanoi
has pursued a strategy of focusing primarily on improving relations with China and thus
further enmeshing (entangling) China economically and politically in the region. As re
gional peace and stability are essential to the wider interests of both Vietnam and China,
the potentiality of armed hostility between the two socialist countries over the disputed

315 Goh, 21-23, 32-33.
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Spratly and Paracel Islands appears low. As such, Vietnam’s security behavior indicates
that threat perceptions of China are currently low and will remain so for the near future.
The Philippines
Following the opening of relations in 1975 between China and the Philippines, the
two countries experienced good bilateral relations. During the Third Indochina War,
Manila supported ASEAN’s tacit alliance with China against Vietnamese hegemonic am
bitions in mainland Southeast Asia. Given that in the security realm the Philippines en
joyed a free ride due to the large American military presence in Subic Bay and Clark Air
Base, Manila could afford to pursue relations with China. However, following the
American military withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992, and the Mischief Reef Affair
in 1995, post-Cold War relations between Manila and Beijing deteriorated. Given Ameri
can indifference regarding the dispute between China and the Philippines in the Spratlys,
Manila turned to ASEAN for assistance.
As discussed in previous chapters, President Fidel Ramos unsuccessfully at
tempted to internationalize the South China Sea dispute in reaction to China’s provoca
tive moves in the Spratlys, but due to a lack of ASEAN consensus on the issue, Ramos
was forced to settle for bilateral talks with Beijing for the time being. These talks did re
sult in a bilateral code of conduct concerning the disputes in the South China Sea.316 But
as discussed in earlier chapters, the code of conduct did little to ease Manila’s worries
about Chinese intentions in the Spratlys. Manila, therefore, continued to press for an
united ASEAN position regarding Chinese territorial claims and actions in the South
316 “Joint Statement on the PRC-RP Consultations on the South China Sea and Other Areas o f Coopera
tion,” 10 August 1995. A good overview o f the “code o f conduct” is given in Rommel C. Banlaoi, The
ASEAN Regional Forum, The South China Sea Disputes, and the Functionalist Option (Quezon City: na
tional Defense College o f the Philippines, 2001). Also see Emmers, 138.
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China Sea. During the informal 1999 ASEAN Summit held in Manila, the Philippines
submitted a draft multilateral code of conduct for the South China Sea in an attempt to
create a collective ASEAN position vis-a-vis China. Manila’s draft included a proposal
for joint development of the Spratly Islands, which was rejected by both Malaysia and
China.

0 1 7

However, due in a large part to Manila’s push within ASEAN for multilateral

development of the Spratlys, Beijing accelerated its bilateral diplomacy with Manila for
joint development of the Spratly Islands. During the September 2003 Manila visit of Wu
Bangguo, Chairman of China’s National People’s Congress, and an informal proposal for
joint development of the Spratlys was made. Wu’s overture was followed in November
by meetings between delegations from the China National Offshore Oil Company
(CNOOC) and the Philippines National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to discuss joint explora
tion and development of oil and natural gas reserves in the disputed region.318 This proc
ess, as discussed earlier, ultimately led to the 2005 Tripartite Agreement between China,
the Philippines, and Vietnam for joint exploration and development of the Spratlys. Ma
nila’s efforts within ASEAN to pressure China towards multilateral development of the
Spratlys succeeded in achieving its goal —but through a bilateral mechanism, which be
came multilateral with Vietnam’s subsequent entry into the China-Philippine agreement.
To a certain extent, then, Manila successfully utilized its ASEAN membership to
pressure China toward a bilateral agreement for joint development in the Spratlys. Given
the poor state of Philippine military capabilities and the declining rate in Philippine de
fense spending (Figure 4.16), some observers might contend that Manila’s diplomatic
feat would not have been possible without American security guarantees -- that balance
317 Emmers, 140-141.
318 Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle For Autonomy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 138-139.
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of power explains the successful conclusion of the 2005 PRC-RP joint development
agreement which subsequently became the Tripartite Agreement. Our analysis of the
U.S. balancing factor, however, indicates that considerations beyond the distribution of
power were responsible for this outcome. Rather, the success of Chinese diplomacy in
reducing Manila’s threat perception of China, as evidenced by the empirical data pre
sented above, is responsible to a large degree for this outcome. It is inconceivable that
such an outcome would have occurred had Manila still perceived China as an “enemy.”
Recent Philippine security behavior indicates that Manila increasingly views China not as
an enemy, but as a “good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a
nonthreatening regional power.”319
Ever since the incorporation of the Philippines into the American empire in 1898,
U.S. military power has been the traditional source of Philippine national security. Dur
ing the Cold War, the substantial American military presence in the Philippines allowed
Manila a “free ride” in national security matters concerning external threats to the Philip
pines. Because the Philippines was a key element in Washington’s strategy of forward
deployment in Asia, Manila utilized and relied upon the American security umbrella for
protection against external threats (1951 Mutual Defense Agreement, 1954 Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty or “Manila Pact” and the establishment of Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization or SEATO). As such, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
were essentially designed as a domestic security force. Therefore, when Washington re
fused the Philippine Senate’s new lease agreement for both Subic Bay and Clark Air Base
in 1991 and militarily withdrew from the Philippines the following year, the AFP inher

3191 borrow David Shambaugh’s description o f China’s image in the region. Shambaugh, “China Engages
Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” 64.
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ited the responsibility for defending the country against external threats —a job that it
was not capable of undertaking by itself. The Mischief Reef affair of 1995 and the lack
of strong American support made this point painfully clear to Manila. According to for
mer U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Joseph Nye, Wash
ington would not involve the U.S. in the dispute between the Philippines and China ex
cept to maintain the free passage of vessels in the region should conflict in the Spratlys
threaten freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.320 In fact, Washington made
clear that the Philippine-claimed areas in the Spratlys were not covered by the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1951. In May 1995 the U.S. State Department issued the following
statement:
The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to
sovereignty over the various islands, reefs, atolls and cays in the South China Sea.
The United States would, however, view with serious concern any maritime
claim, or restriction on maritime activity, in the South China Sea that was not
consistent with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention
T91
on the Law of the Sea.
However, according to Sheldon W. Simon, Washington confirmed in 1999 that the U.S.
would defend the Philippines if it were attacked in the South China Sea.322 Manila’s re
sponse to the 1995 manifestation of the Chinese threat in the South China Sea was to
push the Philippine Congress to approve a military modernization plan and also to began
working to revitalize the U.S.-Philippine alliance by negotiating a Visiting Forces

320 Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes: Conflicting Claims and Potential Solutions
in the South China Sea, Adelphi Paper no. 298 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995):
26-27. Also see Weatherbee, 135.
321 Christine Shelly, Acting Spokesperson o f the U.S. Department o f State, “Spratlys and the South China
Sea”, 10 May 1995 as cited in Emmers, 151.
322 Sheldon W. Simon, “Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: An Assessment and
Projection,” NBR Analysis 14, no. 2 (August 2003): 38.
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Agreement (VFA) and by requesting military assistance.323 Late in January 2002, Manila
agreed to allow about 1000 U.S. soldiers to deploy to the southern Philippines to help in
Manila’s fight against the separatist terror group Abu Sayyaf.324 During the March 2003
annual U.S.-Philippines “Balikatan” joint military exercise, some training activity took
place on Palawan Island bordering the territory in the Spratlys claimed by Manila. Ac
cording to President Arroyo, before focusing on counterinsurgency training against the
separatist group Abu Sayyaf, the focus of the U.S. training of the PAF was defending the
Spratlys against China.
However, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s withdrawal of Filipino troops
from Iraq in 2004 to win the release of a Philippine hostage resulted in a marked decrease
in U.S. assistance to Manila. Beijing responded by offering the Philippines Chinese military assistance —and Manila accepted).

In March 2005, Beijing offered the Philippines

$3 million (US) in military aid to create a Chinese-language training program for the
PAF, invited the Philippines to participate in naval maneuvers, donated engineering
equipment, and opened five slots to Filipinos for military training in China.327 The re
sponse from Washington was a rapid increase in U.S. military assistance to the Philip

323 Carl Baker, “China-Philippines Relations: Cautious Cooperation,” A sia’s Bilateral Relations, AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies (October 2004), 4. Available online at http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdf (accessed 4September 2006).
324 Emmers, 150.
325 “War Games with US Targeted China: Arroyo,” The Straits Times Interactive, 5 April 2004.
326 Beijing invited President Arroyo for a state visit and offered Manila greater cooperation and aid and
subsequently aggressively wooed Philippine policy makers. Hannah Beech, “Deals and Diplomacy,” Time
Asia 165, no. 21 (30 May 2005); Dan Blumenthal, “The Impact o f China’s Economic Growth on North and
Southeast Asia,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, published
by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 22 July 2005. This was not the first Chi
nese offer o f military assistance, however. Beijing made offers o f military assistance to the Philippines in
2004. See “Defense Minister Cao meets with Brunei, Philippine guests,” People’s Daily Online, 24 Sep
tember 2004.
327 Dana Dillon and John J. Tkacik, Jr., “China’s Quest for Asia,” Policy Review, no. 134 (December 2005
& January 2006), 13.
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pines amounting to $300 million (US) over the last few years.328 Presently, there is even
talk of establishing permanent American military bases in the southern island of Min
danao which would support activities of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philip
pines (JOSTFP), established after 9/11 to train and advise the PAF on how best to fight
terrorist groups such as Abu Sayyaf.

The recent improvement in Sino-Philippines se

curity relations, as illustrated by the 2005 Tripartite Agreement in the Spratlys and Ma
nila’s acceptance of increasing Chinese economic and military assistance, clearly demon
strates that Philippine threat perceptions of China have dramatically decreased since the
late 1990s. The recent increase in American military aid and assistance to the Philippines
also indicates growing concerns in Washington that Manila is becoming too friendly with
China —and thus weakening the legitimacy of the U.S. “China threat” thesis and perhaps
even making the establishment of permanent American military bases in the southern
Philippines more problematic for the Bush Administration.
Thailand
Thailand does not view China as a serious national security threat. Thailand has
no common borders with China, and the two countries have no territorial disputes with
one another. Thailand was one of the first states in Southeast Asia to normalize relations
with China (1975), and the two countries share a recent history of economic and strategic
cooperation. Thai companies were the initial investors in China following Deng Xiaop
ing’s decision to liberalize China’s economy and join the world market at the end of the
328 Fabio Scarpello, “Philippines weigh new military marriage,” Asia Times Online, 23 August 2006.
329 In February 2002, 160 US special forces with 500 support staff arrived on the island of Basilan in Min
danao. Scarpello, “Philippines weigh new military marriage,” Asia Times Online, 23 August 2006. Also see
Michael Richardson, “Joint Operation Easier to Begin Than to End,” International Herald Tribune, 28
January 2002, and Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghani
stan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia,” CRS Report for Congress (26 August 2005), Congressional
Research Service, Library o f Congress.
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1970s, and Thailand and China became strategic partners against Vietnam following Ha
noi’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia. In addition, Thailand was a leading proponent (along
with Singapore) beginning in the 1980s for an ASEAN policy of engaging and building a
relationship with China. During the 1990s, Thailand was the most fulsome of the
ASEAN states in its commendation of Beijing’s diplomatic and economic overtures in
the region. During Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s 2001 visit to Thailand, his Thai counter
part emphasized closer and stronger Thai-Chinese cooperation in a wide range of inter
ests, stating that in the future China and Thailand would become “strategic partners.”330
In July 2005, during the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of
diplomatic relations between Thailand and China, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra indicated his anticipation of greater cooperation and a more dynamic strategic
relationship with China.331
However, China does pose several potential security problems for Thailand. First,
China’s increasing influence in mainland Southeast Asia, especially in Cambodia, Laos,
and perhaps Myanmar, worries Bangkok as Thailand continues to value buffer areas at its
borders to manage the region’s strategic balance with Vietnam and China.332 Second,
there is concern that Beijing has already “won over” the region with favorable bilateral
trade agreements and Chinese economic and technical assistance, and is now beginning
to pursue Chinese self-interest more assiduously in Southeast Asia. Thai officials do not
believe that China poses any direct security threat to Thailand, but they do have concerns
about the serious economic challenge China poses as well as the possibility that Beijing

330 “Zhu’s Visit Goes Off Well,” Bangkok Post, 22 May 2001.
331 “China’s Quest for Asia,” 14.
332 See Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security o f Developing States: Lessons from Thailand (Dover,
MA: Auburn House, 1987).
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could disrupt regional stability through political intrigue.333 An example that perturbed
Thai officials is the free trade agreement with China that allowed a flood of cheap Chi
nese products into Thailand while at the same time prevented a free flow of Thai goods
into China because of China’s remaining non-tariff trade barriers.334 Nonetheless, Thai
land has good trade relations with China and recognizes that Beijing’s influence on the
military regime in Myanmar is of value to Thailand.335 However, Bangkok does have
some long-term strategic concerns regarding China that prevent any bandwagoning be
havior by Thailand and, at the same time, encourage the continuance of good relations
with the United States.
Thailand and the United States share a long history of security relations (Thailand
is the first Southeast Asian country to enter into a formal defense treaty with the U.S.).336
Beginning in 1981, Thailand annually hosts the largest American military exercises in
Southeast Asia —the joint Thai-US Cobra Gold military exercise. Since 2002, Singapore
participates in Cobra Gold and, starting in 2004, the Philippines participate in the U.S.led annual military exercise.

'i'in

However, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Thai coop

eration with Washington in the war against terrorism was less than enthusiastic. Sympa
thetic to the American position, but wary of supporting a U.S. war against Muslim coun
tries, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra initially took a neutral stance before finally de
ciding two weeks later to support Washington’s antiterrorism policies by offering to send
troops to Afghanistan and backing the U.S. at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

333 Goh, 40-41.
334 Goh, 18.
335 Goh, 19.
336 In 1954 Thailand and the US join other signatories of the Manila Pact to form the Southeast Asian
Treaty Organization (SEATO), followed in 1962 by the Rusk-Thanat Joint Statement pledging US support
for Thailand's defense. In 1964 the first US military forces are based in Thailand.
337 Weatherbee, 38.
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(APEC) and ASEAN forums. By 2003, Thailand’s position concerning the threat of ter
rorism moved even closer to that of Washington’s. Thaksin’s 2003 “working visit” with
President Bush indicated a strengthening of U.S.-Thai relations and an increased security
role for Thailand concerning the war against terrorism. Thailand has been designated as a
“major non-NATO ally” by Washington and Thailand’s new status was affirmed by an
agreement to deliver advanced medium range air-to-air missiles to the Thai air force.338
While not publicly joining the U.S. coalition to invade Iraq, Thailand pledged support of
the war in May 2003 and soon after dispatched 400 military personnel to assist in rebuild
ing efforts.339 Even though Bangkok views terrorism in mostly domestic terms (Muslim
unrest in southern Thailand) and has reservations about defining terrorism in very Ameri
can terms, the importance of continued strategic relations with the U.S. is clear. How
ever, Thailand is cautious not to strategically lean too far towards the United States for
domestic reasons, as well as to preserve more room for maneuver with China.
In sum, the rise of Chinese power is not perceived in Thailand to be an immedi
ate, pressing national security concern, but rather a possible long-term problem //"Bei
jing’s regional policy shifts away from the present cooperative approach toward a more
self-interested, unilateral policy in Southeast Asia. Until such a shift occurs, Bangkok
appears content to pursue the traditional Thai strategy of maximizing maneuvering room
in Thai-Chinese relations through pursuing close relations with both China and the
United States —a modem version of the famous “bamboo diplomacy” initially under
taken by King Mongkut (Rama IV) in response to the threat posed by European and
American imperialism during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. In the final

338 Weatherbee, 38.
339 Goh, 16-17.
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analysis, there is little evidence that China is viewed as a serious threat in Thailand. Thai
security policy indicates that Bangkok is much more concerned about domestic terrorist
and secessionist threats in the predominantly Muslim areas of southern Thailand, than
worried about the rise of Chinese military power.
Singapore
Singapore’s small size, history, and geographic location make national security a
primary concern. Beginning in 1965 with its traumatic birth through forced separation
from Malaysia, Singapore became “a very small island state perpetually haunted by its
sense of vulnerability.”340 Ethnic dimensions increase Singapore’s sense of vulnerability.
Domestic security has always been the primary focus of Singapore’s ruling ethnic Chi
nese elite who control political power at the expense of Singapore’s Malay population
through one-party electoral domination and an authoritarian application of its internal se
curity act.341 Singapore’s external vulnerability is largely determined by its geographic
location. Also described as a “Chinese island surrounded by a Muslim sea,” Singapore
historically has been concerned about its Malay neighbors, especially Malaysia and Indo
nesia. These two Muslim states have been (and remain) Singapore’s principal external
threat. Relations between Singapore and Indonesia have historically been strained and
confrontational, and Indonesia remains a major security concern of Singapore.342 Singa

340 Hussain Mutalib, “The Socio-Economic Dimensions in Singapore’s Quest for Security and Stability,”
Pacific Affairs 75, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 39.
341 Weatherbee, 37.
342 In 1968, a crisis in Singapore-Indonesian relations resulted from the October hanging of two Indonesian
marines found guilty in Singapore o f having bombed a bank on the island during the period o f Konfrontasi
(or Confrontation) when Indonesian leader Suharto opposed the establishment o f the Federation o f Malay
sia (Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak) with a military and ideological campaign. A second crisis in
Singapore-Indonesian relations occurred in 1975 during Indonesia’s annexation o f East Timor. Singapore
was the only ASEAN state that did not support Indonesia against a United Nations General Assembly reso
lution condemning Indonesia’s actions (Singapore abstained rather than vote against the resolution). This

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

209

pore’s relations with Malaysia have also historically been less than cordiale, as Singapore
traditionally feared being annexed by Malaysia. As such, Singapore possesses the most
modem and capable armed forces in Southeast Asia.343 China, on the other hand, has
never been viewed by Singapore’s ruling elite as a primary security threat, but rather
more as an opportunity.
Singapore, along with Thailand, has historically viewed China as a balancer
against Vietnamese hegemonic intentions in mainland Southeast Asia. While aware of
the challenges posed by China, Singapore viewed its special relationship with China as
essential in limiting Vietnam’s (and thus Moscow’s) influence in the region.344 During
the Third Indochina War (1978-1991), Singapore supported Thailand’s strategy of form
ing an unofficial alliance with China in 1979 to resist Vietnamese expansionism in the
region. In the face of Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, and with Singapore’s insis
tence, the other ASEAN states closed ranks behind Thailand at the June 1979 ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Bali and promised their support in preserving Thai
land’s independence and territorial integrity.345 However, by the March 1980 bilateral
summit between Indonesia and Malaysia held in Kuantan, Malaysia, ASEAN consensus
on Vietnam broke down. Malaysia and Indonesia, concerned about great power implica
tions of conflict with Vietnam, put forth the so-called “Kuantan Principle” which op
posed the Thai-Singapore led strategy of using Chinese military power to force the Viet
namese out of Cambodia. The two Muslim countries proposed allowing Vietnam a po
angered Suharto and caused another period o f strained relations between the two countries. For a good his
tory, see J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966 (Oxford: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1974).
343 Weatherbee, 37.
344 Emmers, 101.
345 Weatherbee argues that ASEAN’s collective political action linking Thailand’s national security to that
o f the other ASEAN states during Hanoi’s December 1978 military incursion into Cambodia “verged on
collective defense.” Weatherbee, 77-78.
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litical sphere of interest in Cambodia in exchange for a peaceful Thai-Cambodian border.
ASEAN solidarity thus collapsed, increasing tensions between Singapore and its two
Muslim neighbors.346
In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the Cold War, and the
1992 American military withdrawal from the Philippines, however, Singapore (and some
other ASEAN states) increasingly feared that China or Japan might fill the ‘power vac
uum’ left in the region by the disengaging external powers. China’s rising power, there
fore, became one of the most critical issues facing the ASEAN states at the end of the
Cold War.347 Since the early 1990s, Singapore has taken a leading role among the
ASEAN states in promoting the economic and political engagement of China in order to
socialize and manage China’s rise by integrating the PRC into the regional and interna
tional economy and society. In addition, Singapore also led the drive to intensify
ASEAN’s external dialogues in political and security issues via the ASEAN PostMinisterial Conference (PMC).348 The 1992 annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign min
isters, held in Manila, was followed by the PMC where initial discussions on regional se
curity were held on a serial rather than multilateral basis. Due to the American military
withdrawal from the Philippines, as well as the South China Sea disputes, the ASEAN
states decided to establish a new multilateral security dialogue in the region that would
include non-ASEAN PMC members. The inaugural ASEAN-PMC Senior Officials
Meeting (SOM) was hosted in May 1993 by Singapore and became a permanent feature

346 A good overview o f the causes and diplomacy o f the Third Indochina War is Nayan Chanda, Brother
Enemy: The War After the War (New York: Macmillan, 1986), and Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee, and
Sorpong Peou, Cambodia - The 1989 Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Documents
(Kraus Intl., 1991).
347 Emmers, 112.
348 The Singapore Declaration o f 1992. ASEAN Secretariat, 1992.
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in intra-ASEAN relations as well as ASEAN’s relations with the seven dialogue partners.
At that year’s SOM, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng played a key role in
laying the groundwork for the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July
1993. Keen on establishing a multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific which
would secure a continuing American involvement in the Asia-Pacific and address China’s
rising power and influence in the region, but also wary of Washington’s strategy of con
taining China, Singapore’s security policy regarding China is based on a strategy of en
gaging both china and the United States instead of pursuing traditional balancing or
bandwagoning strategies predicted by Realist theory.
At present, Singapore seems satisfied with the perceived success of the engage
ment strategy on Chinese behavior and therefore is less concerned about any possible di
rect or indirect Chinese threat. After 9/11, however, with the discovery of Southeast
Asian networks associated with Al-Qaeda and the 2002 arrests in Singapore of members
of the Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiah (JI), terrorism has become the main secu
rity concern for Singapore’s leaders. As such, Singapore increasingly worries about
neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia becoming more “Islamized” and thus representing
increased security threats to Singapore. According to Goh, Singaporean officials view
radicalized political Islam as the most “urgent and fundamental threat” facing Singapore
because the threat arises “not because of what we do, but because of who we are.”349
This threat has pushed Singapore towards closer security cooperation with the United
States that, according to Goh, is also indirect hedging against China: “Singapore is now
maneuvering toward a closer identification of common security interests with the United
States than before. This is a double-hedge: first against the possibility of fundamentalist
349 Goh, 14.
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Islamic threats from with Southeast Asia; second, in the long term, against the potentially
destabilizing effects of a stronger China.”350 Actually, Singapore shares common secu
rity interests with both China and the United States (threat of fundamentalist Islamic ter
rorist movements, desire for regional peace and stability). As such, a strategy of engage
ment of both China and the United States makes the most sense for Singapore. The rising
threat to Singapore is not China but rather the threat of Islamic terrorist groups based in
neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia. Instead of a “hedging” strategy against China,
Singapore’s security cooperation with the U.S. is motivated by a desire for security coop
eration with both Washington and Beijing against Muslim terrorist movements in the re
gion. Cooperation with both powers in the war on terrorism yields maximum security
benefits to Singapore. To this end, Singapore allowed a U.S. Navy logistics unit to relo
cate itself in Singapore after American military facilities in the Philippines were closed in
1992, and announced in January 1998 that American aircraft carriers would have access
to the Changi Naval Base after its completion in 2000.351 More recently, Singapore up
graded its defense relations with the U.S. by signing the Strategic Framework Agreement
in July 2005,352 and now more than 100 U.S. Navy vessels visit Singapore each year.353
Singapore’s recent security behavior indicates that China is no longer viewed as a
principal security concern for the island city-state. Rather, the rise of Islamic fundamen
talism and Islamic-based terrorism is Singapore’s primary security concern considering
350 Goh, 15.
351 Derek da Cunha, Southeast A sia’s Security Dynamics: A Multiplicity o f Approaches amidst Changing
Geopolitical Circumstances, ISEAS Working Papers, Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, July
1999,18-19.
352 Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States o f American and the Republic o f Singapore
fo r a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, International Relations and Security Net
work, available online at www.isn.ethz.ch (accessed 25 March 2006).
353 Dan Blumenthal, “The Impact o f China’s Economic Growth on North and Southeast Asia,” testimony
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, published by the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (22 July 2005).
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its geographic proximity to Malaysia and Indonesia. China’s worries about Islamic fun
damentalism and Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang Province and Singapore’s security con
cerns about its two larger Muslim neighboring states, bring the security policies of Singa
pore and China toward convergence in that they both regard Islamic movements as grow
ing threats to their respective national security. As such, given the history of cooperative
Singapore-China relations against Vietnamese and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia
during the Cold War, and Singapore’s leading role in formulating ASEAN’s post-Cold
War engagement of China, it can be concluded that Singapore currently views China
more as a possible security opportunity than as a security threat.
Indonesia
Indonesia’s recent security policy indicates that Jakarta no longer perceives China
as a threat to Indonesian national security. In fact, recent diplomatic activity between the
two countries indicates quite the opposite. During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s June
2005 visit to Indonesia, China and Indonesia signed a strategic partnership agreement.
Sino-Indonesian ties were strengthened the following month when Indonesian President
Yudhoyono traveled to China and signed several economic and security-related agree
ments, including an agreement for Chinese assistance to develop medium range missiles
since the Western arms embargoes had grounded Indonesia’s fighter aircraft.354
The recent warming of relations between Jakarta and Beijing reflects quite a sea
change in Sino-Indonesian relations. During the Cold War, Indonesia perceived the PRC
as its main external threat due, in part, to Beijing’s association with the failed coup d'etat
undertaken by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, or Indonesian Communist Party) in

354 This information is attributed to the Indonesian defense minister. See “China’s Quest for Asia,” 14.
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1965.355 In 1967, Indonesia severed its diplomatic ties with the PRC as Jakarta contin
ued to view China as the country’s principal security threat.356 This impasse in relations
continued until July 1985 when China and Indonesia signed an agreement for the resump
tion of direct but highly regulated bilateral trade to begin in February 1989.357 SinoIndonesian relations improved further in February 1989 when President Suharto and Chi
nese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met in Tokyo while both men were attending Em
peror Hirohito’s funeral. During their talk, Suharto indicated that he was satisfied with
Qian’s assurances that Beijing would not interfere with Indonesian domestic affairs and
both men agreed that Sino-Indonesian relations should be normalized.358 SinoIndonesian relations were normalized on 8 August 1990. However, Beijing’s promulga
tion of the 1992 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and
Contiguous Areas, as well as the 1995 Mischief Reef Affair between China and the Phil
ippines, caused alarm in Jakarta as China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea in
cluded waters near Indonesia’s Natuna gas fields.359 In response, Indonesia conducted
military exercises during 1996 in the Natuna area to assert its sovereignty and the Defense and Security Ministry drew up plans for the defense of the Natuna islands.
The fashion by which Indonesia approached the rising territorial dispute with
China indicates that Jakarta apparently wished to downplay the issue. As host of the an
nual workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Jakarta under
standably wished to avoid tarnishing its impartial position as honest broker vis-a-vis the

355 Emmers, 88.
356 Lee, “China’s Relations with ASEAN: Partners in the 21st Century?”, 62.
357 Ibid.
358 Lee, China and the South China Sea Dialogues, 16.
359 The Straits Times, 31 May 1995.
360 The Straits Times, 30 June 1995, and 15 August 1996. Also see Liselotte Odgaard, “ASEAN’s Security
Concerns About China,” Security Dialogue 34, no. 1 (March 2003): 15.
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territorial disputes issue and China. The official Indonesian statement concerning its ter
ritorial dispute with China, therefore, was that no sea border problem existed between
Indonesia and China and that there had never been any problem between Jakarta and Bei
jing over the Natuna islands. Beijing responded by agreeing that the Natuna islands be
longed to Indonesia, but added that China was prepared to enter into bilateral discussions
with Indonesia concerning the issue of the sea border delimitation in the area.361
Just as Sino-Indonesian relations are improving, it seems that U.S.-Indonesian re
lations are becoming increasingly strained. After the fall of Sukarno in 1966 and under
Suharto’s rule, Indonesia froze relations with the PRC and replaced the USSR with the
United States as the country’s major defense supplier.362 Relations between Jakarta and
Washington continued to improve in the 1970s as illustrated by the U.S. support of Indo
nesia’s 1975 annexation of Portuguese Timor in reaction to the proclamation of the De
mocratic Republic of East Timor (DRET) by the communist Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) supported by Beijing and Hanoi.

However, rela

tions between Indonesia and the U.S. began to worsen after the economic crash of 1997
and the political upheavals of the post-Suharto era. After the fall of Suharto’s authoritar
ian government in May 1998, the three successive governments of B. J. Habibie, Abdur
rahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri demonstrated marked leadership failure and

361 The Straits Times, 30 June 1995.
362 Weatherbee, 67-68. Also see Emmers, 11-12.
363 President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger met with Suharto in Jakarta in December 1975 and as
sured the Indonesian president that the U.S. would not interfere in spite o f the fact that American weapons
would be used in the invasion breaking American law. See Memorandum o f Conversation between Presi
dents Ford and Suharto, 5 July 1975, 12:40 p.m. - 2:00p.m., Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security
Adviser Memoranda o f Conversations, box 13, July 5 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Su
harto; The Secretary's 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting, Tuesday, August 12, 1975, Secret [excerpt], with cover
memorandum on highlights o f meeting attached, National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State
Records, Transcripts o f Staff Meetings of Secretary o f State Henry Kissinger, 1973-77, box 8, available
online at http://www.gwu.edU/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/#docs.
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reflected a “pervasive culture of corruption.”364 In the post-9/11 world, Indonesia’s rela
tionship with the U.S. continues to be strained. Even though Jakarta supports the U.S.
war against terrorism in a limited fashion, and must confront domestically the challenge
of separatist and Islamic extremist groups such as Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI), the Indonesian
government finds itself facing rising popular anger against the American war in Iraq and
has responded by denouncing American policy while at the same time attempting to
avoid an open breach with Washington. Jakarta’s brutal 2003 military campaign against
the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or “Free Aceh Movement”) and subsequent criticism
from Western human rights groups and national governments, resulted in worsening rela
tions with the U.S. as Jakarta’s actions reflect disdain for Washington’s human rights
campaign which is viewed as a violation of Indonesian sovereignty. Recently, Washing
ton’s anti-terrorism campaign was received with distrust in Indonesia. The U.S. focus on
preemption and regime change has become a point of significant concern among the In
donesian public, 74% of whom worry that the United States could become a military
threat to their country. These concerns were illustrated in 2003 when Indonesian VicePresident Hamzah Haz stated “who is the real terrorist? Well, it’s America . . . In fact,
the US is the King of terrorists because of its war crimes in Iraq. The US condemns terrorists but itself carries out terror acts on Iraq.”

Nonetheless, Indonesia continues to

favor an American military presence in the region to balance China. As such, Jakarta
pursues a policy of modest militarily cooperation with the U.S. including limited transit,
refueling, and visiting rights, as well as joint training and intelligence sharing.

Con

cerning the rise of Chinese military power and Indonesian national security, it is clear
364 Weatherbee, 30.
365 Mark Barker, “Southeast Asia turns on Bush,” The Age, 20 March 2004.
366 Odgaard, 20.
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that Jakarta does not perceive any pressing need to seek closer military relations with the
United States —China is not viewed as a rising threat by Indonesia. Rather, it appears
that Jakarta increasingly views the United States as a rising threat and China as an eco
nomic opportunity and a balance to American militant unilateralism.
Malaysia
Malaysian security policy of the last decade indicates that Kuala Lumpur does not
perceive the rise of Chinese military power as constituting a growing national security
concern, even though a final resolution of the mutual territorial dispute in the Spratlys has
yet to be concluded. Of all the ASEAN states, Malaysia comes the closest in pursuing a
bandwagoning strategy vis-a-vis China, although Kuala Lumpur’s limited military coop
eration with the United States is viewed by some as a balancing strategy directed at
China. If this behavior represents balancing against China, it is extremely modest in
scope. It seems more reasonable to interpret Kuala Lumpur’s most limited military coop
eration with the U.S. in the same light as that of Hanoi’s tentative relationship with
Washington —as a means of leveraging increased economic and foreign aid benefits from
China intended by Beijing to limit Malaysia’s relationship with the United States. After
all, Sino-Malaysian relations are less problematic than China’s relations with the other
states in the region, and therefore there is little perception in Kuala Lumpur of a rising
Chinese threat.
Malaysia was the first Southeast Asian country to establish relations with the
People’s Republic of China in May 1974.367 However, during the Cold War Malaysia
viewed China with suspicion and as a potential threat. Beijing’s aggressive actions in the
367 See Corrine Phuangkasem, Thailand’s Foreign Relations, 1964-80 (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast
Asian Studies, 1984).
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Spratlys during the late 1980s, including some brief military clashes with Malaysian na
val units in mutually contested areas of the archipelago, did cause concern in Kuala
Lumpur. However, Malaysia’s response was far less confrontational than that of either
the Philippines or Vietnam. Instead, Kuala Lumpur pursued a path of accommodation
and maximization of benefits accrued through cooperation with Beijing. During the
1990s, Malaysia supported Beijing’s position against any internationalization of the
South China Sea disputes as well as China’s position against any formal code of conduct
for the South China Sea.368 In January 1995, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir bin
Mohamad stated “it is high time for us to stop seeing China through the lenses of threat
and to fully view China as the enormous opportunity that it is.”

Since the mid-1990s,

Malaysia has pursued the “enormous opportunity” presented by China’s growing econ
omy. In September 2003, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi led a substantial Malaysian delega
tion to China to demonstrate that Malaysia —not Thailand —was China’s natural partner
in Southeast Asia. Then, following Mahathir’s replacement as Prime Minister by Abdul
lah in October 2003, Kuala Lumpur’s support of the PRC “as a stabilizing force in the
region” has been articulated frequently. During 2004, a series of bilateral events cele
brated the thirtieth anniversary of Sino-Malaysian diplomatic relations and served to
highlight indirectly the success of Beijing’s GND.
There exists little evidence that Malaysia seeks to balance China with American
strategic power in spite of increased military and economic relations with the United

368 At the inform Manila Summit of November 1999 Malaysia dissented from the Philippine version o f a
code of conduct also supported by Vietnam proposing joint development o f the Spratly Islands. Later, dur
ing the July 2002 AMM Meeting held in Brunei, Malaysia proposed a non-binding declaration for the
Spratly Islands which moved much closer to the Chinese proposal, which was not approved. Finally, Ma
laysia’s efforts toward a declaration o f conduct for the South China Sea were realized in 2002 at the 8th
ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh. See Emmers, 140-142.
369 New Straits Times, 21 January 1995.
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States as the level of military and economic cooperation between Malaysia and the U.S.
is much too low to constitute any real balancing behavior against the PRC. Since 1984,
the Royal Malaysian Navy has conducted annual joint exercises with the U.S. Navy, and
since 1992 has been prepared to offer the U.S. Navy access to Malaysian facilities.370
Malaysia’s support of ASEAN’s 1992 call for continued U.S. strategic presence in the
region and its low-key military cooperation with the U.S. military during the 1990s illus
trate Kuala Lumpur’s view that American military power remains vital for regional sta
bility. However, this position should not be mistaken for Malaysian acceptance of
American perceptions of a rising China threat. Even in the post-9/11 era, with the atten
dant strengthening of U.S.-Malaysian relations in response to international terrorism,
Kuala Lumpur continues to reject Washington’s China threat thesis.

-3<71

Instead, Malaysia

appears to be seeking “a modus vivendi with China” which will maximize Malaysian
economic and political gains earned through cooperation with Beijing on important is
sues.372 Kuala Lumpur’s limited military cooperation with the United States must, there
fore, be seen more as a strategy aimed at extracting maximum benefits from Malaysia’s
relations with China and less as a balancing strategy against the PRC.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter clearly indicates
that the majority of the ASEAN states do not view China as a rising threat in Southeast
Asia despite China’s increasing economic and military power. Beijing’s GND is clearly

370 Emmers, 150-151.
371 Malaysia has cooperated with the U.S. in the war against al Qaeda in Southeast Asia, but only to the
extent that by doing so Kuala Lumpur can also utilize American help in its domestic battle against the fun
damentalist Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), which has ties with al Qaeda. Weatherbee, 34.
372 Odgaard, 14-15.
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succeeding in dispelling the China threat thesis in Southeast Asia. The primary data set
obtained from our content analysis of regional newspaper articles clearly indicates that
informed public opinion among most ASEAN states increasingly views China as being
less likely to initiate the use of force in the South China Sea to solidify Beijing’s territo
rial claims. For most regional journalists then, traditional Cold War views of China as an
enemy or threat (as measured by the case of the South China Sea disputes) have greatly
diminished as a new image of China as a cooperative “good neighbor” has steadily inten
sified in Southeast Asia. This positive trend is most pronounced in the Philippines and
Vietnam —the two “frontline” ASEAN states historically the most suspicious of Chinese
intentions concerning the disputed territories in the South China Sea. This is undoubtedly
due in part to the fact that both states held such hostile and threatening images of China
as an aggressive and violent actor regarding the disputes, and as such any improvement at
all in their perception of China would appear significant. However, the counter-argument
is that long-held views and opinions are most difficult to change. Any positive change in
China’s image in these most “difficult” tests of Beijing’s GND are, therefore, quite sig
nificant. Much more so than any change observed in states historically more neutral in
their security perceptions of China —Thailand, or perhaps Singapore, for example. Neu
tral images and perceptions are more easily influenced towards change than negative im
ages which have, over time, become institutionalized. In other words, it should be easier
for journalists in Thailand to believe that Beijing’s behavior and policy concerning the
disputes has actually changed in a constitutive rather than an instrumental fashion than it
should be for Filipino or Vietnamese journalists who would naturally be more cautious
and less trusting of Chinese motivations.
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Our analysis of the primary data set indicates that China’s image in the Philip
pines and Vietnam has indeed changed from that of a hostile, aggressive “enemy” toward
a less hostile, more cooperative image as a “partner” or “good neighbor.” This is indeed
remarkable, considering that the territorial disputes between China and the two ASEAN
states are yet still unresolved, and both Vietnam and the Philippines experienced in
stances of armed conflict or hostile interaction with Chinese military forces in the nottoo-distant past (Vietnam, of course, has the longest history of conflict with China). Nei
ther state has significantly increased spending to strengthen its armed forces since the
mid-1990s, nor has either pursued any significant balancing strategy against China. In
stead, both Manila and Hanoi have undertaken strategies of deepening relations with the
PRC. This fact also holds true for most ASEAN states in spite of American warnings of
a rising China threat. This trend is likely to continue during the near-to-mid future, bar
ing any unforeseen events such as an increase in cross-strait tensions between China and
Taiwan, or between Beijing and Washington. Any destabilizing moves undertaken by
Beijing would bring into question China’s “good neighbor” image held by most ASEAN
states.
An analysis of the data obtained from public opinion polls and surveys conducted
in Southeast Asia (and beyond the region as well) concerning China’s image as a rising
economic and military power also support this study’s assertion that views and percep
tions of China as a “threat” have decreased considerably since the mid-1990s. Perhaps
the most striking example is the contrast between 1995 and 2005 Filipino threat percep
tions of China. The 1995 Social Weather Stations Survey data indicated that China’s im
age in the Philippines during the Mischief Reef incident was one of threat. Understanda
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bly so. At the time, a weak and unprepared Manila found itself in an untenable position
as it faced the superior military power of the PRC alone, without an united ASEAN re
sponse or the possibility of direct American military assistance. However, according to
the results of the U.S. State Department’s 2005 public opinion survey, Asian Views o f
China, China’s national image in the Philippines is much less threatening than it was a
mere decade ago. In fact, Filipinos now are substantially more concerned about Ameri
can unilateral use of force as a threat to world peace in the next five years than the rise of
Chinese military power (Figure 17). This metric holds true for the other ASEAN states
analyzed in our study as well.
Data obtained through an analysis of recent security policies of our six ASEAN
states towards China also support the assertion that threat perceptions of China in South
east Asia continue to decrease. Certainly since 9/11, domestic terrorist and separatist
threats remain the principal national security threats for most ASEAN States. As such,
the security behavior and defense expenditures of most Southeast Asian countries since
then have been focused on strengthening counterinsurgency capabilities and strategies —
not on defending themselves against the possible emergence of an hegemonic China.
Clearly, Washington’s pessimistic view of a rising Chinese threat, founded largely upon
Realist analysis, is not shared by most ASEAN states. The data support this conclusion.
Defense spending of the ASEAN countries during the 1990s has, for the most part, re
mained either relatively constant or decreased in spite of several periods during the sec
ond half of the decade of heightened tensions over the Spratlys. This observation is most
salient for Vietnam and the Philippines, the two ASEAN states which traditionally held
the strongest threat perceptions of China due to their territorial disputes with China in the
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South China Sea. If Hanoi and Manila viewed the rise of Chinese economic and military
power as a threat, one would hardly expect a decrease in defense spending. The security
behavior of both states toward China also indicates that they no longer perceive China as
constituting a serious national security threat as neither country has followed an outright
strategic balancing strategy against China nor have they opted to bandwagon with China.
The very fact that Hanoi and Manila have not felt the necessity of choosing either option
indicates that they have a much more benign view of China’s rise than does the United
States. In other words, they do not feel compelled to balance with the United States
against China’s rise because neither Vietnam or the Philippines currently perceive China
as a serious security threat. Rather, China is increasingly viewed as an economic oppor
tunity and as a cooperative good neighbor by both Asian states. The security behavior of
the other ASEAN states also indicates that threat perceptions of China in the region have
decreased significantly while, at the same time, regional perceptions of the U.S. have be
come more reserved. The Bush administration’s unilateral use of force and apparent dis
regard for multilateralism has raised concerns in the region about an American threat to
world peace and thereby makes it easier for Beijing to promote China as a peaceful, co
operative good neighbor in Southeast Asia.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

Unfortunately, there is no single conceptual metamodel sufficient to describe the
evolving Asian system; one size does not fit all. Analysts and policymakers
therefore need to employ multiple analytical tools and policy instruments to
effectively understand and navigate the Asian region in the coming years. Realist
theory seems particularly incapable of explaining such a complex and dynamic
environment, and it thus tends to offer oversimplified (and sometimes dangerous)
policy prescriptions. Nor does liberal institutionalism fully suffice as an analytic
paradigm. There are phenomena in Asia today that neither realist nor liberal
international relations theory is able to capture, thus requiring deep grounding in
area studies to be comprehended.
—David Shambaugh, 2005 —

It is clear that the ASEAN states no longer believe it likely that China will con
tinue to use force and divisive diplomacy in support of its territorial claims in the South
China Sea, as was the case during and shortly following the end of the Cold War. Even
though a conclusive settlement of the South China Sea disputes has yet to be realized, and
Beijing continues to modernize China’s military and increase the power projection capa
bilities of its navy and air force in the South China Sea, the ASEAN states no longer be
lieve military conflict over the disputed territories with China likely. This is true for
ASEAN as a group, as well for the two “frontline” ASEAN states confronting China’s
territorial claims in the Paracels and Spratlys highlighted earlier, Vietnam and the Philip
pines. Considering the history of conflict and hostility between China and Vietnam gen
erated by conflicting territorial claims over the Paracel and Spratly islands (as well as the
enmity between Beijing and Hanoi regarding the Cambodian question), it is surprising
that Sino-Vietnamese relations have improved and deepened to the point that mutual dis
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putes over the land border and the contested maritime boundary in the Tonkin Gulf are
resolved, and that Hanoi agreed in 2005 to participate in joint development of hydrocar
bon resources in the disputed Spratly islands (the Tripartite Agreement between China,
the Philippines, and Vietnam). Surprising, that is, unless Vietnamese threat perceptions
of China have decreased and Hanoi no longer views it neighbor to the north as an “en
emy,” but rather as a cooperative “partner” and potential “friend.” Only then, does it
seem possible that Hanoi would take the risk of weakening Vietnam’s territorial claim in
the Spratlys by a de facto recognition and acceptance of Chinese territorial interests in the
archipelago implicit in Vietnam’s accession to the 2005 Tripartite Agreement.
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS HYPOTHESES
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter Four supports the main arguments
and hypotheses of this case study. Clearly, social learning (both “simple” and “com
plex”) between China and the ASEAN states has affected an evolution of Beijing’s GND
toward a more holistic approach to the disputes which places greater emphasis on coop
eration and common or mutual benefit than during the initial post-Cold War period.
The evidence presented also supports our second hypothesis that the positive change in
Beijing’s GND has affected a positive change in ASEAN threat perceptions of China as
well as the style and orientation of their China policies. In other words, the evidence
supports the argument for our two hypothesized causal relationships: one between social
learning and a reorientation in Beijing’s GND, the other between the reorientation of Bei
jing’s GND and a change in ASEAN perceptions of China and their China policies (Fig
ure 4).
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The empirical evidence also supports the hypothesis that Chinese actions viewed
as incongruent with Beijing’s promoted “good neighbor” image will cause ASEAN per
ceptions to become more suspicious of China. That is, besides leading toward identity
convergence (collective or shared identity), social learning can also at times lead to a di
vergence of identities and an increase in mutual suspicion. As Wendt argues, identity
formation is a constant, ongoing process which has no end point. Therefore it follows that
role-identities between actors are also constantly being socially constructed and recon
structed (usually reconstituted, as culture is “sticky” and resistant to change). As such,
China’s traditional “Cold War” identity was reinforced during the late 1990s by Beijing’s
assertive policy of granting offshore oil exploration contracts in contested areas of the
South China Sea to foreign energy companies. Although Beijing’s actions appear to have
been taken in response to Hanoi’s leasing of concession areas to foreign oil companies in
disputed waters, China’s actions served to reaffirm (reconstruct) the “enemy-enemy” or
“rival-rival” role-identities shared between China and the Philippines, and between China
and Vietnam.
Our content analysis clearly indicates that threat perceptions of China specific to
the territorial disputes decreased following Beijing’s ratification of the 2002 Declaration
of Conduct in the South China Sea and accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in 2003. In all six of our selected ASEAN states, “favorable” images of
China increased while “unfavorable” images decreased (Figures 6, 10-13). And since
images of China coded as “favorable” in our content analysis represent ASEAN percep
tions congruent with those associated with China’s “post-Cold War” identity (coopera
tive, non-threatening, seeking mutual benefit), and “unfavorable” images reflect percep
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tions attributed with China’s traditional “Cold War” identity (confrontational, threaten
ing, pursuing egoistic, zero-sum, self-help policy), there is a direct correlation between
“favorable” images and perceptions of China as a “good neighbor.” Therefore, the trend
of increasing “favorable” images and decreasing “unfavorable” images of China observed
in our study reflect and evidence a weakening of China’s traditional “Cold War” identity
and a corresponding strengthening of China’s new “post-Cold War” identity in Southeast
Asia.
The observed positive change in perceptions of China concerning the territorial
disputes is most pronounced in the Philippines and in Vietnam, the two “frontline” dispu
tant ASEAN states, and less so in Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. More importantly,
all six ASEAN states indicate a correlation between the reorientation in Beijing’s GND
(increasing acceptance of ASEAN norms) and the positive transformation of China’s re
gional image observed in our study. This correlation is clearly exemplified by the data
points for 2002 - 2006. For 2002, the year Beijing signed the ASEAN Declaration of
Conduct in the South China Sea; the frequency of “unfavorable” images of China in all
six states either decreased dramatically or remained low, while the frequency of “favor
able” images increased.
The regional public opinion polls and survey data concerning China’s image sup
port the findings of our case-specific content analysis. In Southeast Asia, traditional
threat perceptions of China (as an “enemy,” “territorial aggressor,” or “dangerous rival”)
have dramatically decreased as perceptions of China as a responsible, cooperative “part
ner” or “friend” (“good neighbor”) intensify. The Philippines provides the strongest sup
porting evidence of a positive change in China’s national image among the region’s pub-
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lies for two reasons. First, the 1995 Social Weather Stations Survey is the only public
opinion study conducted in Southeast Asia concerning China. As such, the Survey repre
sents the sole source of polling data for the mid-1990s available to our analysis. There
fore, public opinion data for the Philippines concerning China’s image allows for two
chronological points of comparison, 1995 and 2005, while corresponding opinion data for
the other ASEAN states is only available since 2005. Second, public opinion in the Phil
ippines is historically the most pro-American of all the ASEAN publics, and therefore
any measurable change in Filipino perceptions of China (and of the U.S., for that matter)
are more significant than those of other regional publics traditionally sympathetic and
biased in favor of China (Malaysia).
Global public opinion polls and surveys conducted during 2004 - 2006 also con
firm the results of both our case-specific content analysis and the regional surveys men
tioned above. Global public opinion generally views China in positive terms. The 2004
BBC World Service Poll of 22 Nations revealed that large majorities in key Asian coun
tries view China’s influence in the world as positive: India (66%), Indonesia (68%), the
Philippines (70%), and that a majority of Australians (56%) also perceive China in posi
tive terms. Interestingly, the 2004 Poll also concluded that individuals with lower levels
of education are less apt to view China positively (45%) than those with medium or
higher levels of education (51% and 52% respectively), and that young people worldwide
generally have more benign views of China than do older people.373 China is perceived
as a cooperative and responsible member of the international community, Chinese eco
nomic and military power are mostly viewed in more benign and less threatening terms
373 Among young people polled (between 18 and 29 years old), 58% had a positive view o f China, while
only 43% o f those over 60 years in age shared the same opinion o f China. BBC World Service 22 Nation
Poll (2004).
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than they are among the American public, where the “China threat” thesis remains rela
tively strong. Gallup polls conducted in 2004,2005, and 2006 concerning China reveal
that the American public views China in less positive and more cautious terms than do
most other publics. Apparently, China’s traditional “Cold War” image remains strong in
the U.S. where China’s “post-Cold War” image has yet to be accepted. Although SinoAmerican relations fall outside the purview of this study, I believe that the current roleidentity shared between China and the U.S. (“rival-rival”) reflects a different “logic of
anarchy” (Hobbesian-Lockean) than that underwriting Sino-ASEAN relations (LockeanKantian). Studies are needed in this area.
China Policies of the ASEAN States
From our analysis of the China policies of six ASEAN states there is little indica
tion in Southeast Asia today that China is perceived to be a military and economic threat
as was the case throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s. Instead, the China policies
of ASEAN and member states indicate that China is increasingly viewed as an economic
and security partner as the rapidly expanding economic and political relations between
China and ASEAN attest. As such, ASEAN’s enthusiastic support and concerted effort
toward a further deepening of Sino-ASEAN relations must not be seen as a “hedging”
strategy, but rather as a policy of “beneficial accommodation” to the rise of Chinese
power. The current China policy of ASEAN is formulated in terms of confidence and
trust in China as a cooperative and peaceful “good neighbor” with whom relations are
based upon mutual benefit, rather than in Realist terms of balance o f power and self-help.
The ASEAN states have “learned” through interaction with Beijing over time that both
parties view regional and global stability as the essential condition for continued eco-
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nomic development of their respective countries. Both sides have also learned that they
increasingly view national security in economic rather than military terms, and therefore
view regional instability as the greatest security threat. And both sides have learned from
one another that they view current U.S. foreign policy (“War on Terror”) as an increasing
threat to regional and global stability. As such, American foreign policy is indirectly re
sponsible, to some extent, for both the positive change of China’s national image in
Southeast Asia as well as the strengthening of ASEAN’s policy of “beneficial accommo
dation” with China. In short, the success of Beijing’s GND in Southeast Asia is due in
part to decreasing regional confidence and trust in the U.S. as the guarantor of regional
security and as the leading economic power in the Asia-Pacific.
While the influence of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia falls outside the
purview of our case study, it seems reasonable to assume that American foreign policy
failures in U.S.-ASEAN relations indirectly helped lead to the significant success of Bei
jing’s GND in the region. Since 1991, Washington’s inattention and neglect of U.S. rela
tions with the ASEAN states (until recently) seriously damaged the credibility of Ameri
can leadership in the region. In fact, as early as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, many
ASEAN states began to question Washington’s commitment to the continuance of Amer
ica’s leadership role in Southeast Asia. Washington’s insensitive and weak reaction to
the Crisis indicated to many that the U.S. was at best indifferent to the economic plight of
the ASEAN states, and at worst pursuing narrow self-interest to the detriment of the
ASEAN economies. Since the turn of the 21st Century, Washington’s continued reliance
on bilateral trade relations with the ASEAN states and avoidance of trade agreements
with ASEAN as a group contrasts starkly with the 2002 China-ASEAN commitment and
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ongoing negotiations to create the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) by 2010.
This situation only serves to strengthen ASEAN perceptions of China as a cooperative
“good neighbor” and the U.S. as a state cooperating only in terms of its own self interest.
Remarks made by Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi during his Sep
tember 2005 address of the Asia Society in New York serve to illustrate this point.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Although the ASEAN-U. S. dialogue relations is 28 years old this year, I feel this
partnership still suffers a considerable problem with expectations which do not
match. ASEAN expects the United States to be an important strategic economic
and development partner as much as it is an important diplomatic partner. The
United States, on the other hand, gives a higher priority to ASEAN as a strategic
partner for political and regional security purposes.. . . Clearly, both sides need to
work hard to erase the lingering perception that, in the dialogue process, the
agenda is conditioned more by the United States’ interests rather than those,
which bring true mutual benefits [emphasis mine] to both sides. To change the
situation, all efforts must be made to put more economic substance into the
relations between ASEAN as a group and the United States as a dialogue partner
[all emphases mine].374
Following 9/11, regional perceptions of U.S. foreign policy have become increas
ingly negative as the Bush Administration is viewed to be myopically focused on the
“War on Terror” and thus unaware (or unconcerned) of ASEAN interests and concerns.
President Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 worsened regional perceptions of American
foreign policy. Increasingly in Southeast Asia (and in much of the world) the U.S. is
seen as a force of instability, while China’s image as a source of regional and global sta
bility correspondingly strengthens. Recent regional and global public polling and survey

374 The Honorable Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, “Creating a Better Understanding of ASEAN - United States
Relations,” formal address of the Asia Society meeting, New York, 15 September 2005. http://www.asia
society. org/speeches/badawi05.html (accessed 3 February 2007).
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data strongly support these perceptions.375 From an ASEAN point of view, if the U.S. is
unwilling or unable to continue to provide cogent leadership in the Asia-Pacific and Bei
jing appears willing and ready to do so, then the Asian countries will increasingly look to
China to play a growing leadership role in Asia. Studies are needed to assess the validity
of this assumed causal relation between the decline of American influence and the rise of
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
The transformation of Vietnam’s China policy is most spectacular. Until 1991,
Hanoi viewed China as an enemy and therefore predicated Vietnamese foreign policy ap
propriately. This situation changed by 1991 as a consequence of the structural changes
mentioned earlier. With the resumption of formal diplomatic relations between Vietnam
and China in 1991, a reorientation of Vietnam’s China policy began - Hanoi’s “enmeshment” strategy. As Sino-Vietnamese political and economic relations improved, talks
between Hanoi and Beijing concerning the disputed land border and maritime boundary
in the Tonkin Gulf eventually led to a resolution of both disputes. In addition, normal
mail and transportation links between the two socialist countries were resumed, as well as
cross-border trade and human transit. The only remaining thorn of contention in improv
ing Sino-Vietnamese relations was the South China Sea disputes. Hanoi’s early attempt
to build a united ASEAN position vis-a-vis China and the South Sea disputes resulted in
failure. However, as the role-identity between China and Vietnam transformed over time
from “enemy-enemy” to “competitor-competitor” or (“partner-partner”) as a result of in375 The recent GlobeScan/PIPA public opinion survey o f the global view o f the United State’s role in world
affairs conducted for the BBC World Service (November 2002 - January 2007) indicates that over twothirds (68%) polled believe that the American military presence in the Middle East causes more conflict
than in prevents and only 17% of those polled view U.S. troops there as a stabilizing force. From the 25
countries polled, 18 view the U.S. as having a mainly negative influence, five view the U.S. as having a
mostly positive influence, while 2 views are evenly divided. Significant to our study, the Philippines is tied
with Nigeria for the highest positive view o f the U.S. global role (72% each), while Indonesia has the sec
ond highest negative view (Germany the highest at 74%) o f the united States’ role in world affairs.
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teraction and social learning, a virtual resolution of the outstanding territorial dispute be
tween China and Vietnam in the Spratlys became possible in 2005.
The recent rapprochement in China-Philippines relations concerning the disputed
territories in the South China Sea is also surprising given the history of tension and con
flict in the dispute. Of all ASEAN states, the Philippines was the loudest critic and most
outspoken opponent of China vis-a-vis the territorial disputes —even to the extent that
Manila was willing to forsake one of ASEAN’s fundamental norms (lessening and resist
ing the influence of external powers in the region) during the 1995 Mischief Reef Crisis
by calling for the internationalization of the dispute with China. However, Manila’s
critical and confrontational policy vis-a-vis China and the South China Sea disputes had
by 2003 transformed into a more optimistic policy favoring increased economic and po
litical cooperation. As we have seen, by 2005 threat perceptions of China in the Philip
pines had decreased to the point that a “virtual” bilateral solution of the Spratlys dispute
became possible. In effect, Manila “learned” that China no longer represented a serious
threat to the territorial integrity of the Philippines. Manila learned to see China as a re
sponsible and cooperative “good neighbor,” as well as an economic opportunity for the
Philippines.
SOCIAL LEARNING AND A REORIENTATION IN BEIJING’S GND
It is clear that traditional threat perceptions of China in Southeast Asia associated
with the South China Sea disputes have decreased appreciably from those held by the
ASEAN states during the Cold War and the subsequent decade. To be sure, structural
change such as the demise of the bipolar international system and the resolution of the
Cambodian crisis in 1991 contributed to the transformation of China’s national image in
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the region from one of threat (“enemy” ) to one of cooperation (“partner” or “friend”).
This transformation probably could not have occurred without a corresponding restructur
ing of the international system. Structural change, however, only partially explains the
remarkable transformation of ASEAN threat perceptions of China and the associated
rapid improvement in Sino-ASEAN relations in general. Structural change associated
with the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the 1991 resolu
tion of the Third Indochina War, lessened foreign policy constraints which historically
limited the extent of China-ASEAN interaction. With these constraints lifted, increased
interaction between China and the ASEAN states was possible. As mentioned in earlier
chapters, Beijing wished to cultivate relations with ASEAN as a means of ending China’s
post-Tiananmen isolation in the international community, and the ASEAN states were
anxious to “socialize” China as a means of “shaping” the behavior (and mollifying poten
tial risks) of this rising economic and military power. Structural change, therefore, facili
tated the implementation of engagement policies desired by both China and the ASEAN
states. Social learning, resulting from diplomatic interaction between China and ASEAN,
is the principle factor responsible for the remarkable improvement and deepening of
Sino-ASEAN relations witnessed the last decade. Interaction between China and
ASEAN concerning the South China Sea disputes - the pivotal issue on which the future
of Sino-ASEAN relations depended - proved crucial in affecting this positive outcome.
As the disputes arguably represented the most difficult issue in China-ASEAN relations
and the most visible manifestation in the region of a possible “China threat,” the recent
deepening of Sino-ASEAN relations would not have been possible without a satisfactory
resolution of the territorial disputes. Therefore, ideational change must also be taken into
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account in reaching a more complete, satisfying understanding and appreciation of Bei
jing’s evolving GND and its effects on Sino-ASEAN relations.
Success of Beijing’s GND directly related to the transformation of China’s iden
tity and interests via complex social learning gained through diplomatic interaction with
ASEAN. During the first period (1989 - 1996), China’s traditional “Cold War” identity
continued as Beijing’s actions concerning the South China Sea disputes reinforced per
ceptions in Southeast Asia of a China threat. In 1992, Beijing’s promulgation of China’s
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, as well as the deal signed the same
year with Crestone Energy Corporation for oil exploration in waters contested by China
and Vietnam, both served to reinforce China’s traditional image in the region. Actions
taken by Beijing in the Spratlys leading to the 1995 Mischief Reef crisis with the Philip
pines further intensified perceptions of China as a rising threat. However, beginning in
1995 - 1996, a reorientation of Beijing’s traditional bilateral approach (Track I diplo
macy) to the territorial disputes to include multilateral diplomacy could be discerned.
As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, the reorientation of Beijing’s GND toward accep
tance of multilateral dialogue with ASEAN concerning the disputes resulted as a conse
quence of social learning affecting change of China’s cogitative base and national iden
tity (“Cold War” identity -> “post-Cold War” identity). This “learning” occurred as a
result of bilateral as well as multilateral interaction between China and the ASEAN
states. As we have seen, by the mid-1990s Beijing learned through bilateral dialogue
with Vietnam and the Philippines that China would have to address the territorial disputes
within ASEAN’s multilateral framework as both Hanoi and Manila sought the advantage
of confronting China as a group, and were therefore unwilling to seriously address the
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disputes at the bilateral level. Concurrently, through participation in multilateral dialogue
at the annual Indonesian-sponsored Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the
South China Sea, Beijing learned that China could safely address the disputes within
ASEAN’s Track I multilateral framework without compromising China’s claim of territo
rial sovereignty. ASEAN’s consensus-based approach to multilateralism —one of the
principle norms which comprise the ASEAN Way —would allow Beijing substantial con
trol over both the pace and the agenda of the talks, while at the same time promote a co
operative, “good neighbor” image of China by finally acceding to multilateral Track I
discussion of the disputes. Within the Track II framework of the workshops, the Chinese
successfully avoided discussion of territorial sovereignty issues (maintaining that this was
a Track I issue) while promoting an image of China as a cooperative and responsible
country through increased participation in joint development activities to evaluate the
natural resources of the South China Sea, ensure maritime safety, and conduct scientific
research. The Chinese also learned at the Workshops that Beijing’s suggestion for joint
development of the disputed territories was not well-received because the ASEAN states
did not yet believe in the veracity of China’s new “good neighbor” image.
Other, less tangible learning also occurred at the Workshops as a result of interac
tion as the unofficial and informal environment of the multilateral Workshops allowed for
more interpersonal interaction and discussion among the participants, many of whom
were high-ranking members of their respective governments in their official capacities.
Attending the Workshops in their personal capacities allowed for more frank and open
dialogue among individuals than was possible in their official capacities. As such, the
unofficial nature of the Workshops provided an environment more conducive to social
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learning than that of Track I multilateral processes such as the ARF and APEC. In effect,
the annual Workshops facilitated the development of an informal, unofficial “epistemic
community” constituted by individuals acting in private capacities who are important and
influential people in their respective official capacities. Social learning which occurred
as a result of interaction at the Track II Workshops undoubtedly influenced the reorienta
tion of Beijing’s GND, which subsequently led to tangible results in Chinese Track I bi
lateral and multilateral diplomacy. The importance and utility of multilateral Track II
dialogue in facilitating cooperation between China and the ASEAN states may be higher
than commonly perceived by most Western scholars and policymakers. This point was
highlighted during a recent conversation with Patrick Lewis, former Antiguan Ambassa
dor to the United Nations and the United States. Asked whether he shared the conven
tional Western opinion that the Indonesian-sponsored Workshops were only “talk-shops”
producing no tangible results and were therefore of little or no utility in dispute resolu
tion, Lewis gave an interesting answer:
Let me answer your question this way. In the United States and Europe there are
many psychiatrists and psychologists. In the developing world by comparison,
there are relatively few. This is because Westerners only feel comfortable dis
cussing their problems in private with a “specialist,” while in many parts of the
developing world an individual’s problems are addressed informally by appropri
ate family members and/or individuals in the community. Solutions to an indi
vidual’s problems are arrived at through an unofficial, group-oriented process
rather than the official, personal process favored in the developed countries.376

Diplomatic interaction between China and the ASEAN states concerning the 1995
Mischief Reef Crisis with the Philippines also led to important social learning for Beijing.

376 Personal discussion with Dr. Patrick Lewis at Hampton University, Hampton Virginia, November 2006.
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At the inaugural ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou, and the Brunei ARF-SOM and sub
sequent ARF Meeting in Jakarta, the Chinese learned that Manila’s attempt at interna
tionalizing the dispute with China over the Spratlys was not warmly received by other
ASEAN member states which desired to deal with the crisis “in house.” In short, Beijing
learned that China and ASEAN held in common the norm of regional autonomy and non
interference —Asian problems should be addressed by Asians. This knowledge impacted
China’s cognitive base by challenging the traditional view of multilateralism as a “Trojan
Horse” of American imperialism. Beijing learned that China could discuss the South
China Sea disputes within ASEAN’s multilateral processes and thereby promote a coop
erative, “good neighbor” image of China in the region without U.S. interference.
ASEAN’s style of multilateralism was compatible, therefore, with Chinese interests.
This knowledge led to an important reorientation of Beijing’s GND concerning the South
China Sea disputes from a traditional bilateral approach to a new approach combining
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.
Beijing’s reoriented Track I approach to the territorial disputes became apparent
at the 1996 ARF Meeting. In response to Ali Alatas’ call for a regional code of conduct,
Qian Qichen responded indirectly by stating that China was now ready to discuss the
South China Sea situation with ASEAN as a group, making good Tang’s 1995 promise
made during the China-ASEAN Hangzhou meeting. However, while committing to mul
tilateral discussion of the disputes, Beijing also underlined China’s position favoring a
bilateral resolution of the disputes by concluding a bilateral code of conduct with Manila
in 1995. Hence, the first overt indications in our case study of a reorientation of Beijing’s
GND (reflecting the birth of China’s “post-Cold War” identity) manifest themselves
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solely in Beijing’s new Track I multilateral approach, while Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy
continued to reinforce China’s traditional “Cold War” identity in Southeast Asia. Addi
tionally, while Beijing’s commitment to discuss the disputes multilaterally with ASEAN
did have the intended effects of lessening threat perceptions of China and promoting
China’s “good neighbor” image in the region, it also elevated the South China Sea issue
to main agenda status in ASEAN Track I dialogue during the second period of our case
study (1997 -2006). This reality led to increased interaction between China and ASEAN
(now Track I and Track II venues) concerning the arguably most contentious and difficult
issue in developing Sino-ASEAN relations.
Over time, “simple” learning led to “complex” learning which in turn caused a
change in China’s cognitive base and a corresponding reorientation of Beijing’s GND.
Beijing learned that the “ASEAN Way” of informal, consensus-based multilateral dia
logue could be instrumentally utilized by China to decrease tensions with Manila, Hanoi,
and ASEAN concerning the South China Sea disputes. By agreeing to discuss the dis
putes with ASEAN as a group (1995, China-ASEAN SOM; 1996, ARF SOM and third
ARF Meeting, second China-ASEAN SOM), Beijing could promote a cooperative “good
neighbor” image and lessen perceptions of a China threat, while at the same time prevent
progress toward any substantive multilateral resolution of the disputes (i.e. Beijing refus
ing to discuss issues of sovereignty). Beijing learned at the Track II Indonesiansponsored Workshops that ASEAN’s informal, consensus-based approach to dispute
resolution (a constitutive norm) would allowed China to participate in multilateral Track I
dialogue with ASEAN concerning the disputes without weakening China’s claims of ter
ritorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.
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During the second period of this study (1997 - 2006), multilateral interaction be
tween China and the ASEAN states increasingly led to “complex” learning directly re
sponsible for changing China’s cognitive base (and continuing reorientation of Beijing’s
GND) to the extent that China’s “schizophrenic” identity —“Cold War” identity in bilat
eral relations, and emerging “post-Cold War” identity in multilateral relations —was fi
nally resolved in favor of the later. The “complex” learning during this period mostly
occurred via multilateral interaction. Most significantly, “complex” learning occurred in
“Asians-only” venues such as the ASEAN-China Summits (ASEAN Plus One), ASEAN
Plus Three, and ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences, as opposed to the ARF, where
membership includes non-Asian states such as the United States and Russia. As dis
cussed in Chapter 3, within the ASEAN-China Summit framework several important
agreements pertaining to the territorial disputes were concluded: the 1997 joint statement,
“ASEAN-China Co-operation Towards the 21st Century” outlining the basic principles
for expanding China-ASEAN economic, political, and security relations and also reaf
firming earlier agreements rejecting the use of force to settle territorial disputes; the 2002
ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; the establishment
of the joint China-ASEAN “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” and China’s
accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003. These
agreements made China the first non-ASEAN state to become a “Strategic Partner” with
ASEAN and also the first non-ASEAN state to accede to the TAC. By 2003, China es
sentially became a “virtual” ASEAN member as Beijing had adopted most of the norms
associated with the ASEAN Way (both regulative and constitutive norms): multilateral
ism; non-interference; rejection of the use of force to settle territorial disputes; and a con
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sensus-based, incremental approach to dispute resolution and regional integration. As a
result, regional threat perceptions of China greatly decreased as China’s “good neighbor”
image supplanted the China as a “threat” image. In short, China’s “post-Cold War” iden
tity first revealed itself in Beijing’s multilateral interaction with ASEAN. China’s new
“post-Cold War” identity only fully manifest itself in Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy with
the Philippines and Vietnam in 2005 as represented by China’s bilateral-tumedmultilateral Tripartite Agreement with Manila and Hanoi. Manila and Hanoi finally ac
cepted China’s long-standing offer for joint development of disputed territories (Spratlys)
because they no longer perceived China as an “enemy” or “threat” as they had during the
1990s. Instead, China became increasingly perceived as being a cooperative “partner”
and “good neighbor.”
China as a “Virtual” ASEAN Member
Social learning and shared knowledge of “Self’ and “Other” generated by ChinaASEAN interaction is responsible, to a large extent, for a convergence of interests and
identity in the relationship. Over time, as social learning affected a change in China’s
cognitive base and thus a reorientation of Beijing’s GND, China increasingly embraced
much of ASEAN’s normative framework - the ASEAN Way - revealing a convergence
of Chinese interests and identity with those of the ASEAN states. Beijing learned that
ASEAN’s informal, consensus-based multilateralism is conducive to Chinese interests in
the region as it allows China to “cooperate” with ASEAN and member states at her own
pace and in issue areas mostly of her choosing, thereby promoting a “good neighbor” im
age and lessening China threat perceptions. Beijing also learned that the ASEAN norm
of non-intervention (“hard” state sovereignty) coincided with China’s disapproval of the
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U.S. human rights campaign targeting the PRC (Clinton Administration) and Washing
ton’s more recent doctrine of preemption and regime change (second Bush Administra
tion). In addition, China learned that ASEAN’s normative position against the use of
force in settling disputes reflects a shared interest of maintaining regional peace and sta
bility conducive to economic development - Deng Xiaoping’s “peace and development”
strategy. This shared normative position also indicates a convergence of interest between
China and the ASEAN states in opposition to current U.S. foreign policy which is in
creasingly viewed in the region as the major source of international conflict and global
instability. Lastly, Beijing learned that ASEAN’s incremental approach to dispute reso
lution allows China to “engage” ASEAN and member states concerning issues of conten
tion in a cooperative but controlled fashion. Cui Tiankai, who heads the Asian affairs
department in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acknowledged that Beijing’s embrace
of multilateralism resulted from knowledge gained through interaction with the ASEAN
states: “It was a gradual learning process for us, as we needed to become more familiar
with how these organizations worked and to learn how to play the game.”377 In other
words, Beijing learned that China and the ASEAN states could “agree to disagree” on
difficult issues while at the same time advance cooperation in other, less contentious is
sue areas. This normative feature of the ASEAN Way, as we have seen, has been crucial
in Beijing’s application of the GND to the territorial disputes. As such, Beijing’s increas
ing adoption of ASEAN’s normative framework indicates a convergence of actor identi
ties toward a collective “Asian” identity.

377 Quoted in Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 70.
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WIDER POLICY AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY
GND in Southeast Asia
Interaction between China and the ASEAN states in issue areas outside those of
our case study during this period (especially trade and economic issues) also produced
social learning which influenced perceptions of “self’ and “other.” This is where
Moore’s “economic-security nexus” comes into play. Beijing’s “New Security Concept”
(NSC) campaign directly linked security and economic issue areas together by essentially
redefining security more in economic terms than in military. This is significant, consid
ering that national security for ASEAN states has been and continues to be defined
mostly in domestic terms due to social unrest caused by widespread economic and politi
cal inequality. In addition, the numerous independence-separatist movements throughout
the region also cause national security to be defined in domestic terms. China faces Is
lamic separatist movements in the western province of Xinjiang, Thailand along its
southern border with Malaysia (the banned Patani United Liberation Organization, the
Mujahideen Islam Pattani, and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional), the Philippines in Min
danao (Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Liberation Front), and Singapore (Jemaah Islamiah).
Indonesia also faces various independence-separatist movements (Jema ’ah Islamiyah and
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). As such, along with the authoritarian measures of maintaining
political power used by many regimes in the region, economic development is seen as
crucial in maintaining domestic order by mitigating sources of conflict caused by eco
nomic disparity. Therefore, for China as well as the ASEAN states, national security is
increasingly defined in domestic and economic terms, rather than in terms of external
military threat. China’s New Security Concept (NSC) mentioned in Chapter 3 highlights
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the increasing importance of “economic security” in the Twenty-First Century, and Bei
jing’s GND in Southeast Asia reflects this view well, as economic relations between
China and ASEAN remain the central focus of Chinese foreign policy.
Beginning with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Beijing began actively promoting
the rise of Chinese economic power as an opportunity (not a threat) for the ASEAN states
to further their own economic recovery and development. Indeed, much China-ASEAN
interaction has occurred in the area of trade and economic relations, and the resulting so
cial learning is leading to increased regional economic integration as China is viewed in
creasingly by ASEAN as an economic “partner” instead of an economic “rival” or
“threat.” The 2005 agreement to establish the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA)
illustrates positive regional perceptions of China in the economic realm. Beijing’s “Early
Harvest” program exemplifies China’s commitment to mutual economic benefit in ChinaASEAN relations. This program grants the less-developed ASEAN countries (Laos,
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar) advantageous bilateral trade privileges with China to
help ease their entrance into the CAFTA. China also provides considerable foreign aid to
the poorer ASEAN countries in the form of economic and technical assistance. Signifi
cantly, Chinese foreign aid loans increasingly come with little-to-no strings attached, as
opposed to foreign aid from the West (World Bank and IMF loans) which comes with
many unpalatable conditions and stipulations. For example, recipient country must hire
many western “advisors” and follow their recommendations as to how the funds are util
ized. Often this “advice” is not in the best interest of developing economies and the
terms and conditions attached to foreign development aid are seen as Western interfer
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ence in the domestic affairs of recipient states. As such, Chinese foreign aid is more pal
atable and provides an alternative to that from the West.
In short, Beijing’s trade and economic-development assistance policies in South
east Asia have only served to reinforce and iterate China’s “good neighbor” image in the
region. The success of Beijing‘s GND in facilitating strengthened China-ASEAN eco
nomic and trade relations and promoting an image of China as an economic “partner” had
a positive “spill-over” effect on the South China Sea disputes. During the second half of
the 1990s, as tensions over the disputed Spratlys were increasing yet again, considerable
progress in China-ASEAN trade and economic relations reinforced China’s “good
neighbor” image among the ASEAN states and served to refute views of China’s eco
nomic rise as an economic threat to the regional economies. Thus the resultant strength
ening of China’s image as a “good neighbor” or “partner” in economic-trade issues
helped to mollify China threat perceptions among the ASEAN states in security issues especially concerning the territorial disputes. It seems unlikely that Manila and Hanoi
would have signed the 2005 Tripartite Agreement for joint oil exploration and develop
ment with China in the contested Spratlys if they still viewed China to be a territorial
threat and economic rival. Instead, the Tripartite Agreement reveals an increased level of
confidence in the Philippines and Vietnam that China can be trusted to live up to her
“good neighbor” image in both economic and security issues.
GND in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond
Several key elements or aspects of Beijing’s current GND in Southeast Asia can
be discerned in the wider application of Chinese foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific and
beyond. Beijing’s initial embrace of regional multilateralism in Southeast Asia has ex
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panded to Northeast Asia as exemplified by the Chinese-sponsored Six-Party Talks, to
Central Asia in the form of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established by
China in June 2001. The SCO is the first regional multilateral cooperative organization
established in the twenty-first century and represents the first multilateral security organi
zation in which China has played a leading role from its inception. This is a remarkable
event in Chinese foreign policy considering that Beijing historically has preferred bilat
eral rather than multilateral diplomacy. While China’s Southeast Asian multilateral di
plomacy has argued against the establishment of a formal and institutionalized security
regime in the Asia-Pacific (multilateral security dialogue and consultation are considered
sufficient to address states’ security concerns), Beijing surprised the world by doing so
with former enemies in Northeast and Central Asia. China’s experience of multilateral
ism in Southeast Asia must have played a major role in Beijing’s 2000 decision to expand
the scope and institutionalization of the bilateral, informal “Shanghai Five” mechanism
into the multilateral, formal SCO. Most interesting is the fact that Beijing advocates
much the same norms for governing relations among SCO members as those advocated
by ASEAN: mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, joint consultation, respect for cultural
diversity, and the desire for common development. Further, Beijing intends the SCO to
constitute a model of cooperation in which large and small powers can collaborate on a
basis of equality. One mechanism advocated by Beijing for promoting equitable relations
among SCO member states is consensus building in decision making - a key ASEAN
norm! Beijing “learned” from interaction with ASEAN that multilateralism is viable and
applicable to China’s periphery foreign policy strategy.
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China’s embrace of regional multilateralism in Northeast Asia has also been in the
area of conflict resolution on the Korean peninsula. Although initially reluctant to get
involved in the Korean nuclear crisis, and disapproving of the U.S. call for multilateral
talks, Beijing began to shift its position in favor of a multilateral approach in early 2003.
In a March 2003 telephone call between President Jiang Zemin and President George
Bush, Jiang advised that the form of dialogue was not of paramount importance. What
really mattered was “whether both sides have sincerity, whether the dialogue has substan
tial content and result.”378 By the second round of the Six-Party Talks held in early 2004,
Beijing strongly advocated the institutionalization of the talks through establishing a
permanent working group and by stationing specialists from all parties in Beijing.

'I 'l Q

Ob

viously, through interaction with the ASEAN states, Beijing came to realize the merits of
both informal and formal multilateral dialogue as a means of dealing with difficult issues,
and also recognize the utility of such an approach to difficult problems in other geo
graphic regions.
Another aspect of Beijing’s GND in Southeast Asia discemable in China’s wider
foreign policy is the strategy of mutual benefit and “win-win” scenarios in inter-state re
lations, so crucially important for China’s “good neighbor” image in Southeast Asia.
China’s trade, diplomatic, and security relations around the world are now predicated on
mutual benefit. This is well-illustrated by Beijing’s considerable effort (and success) in
concluding trade and investment agreements with states worldwide. China has been of
fering debt relief, low-interest loans, and other incentives to many of the world’s poorest
countries, in exchange for access to their natural resources so necessary for China’s

378 “Jiang, Bush Talk over Phone on DPRK, Iraq Issues,” Xinhua News Agency, 10 March 2003.
379 “Six-Party Talks Should Become Mechanism: FM Spokeswoman,” People’s Daily, 24 February 2004.
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booming economy. Hu Jintao’s current eight-nation African tour exemplifies China’s
“win-win” strategy. In his 7 February Pretoria speech, Hu made it clear that “China has
never imposed its will or unequal practices on other countries and will never do so in the
future,” and that China would “certainly not do anything harmful to the interests of Af
rica and its people.” He continued by stressing that China lives in “cooperation and har
mony among nations and we hold that the strong and the rich should not bully the weak
and the poor.” While visiting Sudan, Hu offered the government a “no strings attached”
aid policy which has angered many Western nations who want China to use its economic
leverage to induce Khartoum to end human rights abuses in the Darfur region. Hu did,
however, make it clear that China hoped that the Sudanese government would soon im
plement the peace agreement it had agreed to with the African Union and the United Na
tions.380 China’s current global strategy of pursuing mutual benefit in economic and dip
lomatic relations reflects the effect of social learning and shared knowledge on Chinese
foreign policy gained from Beijing’s earlier diplomatic and economic interaction with the
ASEAN states. In short, much of China’s current foreign policy is the result of lessons
learned earlier by Beijing in its regional GND in Southeast Asia.
Theoretical Implications
The findings of this study support the utility and validity of a constructivist ap
proach in analyzing recent Chinese foreign policy and the meteoric improvement in SinoASEAN relations since the early 1990s. Neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches fall short
in explaining the phenomenal change in Sino-ASEAN relations which began during the
mid-1990s, because of their relatively narrow parameter for explaining change in intema-

38° “Qjjjjg’g Leader Says Investment Will Not Hurt Africa,” New York Times, 7 February 2007.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

249

tional relations. Neo-realism is the most skeptical of the possibility for peaceful change
because change is viewed as a consequence of shifts in the balance or distribution of
power. International institutions are viewed as having only marginal influence on the be
havior of states as they reflect great power self-interest. Neo-liberalism is somewhat less
skeptical of the possibility for peaceful change as international institutions are given a
more influential role in regulating state behavior. In this theoretical paradigm, institu
tions facilitate cooperation among states by providing information and reducing transac
tion costs, and by reducing the likelihood of actor defection or cheating. However, neo
liberalism accepts the basic neo-realist premise that institutions reflect and are affected by
the distribution of power in the international system, and that they are created by selfinterested states. As such, institutions only constrain state behavior and do not change
state interest or identity. Both neo-realism and neo-liberalism take state interest and iden
tity as a given as they are viewed to be exogenous to the process of state interaction.
Hence, mainstream IR theory holds that state interaction does not fundamentally alter the
condition of anarchy.
This narrow focus on the distribution of material power and reliance on a narrow
“self-help” definition of anarchy handicaps both neo-realism and neo-liberalism in their
ability to offer any insightful explanation for the precipitous rise of Chinese influence in
Southeast Asia. The neo-realist approach can not adequately explain why the relatively
small and weak ASEAN states have neither balanced against or bandwagoned with
China, as neo-realism predicts. The best neo-realist explanation for ASEAN’s apparently
aberrant China policy is that ASEAN is pursuing a “hedging” strategy of engaging China
while at the same time balancing against China through military ties with the U.S. Neo
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liberal approaches also fall short in explaining the intensity and rapidity of Sino-ASEAN
rapprochement this past decade or so because of ASEAN’s “weak” form of institutional
ism. Given that neo-liberalism only grants institutions limited power in regulating the
behavior of states, ASEAN’s relatively “low” level of institutionalization would logically
be less able to constrain actor behavior than that of the European Union which represents
“strong” or “high” level institutionalization. The constructivist approach, on the other
hand, views power politics as being socially constructed and also sees cooperation among
states as a social process that can sometimes reorient or transform state interest and iden
tity. As such, the recent habit of conflict avoidance between China, Vietnam, and the
Philippines illustrated in our case study can be better explained as a result of interaction,
socialization, norm formation and identity building, rather than the result of forces ex
ogenous to these social processes (such as the distribution of power in the international
system). This is especially important in our case because the rise of Chinese economic
and military power has apparently not constrained or limited cooperation between China
and the ASEAN states, or had a detrimental effect on Sino-ASEAN relations. By focus
ing on the constitutive effects of norms and social learning (shared knowledge), a con
structivist approach allows interaction and socialization a greater role in regulating state
behavior than do neo-realism and neo-liberalism, as state interest and identity are viewed
as being endogenous to social interaction. This approach allows an analysis of Beijing’s
GND in Southeast Asia that moves beyond the impact of material forces alone. By grant
ing intersubjective factors such as ideas, culture, and identity a determining rather than a
secondary role in our analysis of Sino-ASEAN interaction, a more insightful understand
ing and explanation of China’s rising influence in Southeast Asia is possible. Shambaugh
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concurs: “one reason for the increase in the number of institutions in Asia has been the
growing acceptance of common norms within the region. Such ideational agreement must
precede the formation of institutional architecture; but once norms are institutionalized,
they can become binding on member states.”

'J O f

Our study also supports Wendt’s assertion that anarchy is “what states make of it”
by illustrating the social processes involved in the reorientation of Beijing’s GND and the
positive transformation of China’s identity in Southeast Asia, and their cumulative effect
on Sino-ASEAN relations. Our case study illustrates a change in the “culture of anar
chy” between China and the ASEAN states, lfom that of a “Hobbesian” or “Lockean”
culture (actor role-identity of “enemy” or “rival”) toward a “Kantian” culture (actor roleidentity of “partner” or “friend”). Clearly Vietnam and the Philippines no longer per
ceive China as an enemy or immanent threat as they did during the Cold War and into the
1990s. As such, the rise of Chinese economic and military power (material factors) has
become less of a concern for Hanoi and Manila (and ASEAN as a group) because they no
longer perceive China as a threat, but rather as a responsible and cooperative “good
neighbor,” an economic opportunity, and increasingly as a revitalizing force in ASEAN’s
commitment to establish the ASEAN Community by 2020 (ideational factors). As such,
the ASEAN states view the rise of China’s economic power both as an incredible oppor
tunity to accelerate their respective national development and economic growth, and as
an opportunity to push forward ASEAN economic integration, while they increasingly
view the rise of Chinese military power in less threatening and more benign terms.
“Hobbesian” (Realist) culture of anarchy is becoming largely irrelevant in China’s rela-

381 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 96. Also see Alagappa, Asian Security Order: Instrumental and
Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), chapter 6 by Amitav Acharya.
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tions with ASEAN and member states as the likelihood of military conflict or the out
break of trade wars between China and the ASEAN states in the foreseeable future is
minimal.
China’s recent successful test of an anti-satellite weapon system (ASAT) illus
trates this point. In contrast to Washington’s loud protest against China’s missile test and
dire warnings of China initiating an “arms race in space,” there was relative quiet in
Southeast Asia. Among the ASEAN states, Beijing’s demonstrated ASAT capability
does not represent an increased China threat because the culture of anarchy has changed China is no longer viewed as an aggressive and hostile power (as remains the case in
Washington). Increasing Chinese military power is no longer the concern that it once
was, because the ASEAN states now view China to be a cooperative and vital partner ac
tively (and genuinely) pursuing a foreign policy predicated on peaceful relations and re
gional stability, multilateral dialogue (ASEAN-style), and mutual benefit in economic
and security relations. Instead, the ASEAN states believe it very likely that economic
and political cooperation between China and ASEAN will continue to expand, and the
process of regional integration will move forward as Sino-ASEAN relations increasingly
become underwritten by a “Kantian” culture of anarchy. This is not to say that SinoASEAN relations are currently based on a “Kantian” culture of anarchy, but rather that
they are increasingly moving toward such a reality. Wendt’s categorical representation
of differing cultures of anarchy (“Hobbesian,” “Lockean,” and “Kantian”) however, must
not be viewed in mutually exclusive terms (i.e., Sino-ASEAN relations based solely upon
either a “Lockean” or a “Kantian” culture of anarchy). Rather, these categories should be
understood as reference marks on a gradient scale moving from conflictual relations
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(“enemy-enemy” role-identity) at one end to cooperative relations (“partner-partner” or
“ffiend-friend” role-identities) at the other end of the scale. In addition, the “culture of
anarchy” underwriting state relations can vary in intensity and scope in different issue
areas at the same time. For instance, China’s “good neighbor” image among the ASEAN
states progressed faster in trade and economic relations than it has in security relations.
Usually, an economic relation between states sharing a troubled past progress faster than
security relations, but this is not always the case. As mentioned above, the SCO first ad
dressed security issues before widening the dialogue to include economic relations.
This study’s findings also support China’s “peaceful rise” thesis by challenging
realist (especially the “offensive” realism of John Mearsheimer) assumptions that rising
powers seek to establish hegemony and thus must challenge the established power. His
torical analogies of rising powers are insufficient and do not fit contemporary China. In
fact, these realist assumptions do not fit with China’s past either. This is not the first time
in history that China has risen, but rather the fourth such occurrence. In each instance,
external pressures, combined with internal economic, social and demographic pressures
led to dynastic decline.

-5 0 9

Indeed, there is not a significant history of coercive Chinese

statecraft. As Shambaugh points out, China’s tributary system, which constituted the
Asian regional system for more than two and a half millennia, “was characterized by a
combination of patron-client ties; economic interdependence; security protection for
those closest to China (especially Korea); cultural assimilation into Confucian customs
(lai Hua); political ritual (koutou); and benevolent governance (wangdao). The tribute
system may have been hegemonic, but is was not based on coercion or territorial expan382

China was a rising power three times before this current ascendancy (Qin, Sui, and Ming dynasties).
See Wang Gungwu, “The Forth Rise o f China: Cultural Implications,” China: An International Journal 2
no. 9 (September 2004): 311-322.
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sionism. These are essential points to bear in mind when considering China’s new as•

•

cendance in Asian affairs.”

'l O 'I

Our case study of China’s territorial disputes in the South

China Sea further evidences the possibility that China’s fourth rise to great power status
will also prove to be peaceful.

383 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 95.
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